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Recent advances in processing and storing information has led to an explo-
sion of data collection. Many organizations like the Census, hospitals and even
search engine companies collect, analyze and distribute personal information in
return for useful services. However, the collected data track entire public and
private lives of individuals, thus resulting in an immense privacy risk of unau-
thorized disclosure. This dissertation presents novel conceptual and practical
tools to ensure privacy of individuals while enabling the dissemination of valu-
able data about humans to improve their lives. Our contributions include novel
formal definitions of the privacy risk arising from unauthorized disclosure, and
practical algorithms for enforcing these definitions of privacy.
We consider two distinct settings of data dissemination that require different
notions of privacy. In the first part of this dissertation, we consider a setting
where no sensitive information should be disclosed. We consider the problem
of deciding whether answering a query on a relational database leads to any
disclosure of sensitive information. This problem was shown to be intractable;
we propose practical algorithms for a reasonably large set of query classes.
In the second part of the dissertation, we consider the problem of pub-
lishing “anonymous” aggregate information about populations of individuals
while preserving the privacy of individual-specific information. We present a
novel framework for reasoning about the privacy risk in this setting. We also
propose the first formal privacy definition and practical algorithms for pub-
lishing “anonymous” data that provably guarantees privacy of the individuals
contributing to the data while releasing useful aggregate information. We also
present a case study of applying formal privacy definitions to a real Census data
publishing application.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their
own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A
popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring
it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both.
– James Madison
One of the greatest triumphs of computer science is the unprecedented avail-
ability of information. This has been made possible by breakthroughs in hard-
ware, faster processing speeds, massive storage capabilities and reliable com-
munication, coupled with rapid advances in information retrieval, data man-
agement and data integration. These capabilities, in turn, have revolutionized
the way people work, communicate, gather information, and even shop. How-
ever, these advances have also led to an explosion in data collection. Almost
every action performed by individuals is being electronically logged – the news
they read, the clothes they buy, the friends they meet, the doctors they visit
and even the food they eat. Individuals benefit immensely by allowing such
data collection. Critical services like health-care have markedly improved with
the digitization of medical records. Governments around the worlds base their
economic policies on demographic information collected by Census Bureaus.
Search engine and web service companies track user actions in return for per-
sonalized web services. However, as a side-effect, these electronic logs track the
entire public and private lives of individuals, thus posing an immense privacy
risk of unauthorized disclosure [1, 65]! For instance, in October 2004, Choice-
point inadvertently released private financial information of 145,000 individ-
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uals to criminals operating a scam [1]. In August 2006, the reputed Internet
company America OnLine (AOL) released anonymous logs of search queries
collected from users to aid information retrieval research in academia. How-
ever, identities of individuals were easily uncovered1, revealing their private
lives to millions.
Privacy is globally recognized as a universal value. We as computer scien-
tists have the power and the responsibility to create tools that ensure this inte-
gral part of human dignity while enabling the dissemination of valuable data
about humans for improving the quality of their lives. This dissertation pro-
poses techniques for collecting and sharing personal information that provably
guarantee privacy, and is a step towards fulfilling this responsibility.
1.1 Problem Setting
We introduce our problem setting via the following example. A centralized
trusted data collection agency, say Gotham City Hospital, collects information
from a set of patients. The information collected for each patient includes identi-
fying information like name, address and social security number, demographic
information like age, race and gender, and personal information like symptoms
and medical condition. There are a number of users of this data. For instance,
Dr. Drake requires access to the medical histories of all his patients. Nurse Na-
talia needs access to the drugs prescribed to the patients in her care. Finally,
researcher Riddler, who studies how diseases correlate with age and gender,
may require age, gender and medical condition information from all patients.
1www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/07/AR2006080700790.html
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Table 1.1: Inpatient Medical Records relation.
Name Zip Code Age Nationality Condition Ward #
Alex 13053 28 Russian Heart Disease 2323
Bruce 13068 29 American Heart Disease 2323
Umeko 13068 21 Japanese Viral Infection 1212
Dick 13053 23 American Viral Infection 1212
Eshwar 14853 50 Indian Cancer 1212
Fox 14853 55 Russian Heart Disease 1212
Gray 14850 47 American Viral Infection 2323
Harry 14850 49 American Viral Infection 2323
Igor 13053 31 American Cancer 2323
Jay 13053 37 Indian Cancer 2323
Ken 13068 36 Japanese Cancer 1212
Lewis 13068 35 American Cancer 1212
Over the last half a century many database systems have been built that can
efficient store, index and process the aforementioned queries on large volumes
of data. Throughout this dissertation we will assume that the data is stored in
a relational database system [103]. In a relational database, the collected data is
stored in one or more relations or tables. Table 1.1 is an example of a relation.
Each row in this relation, also called a tuple, contains the medical records of a
unique patient in the hospital. Each column in the table represents different
attributes of each patient. The value of attribute A for tuple t is denoted by t[A]
and is called a cell. Users request access to parts of the data by formulating
queries over the data. We refer to the result of a query, which is also a relation,
as a view of the database. For instance, Table 1.2 is the view of the database
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Table 1.2: View of the Inpatient Medical Records relation containing
records of patients from Ithaca, NY.
Name Zip Code Age Nationality Condition Ward #
Eshwar 14853 50 Indian Cancer 1212
Fox 14853 55 Russian Heart Disease 1212
Gray 14850 47 American Viral Infection 2323
Harry 14850 49 American Viral Infection 2323
corresponding to the query “list all the information about patients from Ithaca
NY (ZipCode = 14850 or 14853)”.
While we know how to efficiently answer queries using relational databases,
with the increasing concerns about privacy, organizations like Gotham City
Hospital face a conflict between a patient’s right to privacy and the hospital’s
need to know and process relevant information. While patients may trust the
hospital’s database systems, they may not trust the users who view the collected
information. For instance, nurse Natalia, who only tends to the patients in ward
#1212, need not be allowed to access the medical records of patient Bruce admit-
ted to ward #2323. Moreover, though Bruce may want researchers to study the
correlation between symptoms and diseases, he may not want them to be able to
precisely infer what he is suffering from. Hence, we are interested in designing
privacy-aware database systems that (i) allow legitimate users to efficiently query
the data, while (ii) provably guaranteeing the privacy of the individuals who
contribute to the data.
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1.2 What is Privacy?
Few values so fundamental to society have been left so undefined in social
theory or have been the subject of such vague and confused writing by social
scientists.
– Alan Westin
In order to design a privacy-aware database system we first need to prescribe
to some reasonable notion of privacy. The term “privacy” is often used in daily
conversation, as well as in philosophical, political and legal discussions; yet
there is no single definition or meaning for the term [44]. The first discussions
of information privacy are accredited to the famous essay by Warren and Bran-
deis [126] who recognized privacy as the “right to be let alone”, and laid the
foundation for a concept of privacy that has come to be known as control over
information about oneself. In this dissertation, we subscribe to Alan Westin who
describes privacy as “the ability to determine for ourselves when, how, and to what
extent information about us is communicated to others” [127]. While this definition
is a good starting point, we still need to adapt it to the context of databases,
and formalize, for instance, “to what extent” information that is released to
a user discloses sensitive information about an individual contributing to the
data. Proposing formal definitions for privacy in the context of database sys-
tems will be a focus of this dissertation.
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1.3 Overview of Database Privacy Solutions
A wide range of technological solutions are required to implement privacy-
aware database systems. Privacy breaches occur in databases due to four main
reasons [1]:
• Lack of Physical Security: Most privacy breaches occur due to the theft of
physical storage devices like hard drives, laptops and backup tapes.
• Intrusion by Hackers: Poor system security and wrong network administra-
tion render the data vulnerable to malicious hackers. For instance, in 2007,
U.S. Secret Service agents found credit card numbers of Ralph Polo Lau-
ren customers in the hands of Eastern European cyber thieves who created
high-quality counterfeit credit cards.
• Dishonest Insiders: Dishonest or disgruntled employees of a data collection
agency may disclose personal information. For instance, a woman in Pak-
istan hired by the University of California San Francisco Medical Center
for transcribing medical records threatened to post patients’ confidential
files on the Internet unless she was paid more money [2].
• Incorrect Privacy Practices: Supposedly privacy-aware databases can lead
to egregious breaches of privacy if they are based on unsound principles.
The AOL data release fiasco described earlier in this chapter is one glaring
example.
The first three threats may be solved by employing technology like encryption,
firewalls and intrusion detection systems, educating administrators, and im-
proving legislation and government regulation.
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In this dissertation, we focus on the fourth “threat”, namely that of informa-
tion sharing by data collection agencies using unsound privacy practices. We
consider two standard techniques for implementing privacy-aware databases,
namely, access control and anonymous data publishing, and show that current im-
plementations can cause unintentional breaches of sensitive information. We
show that this due to the ad-hoc notions of privacy used to implement these
systems. Hence, this dissertation deals with formally understanding and defining
privacy for both access control and anonymous data publishing, developing efficient
algorithms to enforce these privacy notions, and evaluating them on real-world applica-
tions. Before we enumerate the contributions of this dissertation in more detail
(Section 1.4), we describe the current state of the art in access control and anony-
mous data publishing.
1.3.1 Access Control in Databases
Access control is the traditional solution that allows controlled access to a set of
resources. Access control typically includes three parts – authentication, autho-
rization and audit. Authentication refers to the process of establishing the iden-
tity of a user. Authorization is the process of verifying that an authenticated
user has the privileges to perform certain operations on the system. Finally, au-
dit is the process of verifying post facto that all the operations on the system have
been performed by authorized users. Though authentication and audit are very
important problems, they are not the focus of this dissertation.
Any authorization system can be modeled as a set of accessors (e.g., users), a
set of resources (e.g., files, relations or views), an access control policy or a set of
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rules describing whether an accessor is authorized to access a resource (positive
authorization) or not (negative authorization), and an enforcement algorithm that can
efficiently decide whether a request to access a resource can be allowed based on
the access control policy. Authorization systems also contain an administrative
mechanism to grant and revoke authorizations.
The simplest kind of an access control system is usually seen in file systems.
The files in the file system correspond to the resources, and the users of the file
system are the accessors. The access control policy is described in the form of
an access control list (ACL), where every file f is associated with the list of users
ACL(f) who are authorized to access it. The permissions to access a file are
usually granted by a file system administrator or by owners of the individual
files. Given a request from user u for file f , the enforcement algorithm allows u
to access f if and only if u ∈ ACL(f).
In the context of databases, however, such a simple policy does not suffice
since database systems cannot afford to grant authorizations at the granularity
of files or whole relations. In a hospital, for instance, a single Patient relation
can contain the information about thousands of patients. For each patient, in
turn, the Patient relation contains a variety of attributes. Hence, the hospital
might want to specify more fine grained access control policies on this relation.
For instance, the hospital may want nurse Natalia to only access the names and
medical conditions of patients in ward #1212.
One simple solution to implement such fine-grained access control is to main-
tain access control lists for every cell in the relation. However, in such a naive
solution, the number of authorizations in the access control policy is inordi-
nately large – the number of cells in the relation times the number of users in the
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system. This problem becomes even more daunting in the case of discretionary
access control (DAC), where the user who creates a relation should specify an
ACL for each cell.
This challenge is usually solved by specifying authorizations over groups of
users and groups of cells. Rows (tuples) and columns (attributes) are a natural
choice for grouping cells. More generally, arbitrary groups of cells can be de-
scribed using views over the relation. Hence, in DAC based database systems,
authorizations are granted by the owner of a relation to either the whole relation
or to some derived view over the relation. For instance, Dr. Drake may create
a Drake-Patient view relation containing the medical records of his patients. Dr.
Drake may also create Drake-Patient-Prescription relation containing the names
of his patients and the medication prescribed to them. Using DAC, Dr. Drake
can authorize nurse Natalia to access both the above relations.
Users are typically grouped in two ways, leading to two different kinds of
access control methods. In mandatory access control (MAC) [87], each resource
(relation, view, row, column or an individual cell) is labeled by a security level,
each accessor is associated with a security clearance, and the authorizations are
granted to (level, clearance) pairs. In military settings, for instance, security lev-
els and clearances both are one of {Unclassified, Classified, Secret and Top Secret}.
These labels are ordered as
Unclassified < Classified < Secret < Top Secret
Access is granted according to the Bell-LaPadula rules [22]: a user can read any
data item that has a security level lower than her clearance, but write to only
those data items that have a higher security level.
In role based access control (RBAC) [23], authorizations are based on the role
9
in which an accessor is accessing information, rather than her identity. Posi-
tive and negative authorizations are defined per role to resources that are either
complete relations, views, or in some cases individual cells in the table. For
instance, Dr. Drake may act in two roles both as a physician treating patients
and as a researcher correlating symptoms to new diseases. Dr. Drake is al-
lowed/disallowed access to very different kinds of information in these two
roles. As a physician, Dr. Drake may be allowed to view the complete medical
records of his patients, but as a researcher, he may not be able to access infor-
mation that is not necessary for the purposes of research.
However, allowing authorization over cells and arbitrary views over base
relations introduces the following problem. Unlike in file systems, where access
to one file does not usually disclose information about other files, in databases,
access to one view over a relation can disclose information about other nega-
tively authorized views in the following two ways.
First, the answers to two queries might depend on each other if they access
some common cell in the relation while computing the corresponding views.
For instance, consider a user u who is not allowed to access the view “the names
of Dr. Drake’s patients” (V1), and requests access to “the names of patients in
ward #1212” (V2). Can we grant u access to the view V2? Even though there may
be no correlation between being in ward #1212 and being treated by Dr. Drake,
user u can get information about V1 from V2 as follows. User u is allowed to
access the view “the names and ward numbers of all the patients who are not
treated by Dr. Drake” (V3). Hence, user u can find out the names of patients who
are treated by Dr. Drake and in ward #1212, if any, using V3−V2. Therefore, user
u should not be allowed to access V2.
10
Second, the problem becomes trickier in the presence of inference channels
[25]. Inference channels occur in databases either due to integrity constraints
like functional and multivalue dependencies [103], or due to known correlations
between attributes. Consider the following example of a functional dependency
in the Patient relation. A functional dependency A → B occurs in a relation R
when for every two tuples t1, t2 in R, if t1[A] = t2[A] then t1[B] = t2[B]. For
instance, Doctor → Ward is a functional dependency if all the patients treated
by a single doctor are housed in the same ward. Hence, if the patients of Dr.
Drake are housed in ward #1212, access to V2 by user u described above leaks
all the information about V1.
In summary, database authorizations differ from traditional access control
lists because access to one view in a database may disclose information about
other views. Hence, database authorizations need to precisely define the se-
mantics of what information can be accessed, given positive or negative au-
thorizations; we call this a privacy definition. The first part of this dissertation
(Chapter 2) deals with the study of formal privacy definitions for negative au-
thorizations in access control.
1.3.2 Anonymous Data Publishing
Many organizations like hospitals, the Census and, more recently, search en-
gine companies collect information from individuals and expose this informa-
tion to the public with the goal of furthering medical, economic and informa-
tion retrieval research, respectively. Hence, these organizations wish to provide
researchers access to interesting aggregate statistical information about the per-
11
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Figure 1.1: Data Publishing
sonal information they collect, such that researchers can not discover sensitive
information about specific individuals from the data.
A number of techniques have been proposed for disseminating aggregate in-
formation about individuals (see Chapter 5), and most of them fall under one of
two broad categories, data publishing and statistical databases. Figures 1.1 and 1.2
illustrate the main difference between the two classes of techniques. Statistical
databases host a query answering service that evaluates queries posed by the re-
searcher on the original data, and then decides to perform one of the following
actions based on a privacy policy and the history of queries answered – (i) re-
turn the correct answer, (ii) deny an answer, or (iii) return a perturbed answer.
In contrast, the data publishing class of techniques publish one or more views
of the data that preserve statistical information about the original data. The
researchers are allowed to execute arbitrary queries on these published views.
While both these classes of techniques have their advantages and disadvan-
tages, many organizations prefer data publishing due to the following reasons:
• Data publishing requires only a one time effort in creating the published
views. Thereafter, this data can be distributed to researchers, and they can
12
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Figure 1.2: Statistical Databases
be allowed to run arbitrary queries on the published data. On the other
hand, statistical databases require online server support to monitor user
queries, and to evaluate how to answer those queries.
• Researchers usually need access to the data in order to determine how to
analyze the data and may not be able to pose queries oblivious to the data.
Data collection agencies strive to publish data that disclose as much aggre-
gate statistical information as possible, while preserving the privacy of the in-
dividuals contributing to the data. One popular technique, and a focus of this
dissertation, is publishing anonymous microdata. Organizations like the Census
distribute personal data in its raw, unaggregated form, also known as micro-
data, after removing attributes like name and social security number that are
known to uniquely identify individuals. Anonymous microdata is particularly
attractive to researchers since it retains all the statistical information about the
original data, and because the data is in a form that can be readily input into
existing statistical analysis algorithms.
However, individual-specific information can still be inferred from micro-
data even after removing identifying attributes as suggested in following ex-
cerpt [97],
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Some deficiencies inevitably crop up even in the Census Bureau. In 1963,
for example, it reportedly provided the American Medical Association with
a statistical list of one hundred and eight-eight doctors residing in Illinois.
The list was broken down into more than two dozen categories, and each
category was further subdivided by medical specialty and area residence;
as a result, identification of individual doctors was possible . . . .
In fact, a recent study conducted by Sweeney [121] estimated that 87% of the
population of the United States could be uniquely identified using a combina-
tion of seemingly innocuous attributes such as gender, date of birth, and 5-digit
zip code. In fact, those three attributes were used to link the voter registration
records of Massachusetts (which included the name, gender, zip code, and date
of birth) to supposedly anonymized medical data from GIC2 (which included
gender, zip code, date of birth and diagnosis). This “linking attack”, also called
a re-identification attack managed to uniquely identify the medical records of the
governor of Massachusetts in the medical data [122]. Sets of attributes (like gen-
der, date of birth, and zip code in the example above) that can be linked with
external data to uniquely identify individuals in the population are called quasi-
identifiers.
Hence, there has been over a half a century of research primarily dedicated
to developing algorithms and notions of privacy that disallow re-identification
attacks [64, 128]. More recently, Samarati and Sweeney proposed a definition
of privacy called k-anonymity [113, 122] to counter linking attacks using quasi-
identifiers. A table satisfies k-anonymity if every record in the table is indistin-
guishable from at least k − 1 other records with respect to every set of quasi-
2Group Insurance Company (GIC) is responsible for purchasing health insurance for Mas-
sachusetts state employees.
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identifier attributes. Such a table is called a k-anonymous table. Hence, for
every combination of values of the quasi-identifiers in the k-anonymous table,
there are at least k records that share those values. This ensures that individu-
als cannot be uniquely identified by linking attacks. k-anonymity has grown in
popularity because of its conceptual simplicity and due to algorithmic advances
in creating k-anonymous versions of a dataset [72, 18, 94, 6, 7, 81, 82, 83].
Though k-anonymity disallows re-identification attacks, we have no reason
to believe that there are no other attacks that can disclose personal information
about individuals. So, we asked the following question, “Does k-anonymity really
guarantee privacy?” Interestingly, we show in this dissertation that the answer to
this question is no. In Chapter 3, we illustrate using simple attacks that despite
being k-anonymous a published dataset can still disclose sensitive information
about individuals. Motivated by these attacks, in Chapters 3 and 4 we initiate
a formal study of potential attacks, privacy definitions and new algorithms for
publishing anonymous microdata that provably guarantee privacy.
1.4 Contributions and Organization
In this dissertation we propose novel formal definitions of privacy and develop
efficient algorithms that provably guarantee privacy.
The first part of this dissertation (Chapter 2) deals with enforcing formal pri-
vacy definitions in access control. As we noted before, current access control
systems do not associate formal semantics with negative authorizations over
arbitrary views causing unwanted disclosure of sensitive information. We rem-
edy this situation by adopting a formal privacy definition for negative autho-
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rizations on views. Recently, Miklau et al. [96] proposed perfect privacy, a par-
ticularly attractive semantics for deciding whether the answer to a query QV
discloses information about the answer to a secret query QS . Perfect privacy
requires that query QV is truthfully answered by the database if and only if it
discloses no information about the answer to the secret query QS . This ensures
that the user’s belief about the answer to QS does not change even on observing
the answer to the query QV . In this dissertation we propose adopting perfect
privacy as the semantics for negative authorizations. Not only does it provide
a theoretically sound semantics for negative authorizations, it also solves the
problem of inference channels by enforcing access control at the tuple level –
either a user can access a complete tuple or cannot access any attribute of the
tuple.
However, Miklau et al. showed that deciding whether a query QV leaks any
information about the sensitive view QS is intractable (pi
p
2-complete) when QS
and QV belong to a class of queries called conjunctive queries.
In Chapter 2, we show why the problem of enforcing perfect privacy is hard,
and, in the process, identify large sub-classes of conjunctive queries for which
perfect privacy can be efficiently enforced. This work originally appeared in the
proceedings of the Principles of Database Systems, 2006 [88].
In the second part of this dissertation (Chapters 3−4), we consider the prob-
lem of formal privacy definitions for publishing anonymous microdata. In
Chapter 3, we show that k-anonymity does not guarantee privacy. We give
examples of two simple, yet subtle attacks on a k-anonymous dataset that allow
an attacker to identify individual records. First, we show that an attacker can
discover the values of sensitive attributes when there is little diversity in those
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sensitive attributes. Second, attackers often have background knowledge, and
we show that k-anonymity does not guarantee privacy against attackers using
background knowledge. We give a detailed analysis of these two attacks and
propose a novel and powerful privacy definition called `-diversity that defends
against such attacks. In addition to building a formal foundation for `-diversity,
we show in an experimental evaluation that `-diversity is practical and can be
implemented efficiently. This work originally appeared in the proceedings of
the International Conference of Data Engineering, 2006 [89], and subsequently
appeared in the Transactions of Knowledge Discovery from Data, 2007 [91].
One of the strengths of `-diversity is its formal methodology to reason about
privacy. We conclude Chapter 3 by describing a general framework for privacy
definitions. Under this framework, we observe that `-diversity is but a point in
a whole space of privacy definitions. We then briefly describe some of the other
points in this space, including perfect privacy from Chapter 2.
One of the main reasons for the popularity of microdata is the belief that
the data can be anonymized with very little loss in statistical information; this
holds true if removing identifying attributes alone guarantees sufficient privacy.
However, when microdata is required to satisfy stronger privacy criteria there
is a substantial loss of statistical information. For instance, it has been shown
that for sparse high-dimensional data (with a large number of attributes), even
a weak condition like k-anonymity dramatically reduces the utility of the data
[5]. Hence, any study proposing new privacy definitions is incomplete without
a concurrent study of the loss of utility due to enforcing privacy.
Quantifying the utility of an anonymous dataset is a complex task. It de-
pends on the application scenario and the kinds of queries or analyses a re-
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searcher would like to run on the published data. In Chapter 4, we study the
utility of anonymous microdata in the context of a real world application. We
consider a real world Census Bureau application, called OnTheMap, that plots
the commuting patterns of workers in the United States. The source data for
this application collected by the U.S. Census Bureau cannot be used directly by
the mapping program due to privacy concerns. Hence, the application uses syn-
thetic data that statistically mimics the original data. However, there is no proof
that this synthetically generated data guarantees privacy.
Chapter 4 chronicles the challenges we faced in applying theoretical privacy
definitions to the above application. We find that while some existing defini-
tions of privacy are inapplicable to our target application, others are too con-
servative and render the synthetic data useless by guarding against privacy
breaches that are very unlikely. Moreover, the data in our target application
is sparse, and none of the existing solutions are tailored to anonymize sparse
data. We propose efficient algorithms to address both the above issues. This
work originally appeared in the proceedings of the International Conference of
Data Engineering, 2008 [90].
We conclude this dissertation with a detailed discussion of related work in
Chapter 5, and a summary of results in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF ENFORCING PERFECTLY PRIVATE ACCESS
CONTROL
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a theoretical study of the problem of enforcing access
control in databases. Specifically, we study the following problem of enforcing
negative authorizations: given a user who is not allowed to access the views
defined by secret queries QS1 , QS2 , . . ., efficiently decide whether or not to permit
access to a view V defined by the query QV .
In order to answer the above question, one needs to first specify which views
V can be safely accessed given a secret query QS ; we call such a specification a
privacy definition. Intuitively, it is safe to release V if it does not disclose any
information about the answer to QS ; but how does one check whether a view
V discloses information about another query? In fact, a view can disclose infor-
mation about a query to various extents, often in very subtle ways, as illustrated
in the following example.
Example 2.1 Consider a hospital which maintains patient records in two relations with
schemata shown in Figure 2.1. Relation P stores patient identifiers and their names.
Relation D stores patient identifiers, diagnosis, prescribed medication, and their ward
numbers. Suppose nurse Natalia is not allowed to access the answer to the query “list
the names of patients who have cancer” (QS). First, consider the view V1 defined by
the query “list the names of patients who do not have cancer”. Since no patient who
has cancer will feature in V1, it seems reasonable to assume that V1 does not leak any
19
Relation P
PID PName
Relation D
PID Diagnosis Medication Ward #
Figure 2.1: Relational schema of Hospital database.
information about QS , and hence, it is safe to allow Natalia to access V1. Next consider
the view V2 defined by the query “list the names of patients in ward #1212 who have
cancer”. The names presented in V2 will be a subset of the answer to QS , and clearly, it
is not safe to allow access to V2.
Finally, consider the view V3 defined by the query “list the names of patients in
ward #1212”. It is not clear whether V3 discloses information about QS , since there is
no reason to believe there is a correlation between patients who are in ward #1212 and
the patients who have cancer. However, it is, in fact, not safe to allow access to V3, since
V3 leaks information about QS in the following subtle way. Since Natalia can access V1,
by excluding the names of patients who do not have cancer (V1) from V3 she can deduce
the names of the patients in ward #1212 who have cancer (i.e., V2 = V1−V3). We argued
that it is not safe to release V2; therefore, it is should not be safe to release V3 either.
Hence, we need a formal privacy definition that specifies which views can
be safely accessed without disclosing information about a secret query. One
such privacy definition called perfect privacy was proposed by Miklau et al. [96].
Perfect privacy guarantees that a view V defined by the query QV is deemed
safe to be accessed if and only if it does not disclose any information about the
secret query QS . This ensures that the user’s (or adversary’s) belief about the
answer to QS does not change on observing the answer to the query QV .
Perfect privacy has two attractive properties. First, perfect privacy requires
queries and views to be specified using a class of queries called conjunctive
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queries. The usage of conjunctive queries enables the policy writer to express
complex access control policies. In Example 2.1, the secret query can be ex-
pressed by the following conjunctive query:
QS(name) :− P (pid, name), D(pid, cancer,med, ward).
The view V2 can be expressed by the following conjunctive query:
QS(name) :− P (pid, name), D(pid, cancer,med, 1212).
As a more complex example, suppose the hospital is required to release as much
data as possible to a pharmaceutical company without disclosing the names
of patients diagnosed with both hepatitis and cancer. The secret query in this
scenario can be expressed as the following conjunctive query:
QS(name) :− P (pid, name),
D(pid, hepatitis,med1, ward1), D(pid, cancer,med2, ward2).
Second, perfect privacy has the following collusion resistance property. Consider
again a secret query QS , and assume that there are n adversaries {A1, . . . , An},
where adversary Ai requests access to the view defined by query QVi . Perfect
privacy ensures that each QVi will be answered only if each query QVi does not
disclose any information about QS . Moreover, perfect privacy also ensures that
the adversaries cannot learn any sensitive information by colluding with each
other [96]. This collusion-resistance is also crucial for efficient query answer-
ing when the database answers queries interactively. When enforcing perfect
privacy, the database does not need to keep track of all queries ever answered
in order to guarantee that future query answers cannot be combined with old
query answers to disclose information [76].
However, these nice properties of perfect privacy do not come for free. The
problem of checking whether a conjunctive query QV discloses any information
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about another conjunctive query QS is Π
p
2-complete [96], even when the con-
junctive queries have only equality comparisons.
In this chapter, we show that there are interesting sub-classes of queries for
which enforcing perfect privacy is tractable (i.e., there is an algorithm which
runs in time polynomial in the size of the two queries QS and QV ). We first pro-
pose an alternate characterization of perfect privacy in terms of the well studied
notion of query containment [27]. We exploit this connection between perfect pri-
vacy and query containment to identify many subclasses of conjunctive queries
(described in Figure 2.3) where checking perfect privacy is tractable.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce
notation and give the intuition behind the ideas presented in this chapter. Sec-
tion 2.3 gives an alternative characterization of critical tuples, a core property
of perfect privacy. We use this new characterization to connect perfect privacy
with query containment in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we use this connection to
prove tractability results for checking perfect privacy for different query classes.
We conclude by summarizing our results in Section 2.6.
2.2 Overview
2.2.1 Preliminaries
We start with some basic notation.
Relations and Queries: A relation R consists of a relation schema R(A1, . . . , Ar)
and an associated relation instance which is a finite two-dimensional table with
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r columns; we call r the arity of relation R. The columns are called attributes
and the rows are called tuples. Attribute Ai has domain D(Ai). We define DR
as the domain of tuples in the relation R, i.e., DR = D(A1) × . . . × D(Ar). We
assume that all the domains are finite. Each tuple t in the relation is an element
(c1, . . . , cr) ∈ DR and is denoted by t = R(c1, . . . , cr); we call R the relational
symbol of t. We denote by t[Ai] or short t[i] the value of attribute Ai in tuple t.
A database schema S is a finite set of relational schemata {R1, . . . , Rm}. Tup(S)
denotes the set of all tuples over all relations in the schema that can be formed
from the constants in the respective domains. A database instance I is a subset
of Tup(S) and let I denote the set of all database instances. We henceforth use
Tup(I) to mean Tup(S). We assume that the only constraints on the database
are key constraints. A key of a relation R is a minimal set of attributes A such
that for every two tuples t1, t2 ∈ DR, t1[A] = t2[A] ⇒ t1 = t2. Let IK denote the
set of all possible database instances satisfying the key constraints in K. Let KR
denote the set of key constraints on relation R.
A conjunctive query with inequalities Q has the form
Q(a1, a2, . . . , am) :− G1 ∧G2 ∧ . . . ∧Gn ∧ CQ;
where CQ is a set of inequality constraints.
We call G` a subgoal, Q(a1, a2, . . . , an) the goal. Each subgoal G` is of the form
R`(x1, x2, . . . , xk`), where R` is a relation. Similar to a tuple, we call R` the re-
lational symbol of subgoal G`. Each xi = G`[i] is either a constant in D(R`.Ai)
or a variable ranging over D(R`.Ai). Note that while each field in a tuple is a
constant, a field in a subgoal can be a variable. Each ai in the goal is either a vari-
able appearing in one of the subgoals, or a constant in the domain of one of the
attributes of a relation appearing in the query. We denote the set of variables
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appearing in the goal by AQ and we also refer to it as the set of distinguished
variables. The set of variables which appear in the subgoals but not in the goal
is denoted by BQ and called the set of non-distinguished variables. Let KQ denote
the set of all constants appearing in the query. We abuse the notation Q to also
denote the set of subgoals in Q; i.e., Q = {G1, G2, . . . , Gn}. The inequality con-
straints in the set CQ are of the form xiθxj , where θ ∈ {≤, <,≥, >, 6=}, xi is a
variable in AQ ∪ BQ and xj is either a variable in AQ ∪ BQ or a constant in the
domain that xi ranges over.
Semantically, a query is a function from database instances to relation in-
stances. We define the output of a query on a database instance using the idea
of a valuation. A valuation ρ on a conjunctive query Q is a function that (i) maps
variables in the query (AQ ∪BQ) to constants in the respective domains and (ii)
is the identity function for constants in KQ. A constraint preserving valuation ρ
on Q is a valuation such that (xi θ xj) ∈ CQ ⇒ ρ(xi) θ ρ(xj). Unless otherwise
specified, all valuations in the remainder of the paper are constraint preserving.
A subgoal is said to be compatible with a tuple t if the subgoal and the tuple have
the same relational symbol and there is a valuation ρ mapping the subgoal to t.
A set of subgoals {G1, . . . Gn} is compatible if there is a tuple t that ∀i∃ρ : ρ is a
valuation mapping Gi to t.
Given a conjunctive query with inequalities Q and a database instance I ,
a tuple to = Q(c1, c2, . . . , cm) is said to be in the output of Q(I) if there is a
valuation ρ such that ρ(ai) = ci, i.e., each distinguished variable ai is mapped to
a constant ci; and ρ(R(x1, . . . , xr)) ∈ I , i.e., subgoal R(x1, . . . , xr) is mapped to
one of the tuples in relation instance R of the database instance I .
Query Containment: Query Q1 is said to be contained in query Q2 on the set of
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databases in I and is denoted by Q1 ⊆ Q2, if
∀I ∈ I, Q1(I) ⊆ Q2(I).
Throughout the paper, we use the term conjunctive query to denote a conjunctive
query without inequalities, unless otherwise specified.
Perfect Privacy [96]: We give a quick recap of the basic notions of perfect privacy
from Miklau et al. [96]. Let P be a probability distribution over all the possible
tuples P : Tup(I) → [0, 1], where P (t) = p denotes the probability that tuple
t will occur in a database instance. Miklau et al. call the pair (Tup(I), P ) a
dictionary. Let P (QS = s) denote the probability that the query QS outputs s.
Then query QS is perfectly private with respect to QV if for every probability
distribution and for all answers s, v to the queries QS , QV respectively,
P (QS = s) = P (QS = s |QV = v). (2.1)
In other words, the query QS is perfectly private with respect to QV if the ad-
versary’s belief about the answer to QS does not change even after seeing the
answer to QV .
When the only constraints in the database are key constraints, the above
condition can be rephrased in terms of critical tuples. A tuple t is critical to a
query Q, denoted by t ∈ crit(Q), if ∃I ∈ I, Q(I ∪ {t}) 6= Q(I). Let us now state
one of the main results from Miklau et al. [96].
Theorem 2.1 (Perfect Privacy [96]) Let (Tup(I), P ) be a dictionary. Two queries
QS and QV are perfectly private with respect to each other if and only if
crit(QS) ∩ crit(QV ) = ∅.
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Let K = {A1, . . . ,Am} be a set of key constraints over the relations involved in QV
and QS . Then query QV and QS are perfectly private with respect to each other if
∀tS ∈ crit(QS), tV ∈ crit(QV ),∀Ai ∈ K, tS[Ai] 6= tV [Ai].
Miklau et al. also proved the following complexity result.
Theorem 2.2 (Intractability of Perfect Privacy [96]) The problem of checking if a
query QV is perfectly private with respect to query QS is Π
p
2-complete.
2.2.2 Intuition
In this section we provide some intuition behind the rest of the chapter. We are
interested in identifying subclasses of conjunctive queries which allow specifi-
cation of interesting privacy policies while permitting tractable enforcement of
perfect privacy. We first take a very simple class of queries – queries without
self-joins – and illustrate that enforcing perfect privacy is indeed tractable . In
order to determine the complexity of other query classes, we could have labo-
riously enumerated every interesting query class and investigated the hardness
of checking perfect privacy for queries in that class. Instead, we show a connec-
tion between the problem of checking perfect privacy and the problem of query
containment. We use this connection and the vast literature in query contain-
ment to identify interesting query classes .
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Relation P
PID PName
123 John
135 Daisy
146 Chris
Relation D
PID Diagnosis Medication Ward #
123 Hepatitis RX1 1212
135 Cancer RX2 2312
135 Hepatitis RX1 1212
Figure 2.2: A database instance I ∈ I satisfying the relation schema of the
Hospital database.
A Simple Tractable Case
Example 2.2 Consider the hospital database from Figure 2.1. Let the sensitive infor-
mation be specified by the following query QS :
QS(name) :− P (pid, name), D(pid, cancer,med1, ward1)
Query QS has no self joins, i.e., no two subgoals have the same relational symbol. Which
tuples in the domain of relation D are critical to this query? Clearly, any tuple t having
the diagnosis attribute valued cancer, for example t = D(135, cancer, RX2, 2312), is
critical to QS . In particular, for t = D(135, cancer, RX2, 1212), the instance I in
Figure 2.2 is such that QS(I ∪ {t}) 6= QS(I). Also, it is easy to see that any tuple not
having cancer as the value for the diagnosis attribute, such as t′ = D(123, hepatitis,
RX1), is not critical to QS . For any instance I ′ ∈ I, adding the tuple t′ will not lead
to a new output tuple being created since t′ is not compatible with any subgoal. Hence,
a tuple in the domain of relation D is critical to QS if and only if the value for the
diagnosis attribute is cancer.
As illustrated in this example, if QS has no self-joins, a tuple t is critical to QS
if and only if t is compatible with some subgoal in QS . Using this simple check
for critical tuples, the condition for perfect privacy can be simplified as follows.
Queries QS and QV , both without self-joins, share a critical tuple if and only if
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there are subgoals GS ∈ QS and GV ∈ QV both of which are compatible with
some common tuple t ∈ DR. Recall that subgoals are compatible if they have
the same relation symbol and if the subgoals do not have differing constants for
any attribute. Checking this condition is linear in the size of the queries and
hence the problem is tractable.
Connecting Privacy and Query Containment
Let us now give an intuition behind our alternate characterization of perfect
privacy. Suppose a tuple t is critical to Q. By definition, there is some database
instance I , such that Q(I ∪ {t}) 6= Q(I). Since Q is a conjunctive query, it is
monotone, i.e., Q(I) ⊆ Q(I ∪ {t}). Therefore, there is an output tuple to, such
that to ∈ Q(I ∪ {t}) and to 6∈ Q(I). Consider a valuation ρ on Q which creates
this output tuple to ∈ Q(I ∪ {t}). Recall that ρ should map Q’s goal to to and
the subgoals in Q to tuples in (I ∪ {t}). Since, to 6∈ Q(I), ρ cannot map all the
subgoals in Q to tuples in I . Hence, ρ should map some set of subgoals from Q,
say G, to the critical tuple t.
Consider a query Q′ which is constructed from Q by replacing all of the vari-
ables xi appearing in Q by ρ(xi). Since a valuation is an identity function on
constants, ρ is still a valuation from Q′ to (I ∪ {t}) which outputs the tuple to.
So we still have to ∈ Q′(I ∪ {t}) and to 6∈ Q(I).
Remove from Q′ the subgoals in G. Call this new query Q|(G,t) (see Section 2.3
for a formal definition). The valuation ρ now maps all the subgoals in Q|(G,t) to
I and the goal of Q|(G,t) to to. Thus we have, to ∈ Q|(G,t)(I) and to 6∈ Q(I); i.e.,
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Query Class Efficiency Query Class Description
Queries where each subgoal is associated with a
unique relation symbolQueries with
O(nr) e.g., Q(a1, a2) :−R(a1, b1, b2), S(a2, b2), T (a1, b1, b2)no self-joins
Complexity of Q ⊆ Q′ : O(nr), where Q has no self
joins
Query Q represented as tableau. Each variable ap-
Maximal pears only in one column. No two rows r1, r2
Row O(n2r) sharing the same relation symbol are s.t.
Tableaux ∀i, r1[i] = c⇒ r2[i] = c, for all c ∈ KQ
e.g., Q(a1, a2) :−R(a1, b1, 0), R(a2, b2, 1), T (2, b2, b3)
Complexity of Q ⊆ Q′: NP-complete
Queries with at most one self-join per relation
Queries with e.g., Q(a1, a2) :−R(a1, b1, b2), R(a2, b1, b3),
k ≤ 1 O(n
3r)
S(a1, b2, b3), S(a2, b1, b3)
Complexity of Q ⊆ Q′ : O(n2r), where Q has at most
1 self join [115]
Query Q represented as tableau. Each variable ap-
pears only in one column. Each column containing a
Simple O(m22k· repeated non-distinguished variable bi contains no
Tableaux n3r2) other repeated symbol.
e.g., Q(a1, a2) :−R(a1, b2, b3), R(a2, b2, b4),
R(a1, b′2, b3), R(a2, b′′2, b5)
Complexity of Q ⊆ Q′ : O(n3r2), where Q1, Q2 are
simple tableaux queries [15]
The hypergraph constructed using the variables in
the query Q as nodes and subgoals in the queryAcyclic O(m22k·
as (hyper-)edges is acyclic.Queries rn2 logn)
e.g.,Q(a1, a2) :−R(a1, b2, b3), R(a2, b3, b4), R(a1, b5, b6)
Complexity of Q ⊆ Q′ : O(rn2 logn), where Q is
acyclic [30].
The hypergraph constructed using the variables in
Queries the query Q as nodes and subgoals in the query as
with O(m22k· (hyper-)edges has a query-width bounded by c.
Bounded rc2nc+1 log n) e.g., (c = 2): Q(a1, a2) :−R(a1, b3, b1), R(a2, b4, b1),
Query-Width R(a1, b5, b2), R(a2, b6, b2)
Complexity ofQ ⊆ Q′ : O(crnc+1 logn), whereQ has
bounded tree-width [30]
Figure 2.3: Query classes for which checking perfect privacy is tractable.
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Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q. This gives the following condition:
t ∈ crit(Q)⇒ ∃G compatible with t, Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q (2.2)
Interestingly, whenever G is a set of subgoals compatible with t, the query Q|(G,t)
is such that Q|(G,t)(I) ⊆ Q(I∪{t}) (see Section 2.3). This is because any valuation
ρ from Q|(G,t) to I can be extended to a valuation ρ′ from Q to (I ∪ {t}), where
the subgoals in G are mapped to t and the other subgoals are mapped to tuples
in I as in ρ.
When t is not critical to Q, for every instance I , Q(I ∪ {t}) = Q(I). Hence,
for every instance I , Q|(G,t)(I) ⊆ Q(I). This gives us the condition
t 6∈ crit(Q)⇒ ∀G compatible with t, Q|(G,t) ⊆ Q (2.3)
Using Statements 2.2 and 2.3, we can now characterize the perfect privacy
condition using query containment:
QV is perfectly private wrt QS
⇔ crit(QV ) ∩ crit(QS) = ∅
⇔ ∀t ∈ Tup(I), t 6∈ crit(QV ) ∨ t 6∈ crit(QS)
⇔ ∀t ∈ Tup(I),∀GS ,GV compatible with t,
QS|(GS ,t) ⊆ QS ∨QV |(GV ,t) ⊆ QV
Our final goal is to identify cases when the above check is tractable. This will,
however, not be easy as long as the condition has a universal quantifier over all
the tuples in the domain. We show that when attributes have sufficiently large
domains, the universal quantifier over the domain of tuples can be eliminated.
Given a set of subgoals G, let G be a subgoal such that every tuple compatible
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with G is also compatible with G. Let Q|(G,G) be constructed analogous to Q|(G,t).
We show, in Section 2.4, that if Q|(G,G) 6⊆ Q, then some tuple compatible with G
is critical to Q. Using this property, we provide an alternate characterization for
perfect privacy as follows. A query QV does not disclose any information about
QS if and only if for every set of compatible subgoals GS in QS and GV in QV :
QS|(GS ,G?) ⊆ QS ∨QV |(GV ,G?) ⊆ QV ,
where G? is the most general unifier of the subgoals in GS ∪GV (see Section 2.4).
Using the Connection
We can draw three key insights from this alternate definition. First, it is now
intuitively clear why the problem of enforcing perfect privacy is in Πp2; for ev-
ery set of compatible subgoals (universal quantification over a finite number
of choices) we perform a query containment check (which is in NP for con-
junctive queries [27] and is in Πp2 when queries have inequalities [124]). Next,
we observe that if the maximum number of subgoals in a query which share
the same relational symbol is bounded by a constant (alternately, the number of
self-joins per relation is bounded), then the problem of enforcing perfect privacy
is only as hard as performing a constant number of containment checks. Finally,
the query containments that we check are not between two arbitrarily complex
queries, and we can use their structure to propose efficient algorithms for en-
forcing perfect privacy even for query subclasses where query containment is
intractable.
Table 2.3 enumerates our complexity results. The first column enumerates
the subclasses of conjunctive queries where perfect privacy can be enforced
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Table 2.1: Size of the instance (QS , QV ).
n Total number of subgoals: n = |QS |+ |QV |
m Number of relations appearing in QS and QV
r Max arity of relation appearing in QS and QV
k Max number of self-joins per relation in either query
in time polynomial in the size of the queries. The second column gives the
bound on the time required to enforce perfect privacy when QS and QV are
from the specified query class; Table 2.1 explains our notation. Notice that the
case of queries without self-joins is actually a special case of our framework.
For maximal row tableaux, a subclass of tableaux queries, query containment
is intractable. However, since the query containments we check are of a special
form, we can show that perfect privacy can be enforced for these queries effi-
ciently. Tractability of the rest of the query classes leverage tractability results
for query containment [15, 30, 115]. When QS and QV are from different classes,
the tractability result for the less efficient query class holds.
2.3 Critical Tuples
In this section we propose an alternate characterization of critical tuples for con-
junctive queries in terms of query containment. In order to state the alternate
characterization, we first describe how to construct Q|(G,t) from a conjunctive
query Q, a set of compatible subgoals G in Q, and a tuple t which is compat-
ible with all the subgoals in G. The construct Q|(G,t) has interesting properties
(Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2) which we will exploit in the rest of the paper. Finally, we
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re-characterize the critical tuple condition for conjunctive queries in terms of
query containment (Theorem 2.3).
Denote by Q − G the query constructed by removing all the subgoals in G
from the query Q. Denote by Q|(G,t) the query ρt(Q − G), where ρt is a partial
valuation which maps the variables appearing in subgoals in G to corresponding
constants in tuple t, and is the identity function for all other variables in the
query Q − G. Formally ρt is defined as follows: Let VQ denote the variables
appearing in Q, and VG denote the set of variable appearing in G. Let K denote
the set of all constants. Then, ρt is a function ρt : K ∪ VQ → K ∪ (VQ − VG) such
that,
ρt(xi) =
 t[j], if G[j] = xi, for some G ∈ Gxi, otherwise
Q|(G,t) has the following two properties.
Lemma 2.1 Let Q be a conjunctive query and t be a tuple. For every set of subgoals G
in Q which are compatible with t,
∀I, Q|(G,t)(I) ⊆ Q(I ∪ {t}).
Proof. Let ρt be the partial valuation that maps the subgoals G to the tuple t, and
is the identity function for all other variables and constants. Q|(G,t) is equivalent
to ρt(Q−G). Consider any valuation ρ that maps the subgoals of Q|(G,t) to tuples
in the instance I and the goal to output tuple to. Since ρt maps subgoals in G
to t, ρ ◦ ρt is a valuation which maps the subgoals in Q to the tuples in I ∪ {t}
outputting the same tuple to. Hence, every tuple in the output of Q|(G,t)(I) is
also in the output of Q(I ∪ {t}).
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Lemma 2.2 Let Q be a conjunctive query, t a tuple and I a database instance. Let ρ be
a valuation mapping the subgoals in Q to tuples in (I∪{t}). Let G be the set of subgoals
in Q that are mapped to t under ρ. If ρ maps the goal of Q to to, then to ∈ Q|(G,t)(I).
Proof. ρ is a valuation mapping the subgoals in Q to tuples in I ∪ {t}. Since
ρ maps the subgoals in G to t, it is clear that ρ is a valuation from subgoals in
Q − G to tuples in I . Hence, to ∈ (Q − G)(I). Consider a valuation ρ′ which
maps variables appearing Q|(G,t) to constants as follows: ρ′(xi) = ρ(xi). Also ρt
coincides with ρ on the variables appearing in G. Hence, ρ′ maps the subgoals in
Q|(G,t) to tuples in I , and the goal of Q|(G,t) to the same output tuple to. Therefore,
to ∈ Q|(G,t)(I).
We can now state our alternate characterization of critical tuples in terms of
query containment.
Theorem 2.3 A tuple t is critical to a conjunctive query Q if and only if there is some
set of subgoals G in Q which are compatible with t, such that Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q.
Proof. t 6∈ crit(Q) if and only if for every instance I , Q(I ∪ {t}) = Q(I). From
Lemma 2.1, for any set of subgoals G ⊆ Q which are compatible with t, for every
instance I , Q|(G,t)(I) ⊆ Q(I ∪ {t}). Therefore,
t 6∈ crit(Q)⇒ ∀G compatible with t, Q|(G,t) ⊆ Q
To prove the other direction, let I be an instance such that Q(I ∪ {t}) 6= Q(I).
Since Q is monotone, there is a tuple to, such that to ∈ Q(I ∪ {t}) and to 6∈ Q(I).
Hence, there is a valuation ρ which maps the goal of Q to to and the subgoals of
Q to tuples in I ∪ {t}. Since to 6∈ Q(I), ρ should map some set of subgoals G in
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Q to the tuple t (otherwise to ∈ Q(I)). We can now use Lemma 2.2 to show that
to ∈ Q|(G,t)(I). Therefore,
t ∈ crit(Q)⇒ ∃G compatible with t, Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q
2.4 Perfect Privacy
In this section, we give an alternative characterization of perfect privacy in
terms of query containment. In particular, we use our new characterization
of critical tuples to give a novel characterization of perfect privacy in terms of
query containment. Our new characterization, however, involves a universal
quantifier over all the tuples in the domain, making this characterization very
expensive to check. The major technical contribution of this section is to elimi-
nate this universal quantification over all tuples (Theorem 2.5).
We first discuss the case where in every database instance in I the tuples are
independent of each other (Section 2.4.1). We also discuss the scenario with key
constraints (Section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Perfect Privacy with Independent Tuples
In the case when the tuples are independent of each other, a query QV does not
disclose any information about the query QS if and only if no tuple is critical to
both QS and QV [96]. Hence, given our novel characterization for critical tuples
(Theorem 2.3), perfect privacy can be rephrased as
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Input: Conjunctive Queries QS and QV .
Output: Whether QS and QV share a critical tuple.
1: //for every tuple in the domain
2: for all tuples t ∈ Tup(I) do
3: //for every set of subgoals in the query
4: for all GS ⊆ QS , GV ⊆ QV having the same relational symbol as t do
5: if GS ∪ GV is compatible with the tuple t then
6: //consider the partial valuation ρt mapping the
//subgoals in GS ∪ GV to the tuple t
7: ρt : AQ ∪BQ → AQ ∪BQ ∪KQ such that
ρt(xi) =
{
t[j], if G[j] = xi, for some G ∈ GS ∪ GV
xi, otherwise
8: QS |(GS ,t) = ρt(QS − GS), QV |(GV ,t) = ρt(QV − GV ).
9: if
(
QS |(GS ,t) 6⊆ QS AND QV |(GV ,t) 6⊆ QV
)
then
10: return QS and QV SHARE a critical tuple.
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: return QS and QV do NOT SHARE a critical tuple.
Algorithm 1: Perfect Privacy (naive).
Theorem 2.4 A conjunctive queryQV does not disclose any information about another
conjunctive query QS if and only if for every tuple t ∈ Tup(I), and for every set of
subgoals GS in QS and GV in QV such that GS ∪ GV is compatible with t,
QS|(GS ,t) ⊆ QS ∨QV |(GV ,t) ⊆ QV .
Consider an algorithm which naively implements the above condition for
perfect privacy (see Algorithm 1). There are three steps which would make
such an algorithm intractable.
• H1: for every tuple t ∈ Tup(I) (Line 2).
• H2: for every set of subgoals GS in QS and GV in QV which are compatible
with t (Line 4).
• H3: Checking whether QS|(GS ,t) ⊆ QS OR QV |(GV ,t) ⊆ QV (Line 9).
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To identify query classes for which Algorithm 1 is tractable, each of the above
three steps should be tractable.
Step H3: First, given sets of subgoals GS and GV which are compatible with a
tuple t, constructing the queries QS|(GS ,t) and QV |(GV ,t) is at most linear in the
size of the two queries. Performing the two containment checks may not be
polynomial in the size of the queries [27]. However, there are subclasses of
conjunctive queries for which Step H3 is tractable [30, 115]. These query classes
include queries with no self joins, queries with at most one self join, simple
tableaux queries, acyclic queries and queries with bounded query-width. We
discuss these cases in Section 2.5.
Step H2: Since we are only considering conjunctive queries (without inequali-
ties), checking whether a set of subgoals G is compatible with a tuple t is linear
in the number of subgoals. It is sufficient to check for every G ∈ G, if G[i] has
a constant, then t[i] has the same constant. Hence, Steps H2 and H3 can be per-
formed in time O(m22k(nr + T (H3))), where T (H3) is the time taken to perform
Step H3, k is the maximum number of subgoals in either query which share
the same relational symbol, n is the total number of subgoals which appear in
both the queries, r is the maximum arity of a relation which appears in both the
queries, and m is the number of relation symbols that appear in both queries. If
k is a constant, both the Steps H2 and H3 can be performed in time polynomial
in the size of the inputs if the two queries QS and QV belong to one of the query
classes listed above.
Step H1: Step H1 involves a universal quantification over the set of all tu-
ples in the domain. Clearly, assuming that the domain of tuples is very small
(bounded by some polynomial in the size of the input) ensures that the algo-
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rithm is tractable. However, such an assumption would greatly limit the utility
of our result. In most cases, the size of the domain of tuples is very large com-
pared to size of the queries. Hence, in the rest of the section we propose an
alternate characterization for perfect privacy where we eliminate the universal
quantification over the domain of tuples. Interestingly, we are able to remove
the quantification over the domain of tuples when we assume that the domain
of tuples is sufficiently large.
Definition 2.1 (Sufficiently Large Domains)
Let Q(a1, a2, . . . , am) : −G1 ∧ G2 ∧ . . . ∧ Gn ∧ CQ be a conjunctive query. We say
that the domains of the attributes appearing in Q are sufficiently large with respect
to Q, if in every distinct variable xi appearing in the query can be assigned to a unique
constant ci that does not appear in Q and is in the domain of the associated attribute Ai.
The plan for the rest of the section is as follows. First, we generalize the con-
struction Q|(G,t) to Q|(G,G), where G is a subgoal such that every tuple compatible
with G is also compatible with all the subgoals in G. We then show that this con-
struction can also be used to reason about critical tuples. More specifically, we
show that Q|(G,G) ⊆ Q if and only if every tuple compatible with G is not critical
to Q. We then use this construction to state an alternate characterization for per-
fect privacy (Theorem 2.5). This new characterization does not involve a univer-
sal quantifier over all the tuples in the domain. Finally, we prove Theorem 2.5
and bound the running time of an algorithm which implements Theorem 2.5.
Let us start with some definitions. Let G be a set of compatible subgoals
in conjunctive query Q. We say that a subgoal G is compatible with G if every
tuple compatible with G is also compatible with G. We call a subgoal G? the
most general unifier of G (denoted by mgu(G)) if a tuple is compatible with G?
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if and only if the tuple is compatible with G. Since we are only dealing with
conjunctive queries without inequalities, it is easy to see that the most general
unifier of a set of subgoals is unique and well defined. Let VG denote the set of
variables and constants appearing in G.
Given a query Q, a set of compatible subgoals G and a subgoal G which is
compatible with G, denote by Q|(G,G) the query ρG(Q − G). Here, ρG is a partial
valuation defined as follows:
ρG : AQ ∪BQ → AQ ∪BQ ∪KQ ∪ VG such that,
ρG(xi) =
 G[j], if G`[j] = xi, for some G` ∈ Gxi, otherwise
The following two lemmas show interesting properties of Q|(G,G). Lemma 2.3
shows that the query Q|(G,t) is contained in the query Q|(G,G). Lemma 2.4 con-
nects Q|(G,G) and critical tuples.
Lemma 2.3 Let Q be a conjunctive query, G be a set of compatible subgoals, G be a
subgoal (not necessarily in Q) which is compatible with G, and t be a tuple compatible
with G. Then
Q|(G,t) ⊆ Q|(G,G)
Proof. Compare Q|(G,t) and Q|(G,G). If ρt is a mapping which maps variables in
G to corresponding constants in the tuple t and is the identity function for every
other symbol, then it is easy to see that ρt is a homomorphism from Q|(G,G) to
Q|(G,t). Hence, from [27], Q|(G,t) ⊆ Q|(G,G).
Lemma 2.4 Let Q be a conjunctive query, G be a set of compatible subgoals in Q, and
G be a subgoal (not necessarily in Q) which is compatible with G. There is a tuple
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compatible with G that is critical to Q if and only if
Q|(G,G) 6⊆ Q
Proof. Suppose some tuple t, that is compatible with G, is critical to Q. From
Theorem 2.3, Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q. From Lemma 2.3, Q|(G,t) ⊆ Q|(G,G). Hence, Q|(G,G) 6⊆ Q.
To show the converse, suppose Q|(G,G) 6⊆ Q. Then there is an instance I and
an output tuple to such that to ∈ Q|(G,G)(I)while to 6∈ Q(I). Let ρ be the valuation
mapping Q|(G,G) to tuples in I . Let t be a tuple such that t[i] = ρ(G[i]). Clearly, t
is compatible with G. We show that t is critical to Q, completing the proof. Like
in the previous case, we can define a homomorphism ρt from Q|(G,G) to Q|(G,t).
Since the substitutions made by ρt conform to the substitutions made by ρ, ρ is
also a valuation from Q|(G,t) to I outputting to. This shows that Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q and
hence, t is critical to Q.
We are now ready to state our alternate characterization for perfect privacy.
Theorem 2.5 Let QS and QV be conjunctive queries, and let the domains of attributes
be sufficiently large with respect to each of the queries. QV does not disclose any infor-
mation about QS if and only if for every set of compatible subgoals GS in QS and GV in
QV ,
QS|(GS ,G?) ⊆ QS OR QV |(GV ,G?) ⊆ QV
where G? = mgu(GS ∪ GV ).
In the remainder of this section, we prove the above theorem. Proving the
“if” direction of the above condition is quite easy. Suppose tuple t is critical to
both QS and QV . Then from Theorem 2.3, there are sets of subgoals GS in QS
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and GV in QV such that
QS|(GS ,t) 6⊆ QS AND QV |(GV ,t) 6⊆ QV
Since t is compatible with GS and GV , t is also compatible with G? = mgu(GS ∪
GV ). Hence, using Lemma 2.3, we get
QS|(GS ,G?) 6⊆ QS AND QV |(GV ,G?) 6⊆ QV
Proving the converse, however, is trickier. We need to show that if
QS|(GS ,G?) 6⊆ QS and QV |(GV ,G?) 6⊆ QV , then QS and QV share a critical tuple.
From Lemma 2.4, all we can say is that there are tuples tS and tV such that tS
and tV are compatible with G? (and hence compatible with GS and GV ), such that
tS is critical to QS and tV is critical to QV . In fact, unless we assume the domains
are sufficiently large, this is all the above condition guarantees.
The sufficiently large domain assumption ensures that given a query Q there
is a valuation which maps every symbol in Q to a distinct constant in the respec-
tive domain. Using this property, we can prove Lemma 2.5, a stronger version
of Lemma 2.4, which in turn will help us to prove the theorem.
Definition 2.2 (Fine Q|(G,G?)-Critical Tuple)
Let Q be a query, G a set of subgoals in Q and G? be a subgoal compatible with G. A
tuple tf which is critical to a query Q is called a fine Q|(G,G?)-critical tuple1 if there is
a database instance If and a valuation ρf such that
• ρf is a valuation mapping Q|(G,G?) to tuples in If such that every variable appear-
ing in Q|(G,G?) is mapped to a distinct constant not appearing in the query.
1A similar definition is used in the proof of hardness of checking perfect privacy in [96]
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• ρf (G?) = tf .
• ρf maps the goal of Q|(G,G?) to a tuple tof such that tof 6∈ Q(I).
Lemma 2.5 Let Q be a conjunctive query, G be a set of compatible subgoals in Q,
and G? be a subgoal (not necessarily in Q) which is compatible with G. Under the
sufficiently large domain assumption, Q|(G,G?) 6⊆ Q if and only if one of the tuples
compatible with G? is a fine Q|(G,G?)-critical tuple.
Proof. Suppose there exists a tuple t which is a fine Q|(G,G?)-critical tuple. Then
since t is critical to Q and is compatible with G?, Q|(G,G?) 6⊆ Q from Lemma 2.4.
To prove the other direction, suppose Q|(G,G?) 6⊆ Q. Then there is an instance
I and a valuation ρ such that ρ maps the goal of Q|(G,G?) to a tuple to, such that
to 6∈ Q(I). From I and ρ we construct the fine critical tuple tf and the instance-
valuation pair (If , ρf ) which satisfy the conditions in Definition 2.2. Simultane-
ously, we also build a function h whose domain is the set of all constants K and
whose range is the set of constants in I . We will use h to explain why the tf is
indeed a fine critical tuple.
• Initialization: Fix an arbitrary total order on the variables in Q|(G,G?) and
number the variables {x1, x2, . . .}. Initialize h as follows. For constants
c ∈ K that appear in I , h(c) = c. For all other constants c′ ∈ K that do not
appear in I , h(c′) = d for some constant d appearing in I . Initialize ρf = ρ.
• Substitution: Consider the variables in increasing order of their number-
ing. Suppose ρ(xi) = c, and c is either a constant appearing in Q|(G,G?) or
ρf (xj) = c for some j < i. Then ρf (xi) = ci, for some ci not appearing in
Q|(G,G?) and not equal to ρf (xj) for any j < i. Set h(ci) = c.
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• Fine critical tuple: If is the set {ρf (G)|G ∈ Q|(G,G?)} and tf = ρf (G?).
Note that the above construction is possible because of the sufficiently large
domain assumption. To show that tf is indeed a fine critical tuple, we need to
show that ρf is a valuation mapping the goal of Q|(G,G?) to a tuple tof such that
tof 6∈ Q(If ). From the construction it is clear that ρf is a valuation from Q|(G,G?) to
If . Suppose for a contradiction, there is some valuation ρ′ such that tof ∈ Q(If ).
Then h ◦ ρ′ is a valuation which maps subgoals of Q to I and outputs the tuple
to leading to the required contradiction.
Lemma 2.5 guarantees that ifQS|(GS ,G?) 6⊆ QS andQV |(GV ,G?) 6⊆ QV , then there
exist tS and tV compatible with G? such that tS is a fine QS|(GS ,G?)-critical tuple
and tV is a fine QV |(GV ,G?)-critical tuple. We use this property to show that tS is
critical to QV , thus completing the proof.
Lemma 2.6 Let QS and QV be conjunctive queries, GS be a set of subgoals in QS , GV
be a set of subgoals in QV and G? be a subgoal compatible with GS ∪ GV . Let tS and tV
be tuples compatible with G? such that tS is a fine QS|(GS ,G?)-critical tuple, and tV is
a fine QV |(GV ,G?)-critical tuple. Under the sufficiently large domain assumption, there
exists a mapping γ : K → K that satisfies the following properties
1. γ(tV ) = tS .
2. γ is a bijection.
3. for every constant c appearing in QV , γ(c) = c.
Proof. We construct a candidate γ using the following steps. Let KS and KV
denote the sets of constants appearing in tS and tV , respectively.
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• Initialization: Let γ : K → K be the identity function. Set CV = CS = ∅.
• Set γ(tV ) = tS : For every i, if tV [i] = ci and tS[i] = di, then set γ(ci) = di,
CV = CV ∪ {ci} and CS = CS ∪ {di}.
• Make γ a bijection: For every constant d ∈ KS − CV , set γ(d) to a unique
constant in KV − CS .
That γ(tV ) = tS is obvious. Property 3, namely that γ is the identity func-
tion for every constant appearing in QV , is preserved in each of the three steps.
Clearly, this property holds after the initialization step. In the second step, sup-
pose tV [i] = ci appears inQV ; then since tV is a fine critical tuple, surely ci should
also appears G?. Both tV and tS are compatible with G?. This forces tS[i] = ci
and γ(ci) = ci. As a side effect, every ci appearing in QV appears both in CV and
CS . Hence, γ(ci) remains unchanged after the third step.
To prove that γ is a bijection, first we show γ is indeed a function. Suppose
on the contrary, γ maps ci to two different values di and dj ; this can happen only
in the second step where tV [i] is mapped to tS[i] and tS[j]. This is possible only
if tV [i] = tV [j]. Since G? is mapped to tV under the fine valuation, G?[i] = G?[j]
forcing tS[i] = tS[j]. Similarly, in the second step, no two distinct constants ci
and cj are mapped to the same constant d.
To complete the proof that γ is indeed a bijection, note that the number of
distinct constants in tS and tV are the same; since tS and tV are fine critical tuples,
each distinct variable in G? is assigned a distinct constant. Therefore, after the
second and third steps, γ is a bijection.
With Lemma 2.6, the rest of the proof of Theorem 2.5 is straightforward. Let
I ′V = γ(IV ). Then from Lemma 2.6, I
′
V ∪ {tS} = γ(IV ∪ {tV }). Lemma 2.6 also
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Input: Conjunctive Queries QS and QV
Output: Whether QS and QV share a critical tuple.
1: //for every set of subgoals in the two queries
2: for all GS ⊆ QS , GV ⊆ QV do
3: //if all the subgoals in GS ∪ GV are compatible.
4: if GS ∪ GV are compatible subgoals of relation R of arity r then
5: //consider the partial valuation ρ′ mapping the
//subgoals in GS ∪ GV to G? = mgu(GS ∪ GV )
6: Let G? be a subgoal such that
1 ≤ i ≤ r,∃G ∈ GS ∪ GV : G[i] = ci ⇒ G?[i] = ci
1 ≤ i, j ≤ r,∃G,G′ ∈ GS ∪ GV , G[i] = G′[j]⇒ G?[i] = G?[j]
Let VG? = {g1, g2, . . .} be the set of distinct variables appearing in G?.
7: ρG? : AQ ∪BQ → AQ ∪BQ ∪KQ ∪ VG? such that
ρG?(xi) =
{
G?j , if G`[j] = xi, for some G` ∈ GS ∪ GV
xi, otherwise
8: QS |(GS ,G?) = ρG?(QS − GS),
QV |(GV ,G?) = ρG?(QV − GV ).
9: //check if QS |(GS ,G?) ⊆ QS and QV |(GV ,G?) ⊆ QV
10: if
(
QS |(GS ,G?) 6⊆ QS AND QV |(GS ,G?) 6⊆ QV
)
then
11: return QS and QV SHARE a critical tuple.
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: return QS and QV do NOT SHARE a critical tuple.
Algorithm 2: Perfect Privacy (Sufficiently Large Domains)
shows that γ changes the value of a constant only if the constant does not appear
in QV . Hence, ρ is a valuation mapping QV to some I if and only if γ ◦ ρ is a
valuation mapping QV to γ(I). Therefore,
QV (IV ∪ {tV }) 6⊆ QV (IV )
⇒ QV (γ(IV ∪ {tV })) 6⊆ QV (γ(IV ))
⇒ QV (I ′V ∪ {tS}) 6⊆ QV (I ′V )
Hence, tS ∈ crit(QS) ∩ crit(QV ), completing the proof.
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Algorithm 2 sketches a simple algorithm which implements Theorem 2.5.
Since we have eliminated the universal quantifier over tuples, we are left with
only two steps which contribute to the complexity of Algorithm 2.
• H2’: for every set of subgoals GS in QS and GV in QV which are compatible
(Line 2).
• H3’: Checking whether QS|(GS ,G?) ⊆ QS OR QV |(GV ,G?) ⊆ QV (Line 10).
We bound the running time of Algorithm 2 in terms of the notation in Ta-
ble 2.1 and use it in Section 2.5 to motivate our search for tractable query classes.
Given a set of compatible subgoals GS in QS , GV in QV (say, of relation R), the
most general unifierG? can be constructed in timeO(rR(|GS|+|GV |)), where rR is
the arity of relation R. The queries QS|(GS ,G?) and QV |(GV ,G?) can be constructed
in time O(rR(|QS| − |GS| + |QV | − |GV |)). Hence in total this takes O(rn). Let
T (H3′) be the time taken to perform the two containment checks in (H3’). The
number of sets of subgoals GS ∪ GV which share the same relation symbol is at
most m22k. Hence, the running time can be bounded by
O(m22k(nr + T (H3′))) (2.4)
Before we extend out alternate characterization to the case with key con-
straints (in Section 2.4.2), we shed more intuition on the sufficiently large do-
main assumption.
The Sufficiently Large Domain Assumption
In the proof of Theorem 2.5 we showed that the sufficiently large domain as-
sumption is “sufficient” to eliminate the universal quantification over all tuples
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in the domain in the naive alternate characterization of perfect privacy (i.e., The-
orem 2.4). We now show that this assumption is in some sense “necessary” to
help us in our quest for tractable subclasses of queries; i.e., even if Step H2 (con-
sidering all sets of compatible subgoals) and Step H3 (query containment) can be
performed in time polynomial in the size of the input, there are small domains
and queries QS and QV such that checking perfect privacy is co-NP-complete.
We first present an example which illustrates how Algorithm 2 gives incor-
rect results when the domains are small. We then extend the intuition gained
from the example to prove the “necessity” result.
QS(a1, a2, a3) :− R(a1, a2, a3, b4, 0), R(1, a2, a3, 0, 0)
R(a1, 0, 0, 0, 0), R(a1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
QV (a1, a2, a3) :− R(a1, a2, a3, 1, b5), R(1, a2, a3, 1, 1)
R(a1, 1, 0, 1, 1), R(a1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Figure 2.4: Queries QS and QV from Example 2.3
Example 2.3 Consider two queries QS and QV shown in Figure 2.4 on a relation R
having five binary attributes – each attribute takes values 0 or 1. Note that the do-
mains are not sufficiently large since each query has six symbols (two constants and
four variables) while the attribute domains have only two constants.
A tuple critical to both the queries should be compatible with at least one subgoal in
QS and one subgoal in QV (i.e., |GV | ≥ 1 and |GS| ≥ 1). One can easily check that the
only possible candidate for GS ∪ GV is
GS = {R(a1, a2, a3, b4, 0)}; GV = {R(a1, a2, a3, 1, b5)}
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IS =
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
IV =
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
QS|(GS ,G?)(a1, a2, a3) :− R(1, a2, a3, 0, 0), R(a1, 0, 0, 0, 0), R(a1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
QV |(GV ,G?)(a1, a2, a3) :− R(1, a2, a3, 1, 1),R(a1, 1, 0, 1, 1),R(a1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Figure 2.5: IS , IV , and Queries QS|(GS ,G?), QV |(GV ,G?) for Example 2.3
The most general unifier of GS ∪ GV , is G? = R(a1, a2, a3, 1, 0). The queries QS|(GS ,G?)
and QV |(GV ,G?) are shown in Figure 2.5. Also shown in the same figure are instances IS
and IV . It is easy to check that QS|(GS ,G?) 6⊆ QS and QV |(GV ,G?) 6⊆ QV .{
(0, 1, 1) ∈ QS|(GS ,G?)(IS) and QS(IS) = ∅
} ⇒ QS|(GS ,G?) 6⊆ QS{
(0, 1, 1) ∈ QV |(GV ,G?)(IV ) and QV (IV ) = ∅
} ⇒ QV |(GV ,G?) 6⊆ QV
Hence, Algorithm 2 returns that QS and QV share a critical tuple.
In the rest of the example we will show using Lemma 2.4 that QS andQV , in fact, do
not share any critical tuples. Recall that if QS and QV share any critical tuples, then
the tuple should be compatible to G?; i.e, the tuple should be of the form R( , , , 1, 0),
where ‘ ’ can be replaced by either 1 or 0. It is easy to check the following properties:
1. A tuple t is compatible with G? if and only if it is compatible with at least one of
the following subgoals:
• G?1 = R(1, a2, a3, 1, 0).
• G?2 = R(a1, 0, 0, 1, 0).
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• G?3 = R(a1, 0, 1, 1, 0).
• G?4 = R(a1, 1, 0, 1, 0).
• G?5 = R(a1, 1, 1, 1, 0).
2. QS|(GS ,G?1)(1, a2, a3) :−R(1, a2, a3, 0, 0), R(1, 0, 0, 0, 0), R(1, 0, 1, 0, 0).
QS|(GS ,G?1) ⊆ QS : The homomorphism which maps a1 to 1 and b4 to 0 and is
an identity function for the rest of the symbols is a homomorphism from QS to
QS|GS ,G?1 . Hence, every tuple compatible with G?1 is not critical to QS .
3. QS|(GS ,G?2)(a1, 0, 0) :−R(1, 0, 0, 0, 0), R(a1, 0, 0, 0, 0), R(a1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
QS|(GS ,G?2) ⊆ QS : The homomorphism mapping a2, a3 and b4 to 0 is the required
homomorphism. Hence, every tuple compatible with G?2 is not critical to QS .
4. QS|(GS ,G?3)(a1, 0, 1) :−R(1, 0, 1, 0, 0), R(a1, 0, 0, 0, 0), R(a1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
QS|(GS ,G?3) ⊆ QS : The homomorphism mapping a2 and b4 to 0, and a3 to 1 is the
required homomorphism. Hence, every tuple compatible with G?3 is not critical
to QS .
5. QV |(GV ,G?4)(a1, 1, 0) :−R(1, 1, 0, 1, 1), R(a1, 1, 0, 1, 1), R(a1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
QV |(GV ,G?4) ⊆ QV : The homomorphism mapping a2 and b5 to 1, and a3 to 0 is the
required homomorphism. Hence, every tuple compatible with G?4 is not critical
to QV .
6. QV |(GV ,G?5)(a1, 1, 1) :−R(1, 1, 1, 1, 1), R(a1, 1, 0, 1, 1), R(a1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
QV |(GV ,G?5) ⊆ QV : The homomorphism mapping a2, a3 and b5 to 1 is the required
homomorphism. Hence, every tuple compatible with G?5 is not critical to QV .
Hence, from Lemma 2.4, every tuple compatible with GS ∪ GV is either not critical to
QS or not critical to QV . Recall that Lemma 2.4 is true irrespective of the domain size.
Hence, QS and QV do not share any critical tuple.
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The construction in the above example can be extended to formally prove
the “necessity” of the sufficiently large domain assumption.
Theorem 2.6 There exist queries QS and QV with corresponding small domains such
that
1. There is one subgoal GS ∈ QS and one subgoal GV ∈ QV such that GS and GV
are compatible and G? is their most general unifier.
2. For every other set of subgoals GS ∈ QS and GV ∈ QV , GS∪GV are not compatible.
3. QS|({GS},G?) 6⊆ QS and QV |({GV },G?) 6⊆ QV .
Checking whether QS and QV indeed share a critical tuple is NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly the problem is in NP, since it is sufficient to guess the shared
critical tuple from a finite domain. To show hardness, we employ a reduction
from the following NP-complete problem (see Lemma 2.8):
Joint Satisfiability Problem: Given two satisfiable CNF formulae φ and
ψ, checking whether φ ∧ ψ is satisfiable is NP-complete.
Let φS and φV be the inputs to the joint satisfiability problem. Let
x1, x2, . . . , xn be the variables mentioned in φS ∧ φV . Without loss of general-
ity, φS and φV are in 3-CNF. Hence, every clause cj = (`j1 ∨ `j2 ∨ `j3), where each
`jk is either xjk or x¯jk .
Let R be a relation with (n+ 2) binary attributes. Construct QS as follows:
• The goals of QS is the tuple (a1, a2, . . . , an).
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• R(a1, a2, . . . , an, bn+1, 0) is the first subgoal in the query QS .
• For every clause cj = (`j1 ∨ `j2 ∨ `j3), Gj = R(r1, r2, . . . , rn, 0, 0) is a subgoal
of QS such that
– If i = jk, k ≤ 3 and `jk = xjk , then ri = 0.
– If i = jk, k ≤ 3 and `jk = x¯jk , then ri = 1.
– Else, ri = ai.
Construct QV in the same manner with the following changes:
• The first subgoal of QV is R(a1, a2, . . . , an, 1, bn+2).
• Every other subgoal has rn+1 = rn+2 = 1 instead of 0 unlike in QS .
Queries QS and QV from Example 2.3 have been constructed as described
above using the following 3-CNF formulae:
φS = (x¯2)(x1 + x3)(x1 + x¯3)
φV = (x¯2)(x¯1 + x3)(x¯1 + x¯3)
The constructed queries satisfy the three requirements in the statement of
the theorem. The first subgoal of QS is compatible with the first subgoal of QV .
It is easy to see that no other subgoals are compatible.
In order to show that QS and QV satisfy the third requirement, we prove
the following key result in Lemma 2.7: a tuple t satisfies φS if and only if
QS|({GS},t) 6⊆ QS .
The third requirement and the NP-hardness follow directly from Lemma 2.7.
Since φS and φV are satisfiable, there are tuples tS and tV which satisfy them.
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Clearly in this case, QS|({GS},tS) 6⊆ QS and QS|({GV },tV ) 6⊆ QV . Requirement 3
follows from Lemma 2.3.
To show NP-hardness, it is enough to show that t satisfies φS ∧ φV if and
only if t is critical to both QS and QV . This follows directly from Lemma 2.7 and
Theorem 2.3.
Lemma 2.7 Let QS is as constructed in Theorem 2.6. Let t ∈ {0, 1}n be a binary tuple,
and let t′ = {0, 1}n+2 such that t′[i] = t[i] for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and t′[n+1] = t′[n+2] =
0. A tuple t satisfies φS if and only if QS|({GS},t′) 6⊆ QS , where .
Proof. Suppose QS|({GS},t′) ⊆ QS , there is a homomorphism from QS to
QS|({GS},t′). Note that this homomorphism maps each ai to t[i]. The first sub-
goal of QS , namely R(a1, a2, . . . , bn+1, 0), should be mapped to some Gj =
R(r1, r2, . . . , rn, 0, 0). This is possible only if t does not satisfy φS .
If t does not satisfy φS , there is some clause, say cj , which is not satisfied.
Then ai = t[i] is a homomorphism from QS to QS|({GS},t) (which maps the first
subgoal in QS to Gj in QS|({GS},t) and the other subgoals G` in QS to the corre-
sponding subgoals in QS|({GS},t)).
Lemma 2.8 Given two satisfiable CNF formulae φ and ψ, checking whether φ ∧ ψ is
satisfiable is NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly, the problem is in NP. To show hardness, suppose there is a poly-
nomial time algorithm to solve the joint satisfiability problem. We can construct
a polynomial time algorithm for SAT as follows. Every conjunct in a CNF is
trivially satisfiable. Start by checking whether the first two conjuncts are jointly
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satisfiable (using the supposedly efficient algorithm for joint satisfiability). At
any point of time, if the first k conjuncts are unsatisfiable, stop since the whole
formula is unsatisfiable. If the first k conjuncts, say φk, is satisfiable, since the
(k + 1)st conjunct ck+1 is satisfiable, check if φk ∧ ck+1 is satisfiable (again using
the efficient algorithm). If all the conjuncts are exhausted then the CNF formula
is satisfiable.
2.4.2 Perfect Privacy with Key Constraints
In this section we consider the case when the space of database instances IK
should satisfy key constraints specified in K = {A1, . . . ,Ak}; i.e., for every in-
stance I ∈ IK
∀Ai ∈ K, (t1, t2 ∈ I ∧ t1[Ai] = t2[Ai]⇒ t1 = t2)
In this scenario, a query QV discloses some information about the answer to
QS if and only if there exist tuples tS, tV in the domain of relation R, such that
tS ∈ crit(QS) and tV ∈ crit(QV ), and for some set of attributes Ai which is a
key for relation R, tS[Ai] = tV [Ai]. We define sets of subgoals GS and GV to be
compatible on Ai if there are tuples tS, tV ∈ D(R) such that tS[Ai] = tV [Ai] and
tS and tV are compatible with GS and GV , respectively. The following theorem
provides an alternate characterization of perfect privacy in the presence of key
constraints in terms of query containment.
Theorem 2.7 A conjunctive query QV does not disclose any information about con-
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junctive query QS if and only if for every relation R appearing in both QS and QV ,
∀tS, tV ∈ D(R),∀Ai ∈ KR,
∀GS ⊆ QS compatible with tS,∀GS ⊆ QS compatible with tV(
tS[Ai] = tV [Ai]⇒ (QS|(GS ,tS) ⊆ QS OR QS|(GV ,tV ) ⊆ QV )
)
Note that this definition too has a universal quantifier on the tuples in the do-
main; the remainder of this section is focused on removing this quantifier under
the sufficiently large domain assumption. Note that in Theorem 2.7, one needs
to check the query containment only for GS and GV which are compatible on
someAi ∈ KR. To simulate Theorem 2.7 for the case when the domains are suffi-
ciently large, we construct for every keyAi ∈ KR two subgoals – GˆSi compatible
with GS and GˆV i compatible with GV – that are compatible on Ai as follows:
• GS? = mgu(GS) and GV ? = mgu(GV ).
• Now start with GˆSi = GS? and GˆV i = GV ? and make changes such that
any pair of tuples tS, tV , compatible with GˆSi and GˆV i respectively, are
compatible with both GS and GV on the attributes in Ai. This we do by
chasing the following two rules on GˆSi and GˆV i:
– If for some A` ∈ Ai, GˆSi[`] = c a constant, then set GˆV i[`] = c and vice
versa.
– If for some A`, Am ∈ Ai, GˆSi[`] = GˆSi[m], then set GˆV i[`] = GˆV i[m]
and vice versa.
It is easy to see that the above chase procedure terminates in time propor-
tional to |Ai|.
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Theorem 2.8 When the domains of attributes of the relations appearing in the con-
junctive queries QS and QV are sufficiently large with respect to the queries, QV does
not disclose any information about conjunctive query QS if and only if for every relation
R appearing in both QS and QV ,
∀Ai ∈ KR, ∀GS ⊆ QS,GV ⊆ QV , compatible on Ai on R(
QS|(GS ,GˆSi) ⊆ QS OR QS|(GV ,GˆV i) ⊆ QV
)
Proof. The proof of the above theorem is very similar to the proof of Theo-
rem 2.5. When there are tS and tV critical to QS and QV such that for some Ai,
tS[Ai] = tV [Ai], the condition in the theorem follows from Lemma 2.3. For the
other direction, when QS|(GS),GˆSi 6⊆ QS and QS|(GV ),GˆV i 6⊆ QV , from Lemma 2.5
that there are tS and tV compatible with GˆSi and GˆV i, respectively, which are
(fine) critical to QS and QV . Since GˆSi and GˆV i are compatible on Ai, we can
construct a γ mapping tV [Ai] to tS[Ai] like in Lemma 2.6 to show that there is a
t′S which is critical to QV having t
′
S[Ai] = tS[Ai].
2.5 Finding Tractable Cases
In this section we show how to utilize the alternate characterizations for perfect
privacy to identify query classes where checking perfect privacy is tractable. We
restrict our discussion to the scenario with independent tuples, since the reason
for the intractability of checking perfect privacy is the same in the other case.
We will be using the notation from Figure 2.1 in this section.
We utilize two observations to identify tractable query classes. Our analysis
of the running time of Algorithm 2 (Equation 2.4) shows that apart from looping
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over all sets of compatible subgoals GS in QS and GV in QV (H2’) and checking
two containments (H3’), all the other steps involved can be implemented in time
polynomial in the size of the queries. So for queries with a bounded number
of self-joins per relation (k), any query class for which query containment is
tractable also permits efficient enforcement of perfect privacy (Section 2.5.1).
More interestingly, in our definitions of privacy, the query containment checks
we are interested in are of a special form. We illustrate this for a subclass of
tableau queries; even though query containment is not tractable for this class of
queries, the query containments we are interested in are so simple that we can
check perfect privacy in time O(n2r) (Section 2.5.2). In fact, for these queries,
perfect privacy is tractable even if the number of self-joins per relation is not
bounded by a constant. We conclude this section with a brief discussion of
the complexity of checking perfect privacy when the two queries are from two
different query classes (Section 2.5.3).
2.5.1 Using Tractability of Q1 ⊆ Q2
Since the seminal paper by Chandra and Merlin [27], which showed the NP -
hardness of query containment for conjunctive queries, there has been a lot of
work in finding subclasses of conjunctive queries for which the query contain-
ment problem is tractable. We utilize this work to identify four major classes
of queries where checking perfect privacy is tractable – queries with at most
one self join per relation (using results in [115]), simple tableau queries with
bounded k (using results in [15]), acyclic queries with bounded k, and queries
with bounded query-width and bounded k (using [30]).
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Queries with at most one self join per relation
We start with a very simple case. Saraiya [115] shows that checking Q ⊆ Q′ is
tractable whenever Q and Q′ are such that for every subgoal G′ in Q′ there are
at most two subgoals in Q which are compatible with G′.
Theorem 2.9 (Tractability of Containment [115]) Let Q1 and Q2 be two conjunc-
tive queries such that every subgoal in Q2 is compatible with at most two subgoals in
Q1. Then Q1 ⊆ Q2 can be checked in time O(n2r)
For the class of queries with at most one self-join, there are at most two subgoals
of a relation in any query. Hence, any Q|(G,Gˆ) will also be a query with at most
one self join. Therefore, Q|(G,Gˆ) ⊆ Q can be checked correctly using the algo-
rithm in [115]. Moreover, since k(Q) ≤ 2 for any query, we only need to loop
over O(n) sets of the form GS ∪ GV .
Theorem 2.10 (Tractability of Perfect Privacy) Let QS and QV be two queries hav-
ing at most one self-join. Then perfect privacy can be checked in time O(n3r).
Acyclic & Bounded Query-width Queries
There has been extensive work on relating the structure of conjunctive queries
and the hardness of query containment. In particular, Chekuri and Rajaram [30]
relate the hardness of query containment to the cyclicity of the query graph.
The query graph is a hyper graph whose nodes are the symbols appearing in the
query and hyper-edges are the subgoals in the query. A query is acyclic if the
query graph is acyclic.
57
The “degree of cyclicity” in a query is usually measured using query-width.
Acyclic queries have a query-width of 1. The basic idea behind query-width is
the following. An acyclic query can be decomposed into a tree, with each vertex
in the tree corresponding to one subgoal in the query.2 This tree preserves prop-
erties like which subgoals share variables. For a cyclic query one may be able
to construct a tree with each vertex in the tree corresponding to more than one
subgoal. The query-width is the largest number of subgoals which are mapped
to a single vertex in the “best” tree decomposition. We refer the reader to [30]
for formal definitions.
Theorem 2.11 (Tractability of Containment [30]) Let Q2 be a query with a query-
width bounded by c. Then Q1 ⊆ Q2 can be checked in time O(c2rnc+1 log n).
This gives us the following result on the complexity of checking perfect privacy.
Theorem 2.12 (Tractability of Perfect Privacy) Let QS and QV be queries having
query-width bounded by c and at most k self-joins per relation. Then perfect privacy
can be checked in time O(m22kc2rnc+1 log n).
Simple Tableau Queries
In many database schemas, different attributes in the schema are incomparable.
The hospital database schema in Figure 2.1 is one such example. Hence, in
any conjunctive query on an instance of the hospital schema, a variable cannot
be bound to two different attributes. Such queries are called tableau queries, or
short tableaux.
2This can be done by using the GY O-reduction on the query-graph ([134]).
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QS(name) :− P (pid, name),
D(pid,Hepatitis, b1), D(pid,Cancer, b2)
PID PName Disease Medication
QS name
P pid name
R pid Hepatitis b1
R pid Cancer b2
Figure 2.6: Query QS and its tableau representation.
Definition 2.3 (Tableau Query [15])
A tableau query Q is a conjunctive query where every variable (distinguished or non-
distinguished) is associated with only one attribute in the relational schema.
As the name suggests, a tableau query is usually represented in a tabular form.
The columns of this table are the attributes that appear in the query. The rows of
the table are the subgoals of the query, and all definitions from Section 2.2.1 that
involve subgoals thus extend to rows of a tableau query. The goal of the query
is represented by the first row in the table called the summary row. Each row is
labeled with the relation associated with the corresponding subgoal. Figure 2.6
illustrates a tableau representation of a tableau query. Note that no variable ap-
pears in more than one column. Even for this restricted class of queries, Aho et
al. [15] show that the query containment problem is NP -hard. They identify a
further subclass of queries, called simple tableau queries, wherein query contain-
ment is tractable. Figure 2.6 illustrates a simple tableau query.
Definition 2.4 (Simple Tableau Query [15])
A tableau query is simple if in any column with a repeated non-distinguished variable
there is no other symbol that appears in more than one row.
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Query Q
A B C
b1 b2 c3
c1 b
′
2 b3
d1 b
′′
2 b
′
3
b′1 d2 e3
e1 b
′
2 b
′′
3
b1 e2 b
′′
3
subgoal Gˆ
c1 x2 c3
Query Q|(G,Gˆ)
A B C
d1 b
′′
2 b
′
3
b′1 d2 e3
e1 x2 b
′′
3
c1 e2 b
′′
3
Figure 2.7: A tableau Q; a subgoal Gˆ compatible with the first two rows G; and
the query Q|(G,Gˆ).
Theorem 2.13 (Tractability of Containment [15]) Let Q1 and Q2 be two simple
tableaux. Then Q1 ⊆ Q2 can be checked in time O(n3r2).
For us to be able to use the above tractability result, we must show that
given a simple tableau query Q, a set of compatible subgoals G and a subgoal Gˆ
compatible with G, the query Q|(G,Gˆ) is also a simple tableau query.
Lemma 2.9 Let Q be a simple tableau query, G a set of compatible subgoals in Q and Gˆ
a row (not necessarily in Q) compatible with G. Then Q|(G,Gˆ) is a simple tableau query.
Proof. We give an illustrative example followed by the formal proof.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: Consider the simple tableau in Figure 2.7 on a single
relation R with schema R(A,B,C). Let G be the first two rows and Gˆ be the
most general unifier of G. In order to construct Q|(G,Gˆ), the variable b1 is mapped
to constant c1 and b3 to c3. The variables b2 and b′2 are both mapped to variable
x2. Notwithstanding these substitutions, the resultant Q|(G,Gˆ) is still a simple
tableau query. The reasons are clear from the example. b1 appears in G and in
Q − G. Hence, no other symbol can repeat. So when b1 in Q − G was replaced
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by a c1, the only symbol which can repeat is c1. Also, b3 does not repeat and
hence the mapping b3 to c3 does not even appear in the column. So there is only
one repeating symbol in column C in both Q and Q|(G,Gˆ). Finally, both b1 and
b′1 cannot repeat in column B. Hence, mapping the two variables to a single
variable does not cause a violation of the simple tableau property.
FORMAL PROOF Recall that Q|(G,Gˆ) = ρGˆ(Q − G). Since Q is a simple tableau,
Q−G is also a simple tableau. Suppose on the contrary, the mapping ρGˆ violates
the simple tableau condition. Then ρGˆ should map two distinct symbols s1 and
s2 in some column in Q − G to the same variable or constant. Both s1 and s2
cannot be non-distinguished variable, since in this case s1 and s2 appear in both
Q − G and in G, violating the simple tableau property of Q − G. Both s1 and
s2 cannot be constants, since in this case they cannot be mapped to the same
symbol under ρGˆ. Since there is only one distinguished variable in a column, s1
and s2 both cannot be variables; this would violate the simple tableau property
of Q−G as one of s1 and s2 must be non-distinguished variable. Hence, exactly
one of s1, s2, is a constant. Say s1 = c and s2 = x.
For x to be mapped to c under ρGˆ, x should appear in one of the subgoals in
G. Hence, x appears in both Q and Q − G. Since mapping x to c causes Q|(G,Gˆ)
to violate the simple tableau property, there is some other non-distinguished
variable b which repeats in Q−G. Thus both non-distinguished variables x and
b repeat in a column in Q. This is the required contradiction.
Using Lemma 2.9 and Theorem 2.13 we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2.14 (Tractability of Perfect Privacy) Let QS and QV be two simple
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tableaux with at most k rows tagged with the same relation. Perfect privacy can be
checked in time O(m22kn3r2).
2.5.2 Using Tractability of Q|(G,Gˆ) ⊆ Q
Our strategy to identify tractable query classes until now was limited to iden-
tifying query classes where query containment is tractable, without taking into
account that the containments we check have a specific form. In this section
we exploit this to identify another query class where checking perfect privacy is
tractable.
We continue our discussion on tableau queries. Define a partial order ≺ on
the rows of the tableau as follows: if two rows r1 and r2 are tagged with the
same relation, r1 ≺ r2 if
∀i∀c : r1[i] = c⇒ r2[i] = c
The above condition says that r1 ≺ r2 if in every column that r1 has a constant,
r2 has the same constant. We can now define a maximal row.
Definition 2.5 (Maximal Row) We call a row r in a tableau a maximal row if there
is no other row r′ tagged with the same relation as r such that r ≺ r′.
The query class we are considering in this section are those tableau queries
which only contain maximal rows. We call such tableaux maximal row tableaux.
The query QS from Figure 2.6 is an example of a maximal row tableaux.
Definition 2.6 (Maximal Row Tableau) A tableau is a maximal row tableau if for
every two rows r1 and r2 tagged with the same the relation, r1 6≺ r2 and r2 6≺ r1.
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Unlike in the previous cases, where we considered query classes which permit-
ted efficient query containment, we show that query containment is NP -hard
(similar to [15]) even when the two queries are maximal row tableaux.
Theorem 2.15 (Intractability of Containment)
Let Q1 and Q2 be two maximal row tableaux. Checking Q1 ⊆ Q2 is NP -complete.
Proof. (sketch) The problem is clearly in NP since Q1 and Q2 are conjunctive
queries. To show NP -hardness, given a 3-SAT instance, construct two tableaux
like in Example 11 in [15] and replacing distinct ai’s by distinct constants ci. The
two queries constructed are maximal row tableau and the proof in [15] holds
even when the distinguished variables are replaced by constants.
Nevertheless, we are only interested in specific containments. We illustrate
this using the critical tuple check. To show that a tuple t is critical to Q, it is
enough to show a set of subgoals G in Q which are compatible with t such that
Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q. If t is compatible with G, then t is compatible with every G ∈ G.
Consider Q|(G,t), when Q is a maximal row tableau.
Q|(G,t) ⊆ Q iff there is a homomorphism h from the symbols in Q to the
symbols in Q|(G,t) such that h is an identity function on constants and for any
subgoal G′ in Q, h(G′) is a subgoal in Q|(G,t) [27]. However, the following ar-
gument shows that there is no h such that h(G) is a subgoal in Q|(G,t). First,
G does not appear in Q|(G,t). Second, since Q is a maximal row tableau, for
any other subgoal G′ in Q having the same relation as G, there is some column
i where G[i] = c, a constant, and G′[i] is either a variable or a different con-
stant. G′ appears as ρt(G′) in Q|(G,t). Since no variable repeats across columns,
ρt(G
′)[i] = G′[i]. Hence, no homomorphism will map G in Q to ρt(G′) in Q|(G,t),
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for all G′ 6= G, implying that Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q.
Lemma 2.10 Let Q be a maximal row tableau, t a tuple and G a subgoal in Q which is
compatible with t. Then
Q|(G,t) 6⊆ Q
As a consequence of Lemma 2.10, a tuple is critical to a maximal row tableau if
and only if it is compatible with some row in the maximal row tableau. Thus
we can now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2.16 (Tractability of Perfect Privacy) Let QS and QV be two maximal
row tableaux. Then QS and QV share a critical tuple if and only if there are subgoals
GS in QS and GV in QV such that GS is compatible with GV . Hence, perfect privacy
can be checked in time O(n2r).
2.5.3 Queries from Different Classes
Recall that the running time of Algorithm 2 is bounded by the product of
(nr + T (H3′)) and the number of query containments to be checked. When
QS and QV are from the query classes specified in Section 2.5.1, the number
of query containments to be checked is bounded by O(m2k). T (H3′) is bounded
by the running time of query containment for the class where checking query
containment is less efficient.
As we showed in Theorem 2.16, for maximal row tableaux, we need not loop
over all subsets of compatible subgoals. Hence, if QS is a maximal row tableau,
and QV is from one of the subclasses listed in Section 2.5.1 (or vice versa), the
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number of containments to be checked is bounded by O(n2k). Hence, we get
the following theorem,
Theorem 2.17 Let QS be a maximal row tableau. The complexity of checking whether
a conjunctive query QV is perfectly private with respect to QS is
• O(n · r), if QV has no self-joins.
• O(n · n2r), if QV has at most one self-join.
• O(n2k · c2rnc+1 log n), if QV has query-width bounded by c and at most k self-
joins per relation.
• O(n2k ·n3r2), ifQV is a simple tableau query with at most k self-joins per relation.
2.6 Summary
We adopted perfect privacy as the semantics for enforcing access control in
databases. The problem of enforcing perfect privacy was known to be highly
intractable even for conjunctive queries without inequalities. In this chapter we
identified many subclasses of conjunctive queries for which enforcing perfect
privacy is tractable. This helps policy designers to decide what policies can be
efficiently enforced.
65
CHAPTER 3
`-DIVERSITY: PRIVACY BEYOND K-ANONYMITY
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we initiate a formal study of privacy definitions for anonymous
data publishing. Many organizations are publishing microdata, or tables that
contain unaggregated information about individuals. These tables can include
medical, voter registration, census, and customer data. Microdata is a valuable
source of information for the allocation of public funds, medical research, and
trend analysis. However, publishing such microdata poses a great privacy risk;
if individuals can be uniquely identified in the microdata, then their private
information (such as their medical condition) would be disclosed.
To avoid the identification of records in microdata, uniquely identifying in-
formation like names and social security numbers are removed from the table.
However, this first sanitization still does not ensure the privacy of individu-
als in the data; combinations of seemingly innocuous attributes can uniquely
identify individuals. For instance, it is estimated that 87% of the population of
the United States can be identified by linking the combination of their gender,
date of birth, and 5-digit zip code [121] with public records. Sets of attributes
(like gender, date of birth, and zip code) that can be linked with external data
to uniquely identify individuals in the population are called quasi-identifiers. To
counter “linking attacks” using quasi-identifiers, Samarati and Sweeney pro-
posed a definition of privacy called k-anonymity [113, 122]. A table satisfies k-
anonymity if every record in the table is indistinguishable from at least k − 1
other records with respect to every set of quasi-identifier attributes; such a ta-
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Table 3.1: Inpatient microdata.
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 13053 28 Russian Heart Disease
2 13068 29 American Heart Disease
3 13068 21 Japanese Viral Infection
4 13053 23 American Viral Infection
5 14853 50 Indian Cancer
6 14853 55 Russian Heart Disease
7 14850 47 American Viral Infection
8 14850 49 American Viral Infection
9 13053 31 American Cancer
10 13053 37 Indian Cancer
11 13068 36 Japanese Cancer
12 13068 35 American Cancer
ble is called a k-anonymous table. Hence, for every combination of values of
the quasi-identifiers in the k-anonymous table, there are at least k records that
share those values. This ensures that individuals cannot be uniquely identified
by linking attacks.
Example 3.1 Table 3.1 shows medical records from Gotham City hospital. Note that
the table contains no uniquely identifying attributes like name, social security number,
etc. In this example, we divide the attributes into two groups: the sensitive attributes
(consisting only of medical condition) and the non-sensitive attributes (zip code, age,
and nationality). An attribute is marked sensitive if an adversary must not be allowed
to discover the value of that attribute for any individual in the dataset. Attributes
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Table 3.2: 4-Anonymous Inpatient microdata.
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 130** < 30 ∗ Heart Disease
2 130** < 30 ∗ Heart Disease
3 130** < 30 ∗ Viral Infection
4 130** < 30 ∗ Viral Infection
5 1485* ≥ 40 ∗ Cancer
6 1485* ≥ 40 ∗ Heart Disease
7 1485* ≥ 40 ∗ Viral Infection
8 1485* ≥ 40 ∗ Viral Infection
9 130** 3∗ ∗ Cancer
10 130** 3∗ ∗ Cancer
11 130** 3∗ ∗ Cancer
12 130** 3∗ ∗ Cancer
not marked sensitive are non-sensitive. Furthermore, let the collection of attributes
{zip code, age, nationality} be the quasi-identifier for this dataset. Table 3.2 shows a
4-anonymous table derived from the table in Table 3.1 (here “*” denotes a suppressed
value; so, for example, “zip code = 1485*” means that the zip code is in the range
[14850 − 14859] and “age=3*” means the age is in the range [30 − 39]). Note that in
the 4-anonymous table, each tuple has the same values for the quasi-identifier as at least
three other tuples in the table.
Because of its conceptual simplicity, k-anonymity has been widely discussed
as a viable definition of privacy in data publishing, and due to algorithmic ad-
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vances in creating k-anonymous versions of a dataset [7, 18, 81, 94, 113, 122, 136],
k-anonymity has grown in popularity. However, does k-anonymity really guar-
antee privacy? In the next section, we will show that the answer to this question
is interestingly no. We give examples of two simple, yet subtle attacks on a k-
anonymous dataset that allow an attacker to learn sensitive information about
individuals in the table. Defending against these attacks requires a stronger no-
tion of privacy that we call `-diversity, the focus of this chapter. Let us first show
the two attacks to give the intuition behind the problems with k-anonymity.
3.1.1 Attacks On k-Anonymity
In this section we present two attacks, the homogeneity attack and the back-
ground knowledge attack, and we show how they can be used to compromise a
k-anonymous dataset.
Homogeneity Attack: Alice and Bruce are antagonistic neighbors. One day
Bruce falls ill and is taken by ambulance to the hospital. Having seen the am-
bulance, Alice sets out to discover what disease Bruce is suffering from. Alice
discovers the 4-anonymous table of current inpatient records published by the
hospital (Table 3.2), and so she knows that one of the records in this table con-
tains Bruce’s data. Since Alice is Bruce’s neighbor, she knows that Bruce is a
31-year-old American male who lives in the zip code 13053 (the quiet town of
Dryden). Therefore, Alice knows that Bruce’s record number is 9, 10, 11, or
12. Now, all of those patients have the same medical condition (cancer), and so
Alice concludes that Bruce has cancer.
Observation 1 k-Anonymity can create groups that leak information due to lack of
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diversity in the sensitive attribute.
Such a situation is not uncommon. As a back-of-the-envelope calculation,
suppose we have a dataset containing 60,000 distinct tuples where the sensi-
tive attribute can take three distinct values and is not correlated with the non-
sensitive attributes. A 5-anonymization of this table will have around 12,000
groups1 and, on average, 1 out of every 81 groups will have no diversity (the
values for the sensitive attribute will all be the same). Thus we should expect
about 148 groups with no diversity. Therefore, information about 740 people
would be compromised by a homogeneity attack. This suggests that in addition
to k-anonymity, the sanitized table should also ensure “diversity” – all tuples
that share the same values of their quasi-identifiers should have diverse values
for their sensitive attributes.
The possibility of a homogeneity attack has been previously discussed in the
literature (e.g., [100]). One solution to the homogeneity problem, as presented
by Ohrn et al. [100], turns out to be a specific instance of our general principle
of `-diversity (see Section 3.4). For reasons that will become clear in Section 3.4,
we refer to that method as entropy `-diversity.
The next observation is that an adversary could use “background” knowl-
edge to discover sensitive information.
Background Knowledge Attack: Alice has a pen-friend named Umeko who
is admitted to the same hospital as Bruce, and whose patient records also ap-
pear in the table shown in Figure 3.2. Alice knows that Umeko is a 21 year-old
Japanese female who currently lives in zip code 13068. Based on this informa-
1Our experiments on real data sets show that data is often very skewed and a 5-anonymous
table might not have so many groups
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tion, Alice learns that Umeko’s information is contained in record number 1,2,3,
or 4. Without additional information, Alice is not sure whether Umeko caught
a virus or has heart disease. However, it is well-known that Japanese have an
extremely low incidence of heart disease. Therefore Alice concludes with near
certainty that Umeko has a viral infection.
Observation 2 k-Anonymity does not protect against attacks based on background
knowledge.
We have demonstrated (using the homogeneity and background knowledge
attacks) that a k-anonymous table may disclose sensitive information. Since
both of these attacks are plausible in real life, we need a stronger definition
of privacy that takes into account diversity and background knowledge. This
chapter addresses this very issue.
3.1.2 Contributions and Chapter Outline
We start by introducing an ideal notion of privacy called Bayes-optimal for the
case that both data publisher and the adversary have knowledge of the com-
plete joint distribution of the sensitive and nonsensitive attributes (Section 3.3).
Unfortunately in practice, the data publisher is unlikely to possess all this in-
formation, and in addition, the adversary may have more specific background
knowledge than the data publisher. Hence, while Bayes-optimal privacy sounds
great in theory, it is unlikely that it can be guaranteed in practice. To address
this problem, we show that the notion of Bayes-optimal privacy naturally leads
to a novel practical criterion that we call `-diversity. `-Diversity provides privacy
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even when the data publisher does not know what kind of knowledge is pos-
sessed by the adversary. The main idea behind `-diversity is the requirement
that the values of the sensitive attributes are well-represented in each group
(Section 3.4). We show that existing algorithms for k-anonymity can be adapted
to compute `-diverse tables (Section 3.5), and we experimentally show that `-
diversity is practical and can be implemented efficiently (Section 3.6).
One of the main contributions of `-diversity is the formal methodology used
to reason about privacy. In Section 3.7 we present a more general framework for
privacy definitions. This framework extends our formal reasoning presented in
this chapter to help (a) design privacy definitions for new applications, and (b)
compare different privacy metrics.
Before presenting our contributions, we introduce the notation needed to
formally discuss data privacy in the next section.
3.2 Model and Notation
In this section we will introduce some basic notation that will be used in the
remainder of the paper. We will also discuss how a table can be anonymized
and what kind of background knowledge an adversary may possess.
Basic Notation. We assume that the microdata is in a single relational table
T{t1, t2, . . . , tn} with attributes A1, . . . , Am, and that T is a subset of some larger
population Ω. We also assume that each tuple ti ∈ T represents a unique indi-
vidual from the population. For example, if T houses the in-patient records of
Gotham City hospital, then Ω could be the population of the Gotham County.
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Let A denote the set of all attributes {A1, A2, . . . , Am} and t[Ai] denote the value
of attribute Ai for tuple t. If C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cp} ⊆ A then we use the notation
t[C] to denote the tuple (t[C1], . . . , t[Cp]), which is the projection of t onto the
attributes in C.
In privacy-preserving data publishing, there exist several important subsets
of A. A sensitive attribute is an attribute whose value for any particular individ-
ual must be kept secret from people (e.g., researchers) who have no direct access
to the original data. Let S denote the set of all sensitive attributes. An example
of a sensitive attribute is medical condition from Table 3.1. The association be-
tween individuals and medical condition should be kept secret; thus we should
not disclose which particular patients have cancer, but it is permissible to dis-
close the information that there exist cancer patients in the hospital. We assume
that the data publisher knows which attributes are sensitive. To simplify the
discussion, for much of this paper we will also assume that there is only one
sensitive attribute; the extension of our results to multiple sensitive attributes is
not difficult and is handled in Section 3.4.3. All attributes that are not sensitive
are called nonsensitive attributes. LetN denote the set of nonsensitive attributes.
We are now ready to formally define the notion of a quasi-identifier.
Definition 3.1 (Quasi-identifier) A set of nonsensitive attributes {Q1, . . . , Qw} of a
table is called a quasi-identifier if these attributes can be linked with external data to
uniquely identify at least one individual in the general population Ω.
One example of a quasi-identifier is a primary key like social security num-
ber. Another example is the set {Gender, Age, Zip Code} in the GIC dataset
that was used to identify the governor of Massachusetts as described in the in-
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troduction. Let us denote the set of all quasi-identifiers by QI. We are now
ready to formally define k-anonymity.
Definition 3.2 (k-Anonymity) A table T satisfies k-anonymity if for every tuple t ∈
T there exist k − 1 other tuples ti1 , ti2 , . . . , tik−1 ∈ T such that t[C] = ti1 [C] = ti2 [C] =
· · · = tik−1 [C] for all C ∈ QI.
The Anonymized Table T ?. Since the quasi-identifiers might uniquely iden-
tify tuples in T , the table T is not published; it is subjected to an anonymization
procedure and the resulting table T ? is published instead.
There has been a lot of research on techniques for anonymization (see Chap-
ter 5 for a discussion of related work). These techniques can be broadly clas-
sified into generalization techniques [7, 81], generalization with tuple suppression
techniques [18, 114], and data swapping and synthetic data generation techniques
[3, 4, 56, 106]. In this chapter we limit our discussion only to generalization
techniques; synthetic data generation techniques will be the focus of the next
chapter.
Definition 3.3 (Domain Generalization) A domain D? = {P1, P2, . . . } is a gen-
eralization (partition) of a domain D if
⋃
Pi = D and Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ whenever i 6= j.
For x ∈ D we let φD?(x) denote the element P ∈ D? that contains x.
Note that we can create a partial order≺G on domains by requiring D ≺G D?
if and only if D? is a generalization of D. Given a table T = {t1, . . . , tn} with
the set of nonsensitive attributes N and a generalization D?N of domain(N ), we
can construct a table T ? = {t?1, . . . , t?n} by replacing the value of ti[N ] with the
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generalized value φD?N (ti[N ]) to get a new tuple t
?
i . The tuple t?i is called a gener-
alization of the tuple ti and we use the notation ti
?→ t?i to mean “t?i generalizes
ti”. Extending the notation to tables, T
?→ T ? means “T ? is a generalization of
T”. Typically, ordered attributes are partitioned into intervals, and categorical
attributes are partitioned according to a user-defined hierarchy (for example,
cities are generalized to counties, counties to states, and states to regions).
Example 3.1 (Continued) Table 3.2 is a generalization of Table 3.1. We generalized
on the Zip Code attribute by partitioning it into two sets: “1485*” (representing all
zip codes whose first four digits are 1485) and “130**” (representing all zip codes whose
first three digits are 130). Then we partitioned Age into three groups: “< 30”, “3*”
(representing all ages between 30 and 39), and “≥ 40”. Finally, we partitioned Nation-
ality into just one set “*” representing all nationalities.
The Adversary’s Background Knowledge. Since the background knowl-
edge attack was due to the adversary’s additional knowledge about the table,
let us briefly discuss the type of background knowledge that we are modeling.
First, the adversary has access to the published table T ? and she knows that
T ? is a generalization of some base table T . The adversary also knows the do-
main of each attribute of T .
Second, the adversary may know that some individuals are in the table. This
knowledge is often easy to acquire. For example, GIC published medical data
about all Massachusetts state employees. If the adversary Alice knows that her
neighbor Bruce is a Massachusetts state employee then Alice is almost certain
that Bruce’s information is contained in that table. In this case, we assume that
Alice knows all of Bruce’s nonsensitive attributes. In addition, the adversary
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could have knowledge about the sensitive attributes of specific individuals in
the population and/or the table. For example, the adversary Alice might know
that neighbor Bruce does not have pneumonia since Bruce does not show any
of the symptoms of pneumonia. We call such knowledge “instance-level back-
ground knowledge,” since it is associated with specific instances in the table. In
addition, Alice may know complete information about some people in the table
other than Bruce (for example, Alice’s data may be in the table).
Third, the adversary could have partial knowledge about the distribution
of sensitive and nonsensitive attributes in the population. We call this “demo-
graphic background knowledge.” For example, the adversary may know
P
(
t[Condition] = “cancer”
∣∣ t[Age] ≥ 40) and may use it to make additional in-
ferences about records in the table.
Now armed with the right notation, let us start looking into principles and
definitions of privacy that leak little information.
3.3 Bayes-Optimal Privacy
In this section we analyze an ideal notion of privacy. We call it Bayes-Optimal
Privacy since it involves modeling background knowledge as a probability dis-
tribution over the attributes and uses Bayesian inference techniques to reason
about privacy. We introduce tools for reasoning about privacy (Section 3.3.1),
use them to discuss theoretical principles of privacy (Section 3.3.2), and then
point out the difficulties that need to be overcome to arrive at a practical defini-
tion of privacy (Section 3.3.3).
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3.3.1 Changes in Belief Due to Data Publishing
For simplicity of discussion, we combine all the nonsensitive attributes into a
single, multi-dimensional quasi-identifier attribute Q whose values are gener-
alized to create the anonymized table T ? from the base table T . Since Bayes-
optimal privacy is only used to motivate a practical definition, we make the
following two simplifying assumptions: first, we assume that T is a simple ran-
dom sample from some larger population Ω (a sample of size n drawn without
replacement is called a simple random sample if every sample of size n is equally
likely); second, we assume that there is a single sensitive attribute. We would
like to emphasize that both these assumptions will be dropped in Section 3.4
when we introduce a practical definition of privacy.
Recall that in our attack model, the adversary Alice has partial knowledge
of the distribution of the sensitive and non-sensitive attributes. Let us assume
a worst case scenario where Alice knows the complete joint distribution f of Q
and S (i.e., she knows their frequency in the population Ω). Consider any indi-
vidual Bruce that Alice knows is in the table. She knows that Bruce corresponds
to a record t ∈ T that has been generalized to a record t∗? in the published table
T ?. She also knows the value of Bruce’s non-sensitive attributes (i.e., she knows
that t[Q] = q). Alice’s goal is to use her background knowledge to discover
Bruce’s sensitive information — the value of t[S]. We gauge her success using
two quantities: Alice’s prior belief, and her posterior belief.
Alice’s prior belief, α(q,s), that Bruce’s sensitive attribute is s given that his
nonsensitive attribute is q, is just her background knowledge:
α(q,s) = Pf
(
t[S] = s
∣∣ t[Q] = q)
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After Alice observes the table T ?, her belief about Bruce’s sensitive attribute
changes. This new belief, β(q,s,T ?), is her posterior belief :
β(q,s,T ?) = Pf
(
t[S] = s
∣∣ t[Q] = q ∧ ∃t? ∈ T ?, t ?→ t?)
Given f and T ?, we can derive a formula for β(q,s,T ?) which will help us for-
mulate our new privacy definition in Section 3.4. The main idea behind the
derivation is to find a set of equally likely disjoint random worlds (like in [16])
such that a conditional probability P (A|B) is the number of worlds satisfying
condition A ∧B divided by the number of worlds satisfying condition B.
Theorem 3.1 Let T ? be a published table which is obtained by performing generaliza-
tions on a table T ; let X be an individual with X[Q] = q who appears in the table T
(and also T ?); let q? be the generalized value of q in T ?; let s be a possible value of the
sensitive attribute; let n(q?,s′) be the number of tuples t? ∈ T ? where t?[Q] = q? and
t?[S] = s′; and let f(s′ | q?) be the conditional probability of the sensitive attribute
being s′ conditioned on the fact that the nonsensitive attribute Q is some q′ which can
be generalized to q?. Then the observed belief that X[S] = s is given by:
β(q,s,T ?) =
n(q?,s)
f(s|q)
f(s|q?)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
f(s′|q)
f(s′|q?)
(3.1)
Proof. For ease of reference, we review the notation used in this proof in Ta-
ble 3.3. To help us model the adversary’s uncertainty about the value of Bruce’s
sensitive attribute after seeing the anonymized table T ?, we will construct a
set of random worlds such that T ? could have come from any one of these ran-
dom worlds with equal probability. In all of these worlds, Bruce (or X , as we
will call him in this proof) appears in T ?. In any two different random worlds,
either some individual in the population has a different value for the sensitive
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Table 3.3: Notation used in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Notation Description
T Un-anonymized table
T ? The anonymized table
Q Domain of the quasi-identifier attribute
Q? Generalized domain of the quasi-identifier attribute
S Domain of the sensitive attribute
Ω Population of individuals
Bruce, the individual in the population Ω with X[Q] = q
X
and who is known to be in T
Nq Number of individuals w in the population Ω such that w[Q] = q
Number of individuals w in the population Ω
N(q,s) such that w[Q] = q and w[S] = s
Number of individuals w in the population Ω
N(q?,s) such that w[S] = s and w[Q?] = q?
n Number of tuples in the anonymized table T ?
Number of tuples t? in the anonymized table T ?
n(q?,s) such that t?[S] = s and t?[Q?] = q?
attribute, or a different set of individuals appear in T ?. Since the random worlds
are equally likely and mutually exclusive, the required conditional probability
is the fraction of the total number of worlds in which X[S] = s (as in [16]).
Constructing the set of random worlds:
Formally, a random world is a pair (ψ,Zn). ψ : Ω → S is an assignment of
sensitive values for each individual ω ∈ Ω. Zn is a simple random sample of n
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individuals from Ω. We are interested in only those assignments ψ which are
consistent with the adversary’s background knowledge. In particular, the ad-
versary knows the size of Ω and the distribution of sensitive and nonsensitive
attributes; i.e., for every (q, s), the adversary knows N(q,s) – the number of indi-
viduals with nonsensitive attribute q who have sensitive value s. Therefore for
every (q, s), ψ should assign the value s to exactly N(q,s) out of the Nq individuals
who have the nonsensitive value q. Note that in any two distinct assignments
ψ1, ψ2 there is some individual ω such that ψ1(ω) 6= ψ2(ω); i.e., ω is assigned to
different values of S. Given only knowledge of the distribution of sensitive and
nonsensitive attributes, the adversary has no preference for any of the ψ and,
invoking the principle of indifference, considers each ψ to be equally likely.
The second component of a random world is Zn. Zn is a size n simple ran-
dom sample from the population Ω. By the definition of a simple random sam-
ple, each Zn is equally likely. Since the sample Zn is picked independent of the
assignment ψ, each random world (ψ,Zn) is equally likely.
Each (ψ,Zn) describes a table T(ψ,Zn) containing n tuples with Q and S as
attributes. We are interested in only those random worlds where X appears
in T(ψ,Zn) and where T(ψ,Zn)
?→ T ?. We can rephrase this condition as follows.
We say that a random world (ψ,Zn) is compatible with the published table T ?
containing X , written as (ψ,Zn) ` (T ?, X), if the following two conditions hold:
1. X ∈ Zn, where X is the individual with X[Q] = q who is known to be in
the table; and
2. for every (q?, s) pair there are n(q?,s) individuals ω in Zn such that ω[Q] is
generalized to q? and such that ψ(ω) = s.
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The set of compatible random worlds completely characterizes the set of worlds
which give rise to the anonymized table T ? containing X . It is clear that these
worlds are equally likely. Also any two compatible random worlds are mutu-
ally exclusive because either some individual in the population is assigned a
different value for S or the sample of individuals Zn is different.
Calculating the conditional probability β(q,s,T ?):
To calculate the conditional probability β(q,s,T ?), we need to find the fraction of
the total number of compatible random worlds in which X is assigned the sensi-
tive value s. Let T ?X = {(ψ,Zn) ` (T ?, X)} be the set of random worlds which are
compatible with T ? containing X . Let T ?(X,s) = {(ψ,Zn) ` (T ?, X)| ψ(X) = s} be
the set of random worlds compatible with T ? where X is assigned the sensitive
value s. Then,
β(q,s,T ?) =
|T ?(X,s)|
|T ?X |
Note that T ?(X,s1) and T ?(X,s2) are disjoint sets of random worlds – in all the worlds
in T ?(X,s1), X is assigned the sensitive value s1 and in all the world in T ?(X,s2), X is
assigned the sensitive value s2. Thus
|T ?X | =
∑
s′∈S
|T ?(X,s′)|
We now proceed to calculate the cardinality of T ?(X,s) for each s. First we will
compute the number of assignments ψ such that ψ(X) = s and then for each
ψ we will compute the number of samples Zn such that (ψ,Zn) ` (T ?, X). The
number of assignments ψ compatible with the background knowledge such that
ψ(X) = s can be calculated as follows. X is assigned the sensitive value s. Since
X[Q] = q, out of the remaining Nq−1 individuals having the nonsensitive value
q, N(q,s) − 1 of them are assigned s. For every other sensitive value s′, N(q,s′) out
of the Nq − 1 individuals are assigned s′. For every q′ 6= q and every s′, some
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N(q′,s′) out of the N ′q individuals having the nonsensitive value q′ are assigned s′.
The number of these assignments is
(Nq − 1)!
(N(q,s) − 1)!
∏
s′ 6=s
N(q,s′)!
×
∏
q′ 6=q
Nq′ !∏
s′∈S
N(q′,s′)!
=
N(q,s)
Nq
∏
q′∈Q
Nq′ !∏
s′∈S
N(q′,s′)!
(3.2)
For each mapping ψ such that ψ(X) = s, we count the number of Zn’s such
that (ψ,Zn) ` (T ?, X) as follows. Let q? be the generalized value of q = X[Q].
X’s record will appear as t?X = (q
?, s) in the table T ?. Apart from t?X , T
? contains
n(q?,s)−1 other tuples of the form (q?, s). Hence, apart fromX , Zn should contain
n(q?,s) − 1 other individuals ω with ψ(ω) = s and ω[Q] = q′ where q′ generalizes
to q?. For all other (q?′, s′) such that q?′ 6= q? or s′ 6= s, Zn should contain n(q?′,s′)
individuals ω′ where ψ(ω′) = s′ and q?′ is the generalized value of ω[Q]. The
number of Zn’s is given by(
N(q?,s) − 1
n(q?,s) − 1
)
×
∏
(q?′,s′)∈(Q?×S)−{(q?,s)}
(
N(q?′,s′)
n(q?′,s′)
)
=
nq?,s
N(q?,s)
∏
(q?′,s′)∈Q?×S
(
N(q?′,s′)
n(q?′,s′)
)
(3.3)
The cardinality of T ?(X,s) is therefore the product of Equations 3.2 and 3.3 and can
be expressed as
|T ?(X,s)| =
N(q,s)
Nq
∏
q′∈Q
Nq′ !∏
s′∈S
N(q′,s′)!
× nq?,s
N(q?,s)
∏
(q?′,s′)∈Q?×S
(
N(q?′,s′)
n(q?′,s′)
)
= n(q?,s)
N(q,s)
N(q?,s)
× 1
Nq
∏
q′∈Q
Nq′ !∏
s′∈S
N(q′,s′)!
×
∏
(q?′,s′)∈Q?×S
(
N(q?′,s′)
n(q?′,s′)
)
= n(q?,s)
N(q,s)
N(q?,s)
× E
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The expression E is the same for all s′ ∈ S. Hence, the expression for the ob-
served belief is
β(q,s,T ?) =
|T ?(X,s)|∑
s′∈S |T ?(X,s′)|
=
n(q?,s)
N(q,s)
N(q?,s)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
N(q,s′)
N(q?,s′)
Using the substitutions f(q, s) = N(q,s)/N and f(q?, s) = N(q?,s)/N , we get the
required expression.
β(q,s,T ?) =
n(q?,s)
f(q,s)
f(q?,s)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
f(q,s′)
f(q?,s′)
=
n(q?,s)
f(s|q)
f(s|q?)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
f(s′|q)
f(s′|q?)
Note that in the special case when S and Q are independent, The expression for
the observed belief simplifies to
β(q,s,T ?) =
n(q?,s)
f(s|q)
f(s|q?)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
f(s′|q)
f(s′|q?)
=
n(q?,s)
f(s)
f(s)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
f(s′)
f(s′)
=
n(q?,s)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
Armed with a way of calculating Alice’s belief about Bruce’s private data af-
ter she has seen T ∗, let us now examine some principles for building definitions
of privacy.
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3.3.2 Privacy Principles
Given the adversary’s background knowledge, a published table T ? might leak
private information in two important ways: positive disclosure and negative dis-
closure.
Definition 3.4 (Positive disclosure) Publishing the table T ? that was derived from
T results in a positive disclosure if the adversary can correctly identify the value of a
sensitive attribute with high probability; i.e., given a δ > 0, there is a positive disclosure
if β(q,s,T ?) > 1− δ and there exists t ∈ T such that t[Q] = q and t[S] = s.
Definition 3.5 (Negative disclosure) Publishing the table T ? that was derived from
T results in a negative disclosure if the adversary can correctly eliminate some possible
values of the sensitive attribute (with high probability); i.e., given an ² > 0, there is a
negative disclosure if β(q,s,T ?) < ² and there exists a t ∈ T such that t[Q] = q but
t[S] 6= s.
The homogeneity attack in Section 3.1.1 where Alice determined that Bruce
has cancer is an example of a positive disclosure. Similarly, in the example
from Section 3.1.1, even without background knowledge Alice can deduce that
Umeko does not have cancer. This is an example of a negative disclosure.
Note that not all positive disclosures are disastrous; if the prior belief was
that α(q,s) > 1 − δ, the adversary would not have learned anything new. Simi-
larly, negative disclosures are not always bad: discovering that Bruce does not
have Ebola might not be very serious because the prior belief of this event was
small. Hence, the ideal definition of privacy can be based on the following prin-
ciple:
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Principle 3.1 (Uninformative Principle) The published table should provide the ad-
versary with little additional information beyond the background knowledge. In other
words, there should not be a large difference between the prior and posterior beliefs.
The uninformative principle can be instantiated in several ways, for example
with the (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy breach definition [62].
Definition 3.6 ((ρ1, ρ2)-privacy) Given a table T ∗ and two constants ρ1 and ρ2, we
say that a (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy breach has occurred when either α(q,s) < ρ1 ∧ β(q,s,T ?) > ρ2
or when α(q,s) > 1 − ρ1 ∧ β(q,s,T ?) < 1 − ρ2. If a (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy breach has not
occurred, then table T ∗ satisfies (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy.
An alternative privacy definition based on the uninformative principle would
bound the maximum difference between α(q,s) and β(q,s,T ?) using any of the func-
tions commonly used to measure the difference between probability distribu-
tions. Any privacy definition that is based on the uninformative principle, and
instantiated either by a (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy breach definition or by bounding the
difference between α(q,s) and β(q,s,T ?) is a Bayes-optimal privacy definition. The
specific choice of definition depends on the application.
Note that any Bayes-optimal privacy definition captures diversity in addi-
tion to background knowledge. To see how it captures diversity, suppose that
all the tuples whose nonsensitive attribute Q have been generalized to q? have
the same value s for their sensitive attribute. Then n(q?,s′) = 0 for all s′ 6= s and
hence the value of the observed belief β(q,s,T ?) becomes 1 in Equation 3.1. This
will be flagged as a breach whenever the prior belief is not close to 1.
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3.3.3 Limitations of the Bayes-Optimal Privacy
For the purposes of our discussion, we are more interested in the properties of
Bayes-optimal privacy rather than its exact instantiation. In particular, Bayes-
optimal privacy has several drawbacks that make it hard to use in practice.
Insufficient Knowledge. The data publisher is unlikely to know the full dis-
tribution f of sensitive and nonsensitive attributes over the general population
Ω from which T is a sample.
The Adversary’s Knowledge is Unknown. It is also unlikely that the adver-
sary has knowledge of the complete joint distribution between the non-sensitive
and sensitive attributes. However, the data publisher does not know how much
the adversary knows. For example, in the background knowledge attack in Sec-
tion 3.1.1, Alice knew that Japanese have a low incidence of heart disease, but
the data publisher did not know that Alice knew this piece of information.
Instance-Level Knowledge. The theoretical definition does not protect
against knowledge that cannot be modeled probabilistically. For example, sup-
pose Bruce’s son tells Alice that Bruce does not have diabetes. The theoretical
definition of privacy will not be able to protect against such adversaries.
Multiple Adversaries. There will likely be multiple adversaries with dif-
ferent levels of knowledge, each of which is consistent with the full joint dis-
tribution. Suppose Bruce has a disease that is (a) very likely among people in
the age group [30-50], but (b) is very rare for people of that age group who are
doctors. An adversary who only knows the interaction of age and illness will
think that it is very likely for Bruce to have that disease. However, an adversary
who also knows that Bruce is a doctor is more likely to think that Bruce does not
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have that disease. Thus, although additional knowledge can yield better infer-
ences on average, there are specific instances where it does not. Thus the data
publisher must take into account all possible levels of background knowledge.
3.4 `-Diversity: Privacy beyond k-Anonymity
In this section we discuss how to overcome the difficulties outlined at the end
of the previous section. We derive the `-diversity principle (Section 3.4.1), show
how to instantiate it with specific definitions of privacy (Section 3.4.2), outline
how to handle multiple sensitive attributes (Section 3.4.3), and discuss how `-
diversity addresses the issues raised in the previous section (Section 3.4.4).
3.4.1 The `-Diversity Principle
In this subsection we will derive the principle of `-diversity in two ways. First,
we will derive it in an ideal theoretical setting where it can be shown that the
adversary’s background knowledge will not lead to a privacy breach. Then
we will re-derive the `-diversity principle from a more practical starting point
and show that even under less-than-ideal circumstances, `-diversity can still
defend against background knowledge that is unknown to the data publisher.
Although the arguments in this subsection can be made precise, we will keep
our discussion at an intuitive level for the sake of clarity.
Let us re-examine the expression for computing the adversary’s observed
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belief (Theorem 3.1):
β(q,s,T ?) =
n(q?,s)
f(s|q)
f(s|q?)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
f(s′|q)
f(s′|q?)
(3.4)
For the moment, let us consider an ideal setting where if two objects have
“similar” nonsensitive attributes then their sensitive attributes have similar
probabilistic behavior. More formally, given a similarity measure d(·, ·) then
∀² > 0, ∃δ such that if d(q1, q2) < δ then maxs |f(s|q1) − f(s|q2)| < ². This sim-
ilarity assumption is implicit in many data analysis algorithms, for instance in
all k-Nearest Neighbor classifiers.
Now let us define a q?-block to be the set of tuples in T ? whose nonsensitive
attribute values generalize to q?. If all tuples in a q?-block are “similar” based
on their nonsensitive attributes, then f(s|q) ≈ f(s|q?) for those q that appear in
the q?-block, and because of (approximate) cancellations, Equation 3.4 could be
approximated arbitrarily well by Equation 3.5:
L(q, s, T ?) =
n(q?,s)∑
s′∈S n(q?,s′)
(3.5)
Thus given enough data and a good partitioning, background knowledge
cancels out and has no effect on the inferences that can be made from the table!
The only inferences that can be made are those that depend solely on the n(q∗,s′)
– the frequencies of each s′ ∈ S for each q∗-block. Therefore to prevent privacy
breaches, we need to ensure for every q∗-block that the ` most frequent values
of S have roughly the same frequencies. This guarantees that P (s|q∗) ≤ 1/(`+²)
for some small ² > 0 and for all s ∈ S and ensures that Alice will be uncertain
about Bruce’s true medical condition. This is the essence of `-diversity.
All of the above arguments relied on the following three assumptions: tuples
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with similar non-sensitive attributes values have similar sensitive attributes val-
ues, there is a good partitioning of the data, and there is a large amount of data
so that many “similar” tuples fall into each partition. Let us re-examine privacy
breaches when these assumptions do not hold.
Recall that Theorem 3.1 allows us to calculate the observed belief of the ad-
versary. Consider the case of positive disclosures; i.e., Alice wants to determine
that Bruce has t[S] = s with very high probability. From Theorem 3.1, this can
happen only when:
∃s, ∀s′ 6= s, n(q?,s′) f(s
′|q)
f(s′|q?) ¿ n(q?,s)
f(s|q)
f(s|q?) (3.6)
The condition in Equation (3.6) could occur due to a combination of two factors:
(i) a lack of diversity in the sensitive attributes in the q?-block, and/or (ii) strong
background knowledge. Let us discuss these in turn.
Lack of Diversity. Lack of diversity in the sensitive attribute manifests itself
as follows:
∀s′ 6= s, n(q?,s′) ¿ n(q?,s) (3.7)
In this case, almost all tuples have the same value s for the sensitive attribute
S, and thus β(q,s,T ?) ≈ 1. Note that this condition can be easily checked since it
only involves counting the values of S in the published table T ?. We can ensure
diversity by requiring that all the possible values s′ ∈ domain(S) occur in the q?-
block with roughly equal proportions. This, however, is likely to cause signifi-
cant loss of information: if domain(S) is large then the q?-blocks will necessarily
be large and so the data will be partitioned into a small number of q?-blocks.
Another way to ensure diversity and to guard against Equation 3.7 is to require
that a q?-block has at least ` ≥ 2 different sensitive values such that the ` most
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frequent values (in the q?-block) have roughly the same frequency. We say that
such a q?-block is well-represented by ` sensitive values.
Strong Background Knowledge. The other factor that could lead to a pos-
itive disclosure (Equation 3.6) is strong background knowledge. Even though
a q?-block may have ` “well-represented” sensitive values, Alice may still be
able to use her background knowledge to eliminate sensitive values when the
following is true:
∃s′, f(s
′|q)
f(s′|q?) ≈ 0 (3.8)
This equation states that Bruce with quasi-identifier t[Q] = q is much less likely
to have sensitive value s′ than any other individual in the q?-block. For exam-
ple, Alice may know that Bruce never travels, and thus he is extremely unlikely
to have Ebola. It is not possible for a data publisher to reveal some infor-
mation about the data while still guarding against attacks employing arbitrary
amounts of background knowledge (since the revealed information may be pre-
cisely what the adversary needs to recreate the entire table). However, the data
publisher can still guard against many attacks even without having access to Al-
ice’s background knowledge. In our model, Alice might know the distribution
f(q, s) over the sensitive and non-sensitive attributes, in addition to the condi-
tional distribution f(s|q). The most damaging type of such information has the
form f(s|q) ≈ 0, e.g., “men do not have breast cancer”, or the form of Equa-
tion 3.8, e.g., “Japanese have a very low incidence of heart disease”. Note that
a priori information of the form f(s|q) = 1 is not as harmful since this positive
disclosure is independent of the published table T ?. Alice can also eliminate
sensitive values with instance-level knowledge such as “Bruce does not have
diabetes”.
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In spite of such background knowledge, if there are ` “well represented” sen-
sitive values in a q?-block, then Alice needs `−1 damaging pieces of background
knowledge to eliminate ` − 1 possible sensitive values and infer a positive dis-
closure! Thus, by setting the parameter `, the data publisher can determine
how much protection is provided against background knowledge — even if
this background knowledge is unknown to the publisher.
Note that Alice may know ` pieces of instance-level background knowledge
of the form “individual Xi does not have disease Y ” (for i = 1 . . . `), where each
Xi is a different individual. However, we have been talking only about elimi-
nating sensitive values for a single individual. It has been shown [92] that for a
specific individual Bruce, the worst case disclosure occurs when Xi = Bruce in
all the ` pieces of information Alice possesses.
Moreover, when inferring information about Bruce, knowing the exact sen-
sitive values of some other individuals in the table is less damaging than state-
ments of the form “Bruce does not have cancer”. This is because knowing the
sensitive value for some other individual only eliminates from consideration
one tuple that may have corresponded to Bruce while the latter statement elim-
inates at least one tuple.
Putting these arguments together, we arrive at the following principle for
protecting against adversaries with unknown background knowledge.
Principle 3.2 (`-Diversity Principle) A q?-block is `-diverse if contains at least `
“well-represented” values for the sensitive attribute S. A table is `-diverse if every
q?-block is `-diverse.
Returning to our example, consider the inpatient records shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.4: 3-Diverse Inpatient microdata.
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 1305* ≤ 40 ∗ Heart Disease
4 1305* ≤ 40 ∗ Viral Infection
9 1305* ≤ 40 ∗ Cancer
10 1305* ≤ 40 ∗ Cancer
5 1485* > 40 ∗ Cancer
6 1485* > 40 ∗ Heart Disease
7 1485* > 40 ∗ Viral Infection
8 1485* > 40 ∗ Viral Infection
2 1306* ≤ 40 ∗ Heart Disease
3 1306* ≤ 40 ∗ Viral Infection
11 1306* ≤ 40 ∗ Cancer
12 1306* ≤ 40 ∗ Cancer
Table 3.4 is a 3-diverse version of the table. Comparing it with the 4-anonymous
Table 3.2 we see that the attacks against the 4-anonymous table are prevented by
the 3-diverse table. For example, Alice cannot infer from the 3-diverse table that
Bruce (a 31 year old American from zip code 13053) has cancer. Even though
Umeko (a 21 year old Japanese from zip code 13068) is extremely unlikely to
have heart disease, Alice is still unsure whether Umeko has a viral infection or
cancer.
The `-diversity principle advocates ensuring ` “well represented” values for
the sensitive attribute in every q?-block, but does not clearly state what “well
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represented” means. Note that we called it a “principle” instead of a definition
— we will use it to give two concrete instantiations of the `-diversity principle
and discuss their relative trade-offs.
3.4.2 `-Diversity: Instantiations
In this section we will give two instantiations of the `-diversity principle: en-
tropy `-diversity and recursive `-diversity. After presenting the basic defini-
tions, we’ll extend them to cases where some positive disclosure is allowed.
The first instantiation of the `-diversity principle, and the simplest one to
describe, uses the information-theoretic notion of entropy:
Definition 3.7 (Entropy `-Diversity [100]) A table is Entropy `-Diverse if for ev-
ery q?-block
−
∑
s∈S
p(q?,s) log(p(q?,s′)) ≥ log(`)
where p(q?,s) =
n(q?,s)∑
s′∈S
n(q?,s′)
is the fraction of tuples in the q?-block with sensitive attribute
value equal to s.
As a consequence of the above condition, every q?-block has at least ` distinct
values for the sensitive attribute. Using this definition, Figure 3.4 is actually
2.8-diverse.
Entropy `-diversity was first proposed by Ohrn et al. [100] as a way of de-
fending against the homogeneity problem (without considering the role of back-
ground knowledge). Note that entropy `-diversity captures the notion of well-
represented groups due to the fact that entropy increases as frequencies become
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more uniform. We can also capture the role of background knowledge more
explicitly with an alternate definition.
Let s1, . . . , sm be the possible values of the sensitive attribute S in a q?-block.
Assume that we sort the counts n(q?,s1), . . . , n(q?,sm) in descending order and
name the elements of the resulting sequence r1, . . . , rm. One way to think about
`-diversity is the following: the adversary needs to eliminate at least ` − 1 pos-
sible values of S in order to infer a positive disclosure. This means that, for
example, in a 2-diverse table, none of the sensitive values should appear too
frequently. We say that a q?-block is (c, 2)-diverse if r1 < c(r2 + · · · + rm) for
some user-specified constant c. For ` > 2, we say that a q?-block satisfies recur-
sive (c, `)-diversity if we can eliminate one possible sensitive value in the q?-block
and still have a (c, `−1)-diverse block. This recursive definition can be succinctly
stated as follows:
Definition 3.8 (Recursive (c, `)-Diversity) In a given q?-block, let ri denote the
number of times the ith most frequent sensitive value appears in that q?-block. Given a
constant c, the q?-block satisfies recursive (c, `)-diversity if r1 < c(r`+r`+1+· · ·+rm).
A table T ? satisfies recursive (c, `)-diversity if every q?-block satisfies recursive `-
diversity. We say that 1-diversity is always satisfied.
Now, both entropy and recursive `-diversity may be too restrictive. To see
why, let us first look at entropy `-diversity. Since −x log(x) is a concave func-
tion, it can be shown that if we split a q?-block into two sub-blocks q?a and q?b
then entropy(q?) ≥ min(entropy(q?a), entropy(q?b )). This implies that in order for
entropy `-diversity to be possible, the entropy of the entire table must be at least
log(`). This might not be the case, especially if one value of the sensitive at-
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tribute is very common – for example, if 90% of the patients have cancer as the
value for the medical condition attribute.
This is also a problem with recursive `-diversity. It is easy to see that if 90%
of the patients have cancer as the value for the medical condition attribute then
there will be at least one q∗-block where cancer will have frequency of at least
90%. Therefore if we choose c < 9 in Definition 3.8, no generalization of the base
table will satisfy recursive (c, `)-diversity.
One the other hand, some positive disclosures may be acceptable. For ex-
ample, a clinic might be allowed to disclose that a patient has a cancer because
it is well known that most patients who visit the clinic have heart problems.
It may also be allowed to disclose that medical condition = healthy if this is not
considered an invasion of privacy.
At this point one may be tempted to remove tuples with nonsensitive med-
ical condition values, publish them unaltered, and then create an `-diverse ver-
sion of the remaining dataset. In some cases this is acceptable. However, there
are three important issues why the above suggestion may not be acceptable: the
anonymity of the unaltered tuples, the privacy of the remaining tuples, and the
utility of the resulting published data.
First, publishing unaltered tuples gives an adversary the ability to link them
to external data and identify the corresponding individuals. This may be con-
sidered a privacy breach [29], since it is reasonable for individuals to object to
being identified as respondents in a survey. To avoid this, one could publish a
k-anonymous version of tuples with nonsensitive medical condition values and
a `-diverse version of the rest of the table.
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Second, separating individuals with nonsensitive medical conditions from
the rest can impact the individuals with sensitive medical conditions. As an
extreme case, suppose medical condition can only take two values: healthy and
sick. There is no way to achieve 2-diversity on the table of patients that are
sick; if Alice knows Bruce is in the table and Bruce is not listed as a healthy
patient, he must then be sick. More generally, separating records with sensitive
values from records with nonsensitive values reduces the possible choices for
the security parameter `.
A third issue with partitioning the data into two tables is related to the utility
of the data for a researcher. Since each of the tables is smaller than the whole
dataset, to satisfy k-anonymity and `-diversity the tables might have to be gen-
eralized more than if a single table had been anonymized. For instance, consider
a table reporting the gender and medical condition of 2,000 individuals, where
the attribute medical condition can take three values: healthy, cancer, and hep-
atitis. Suppose in this table there are 1,000 males and 1,000 females; 700 of the
1,000 males are healthy and the other 300 have hepatitis, and 700 of the 1,000
females are healthy while the other 300 have cancer. If the disclosure of medical
condition = healthy is not considered an invasion of privacy, then this table satis-
fies 2-diversity (and thus requires no further generalizations). In contrast, if we
were to publish the healthy patients separately, we would need to suppress the
gender information of the unhealthy individuals in order to achieve 2-diversity
on the table containing the unhealthy patients. Additionally, if the data is sep-
arated then the two resulting tables are likely to have different schemas. For
example, one table may be generalized so that age appears as an interval of
length 5 (i.e. [30-34]) and only the first 4 digits of zip code are given, while the
second table may give the full zip code but may generalize age to intervals of
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length 10. Learning from such data is not as straightforward as learning from a
single table, and in some cases can be intractable [86].
Thus an alternate approach is needed to handle the case when some of the
values in the domain of the sensitive attribute need not be kept private. To
capture this notion that some positive disclosure is acceptable, let Y be the set
of those sensitive values for which positive disclosure is allowed. We call Y a
don’t-care set; we are not worried about those values being too frequent. Let
sy be the most frequent sensitive value in the q?-block that is not in Y and let
ry be the associated frequency. Then the q?-block satisfies `-diversity if we can
eliminate the `− 2 most frequent values of S not including ry without making sy
too frequent in the resulting set. Thus, if we remove the sensitive values with
counts r1, . . . , ry−1, then the result is (` − y + 1)-diverse. This brings us to the
following definition.
Definition 3.9 (Positive Disclosure-Recursive (c, `)-Diversity). Let Y ⊂ S be a
don’t-care set. In a given q?-block, let the most frequent sensitive value not in Y be the
yth most frequent sensitive value. Let ri denote the frequency of the ith most frequent
sensitive value in the q?-block. Such a q?-block satisfies pd-recursive (c, `)-diversity
when one of the following holds:
• when y ≤ `− 1 and ry < c
m∑
j=`
rj
• when y > `− 1 and ry < c
y−1∑
j=`−1
rj + c
m∑
j=y+1
rj
We denote the summations on the right hand side of the both conditions by tailq?(sy).
Now, note that if ry = 0 then the q?-block only has sensitive values that
can be disclosed and so both conditions in Definition 3.9 are trivially satisfied.
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Second, note that if c > 1 then the second condition clearly reduces to just the
condition y > ` − 1 because ry ≤ r`−1. The second condition states that even
though the ` − 1 most frequent values can be disclosed, we still do not want ry
to be too frequent if `− 2 of them have been eliminated (i.e., we want the result
to be 2-diverse).
To see this definition in action, suppose there are two values for medical con-
dition, healthy and sick. If healthy is a don’t-care value, then (c, 2)-diversity states
that the number of sick patients in a q∗-block is less than c times the number of
healthy patients or, equivalently, at most c
c+1
patients in a q∗-block are sick. Thus
if c = 0.03 then at most 3% of the patients in any q∗-block are not healthy, and if
c = 1 then at most half the patients in any q∗-block are not healthy.
Entropy `-diversity can also be extended to handle don’t-care sets. The en-
tropy `-diversity with don’t-care sets can be analogously defined; its descrip-
tion is a bit more involved, and the interested reader may find the details in
Machanavajjhala et al. [91].
Until now we have treated negative disclosure as relatively unimportant
compared to positive disclosure. However, negative disclosure may also be im-
portant. If W is the set of values for the sensitive attribute for which negative
disclosure is not allowed then, given a user-specified constant c2 < 100, we
require that each s ∈ W appear in at least c2-percent of the tuples in every q?-
block, resulting in the following definition. This is incorporated into `-diversity
definitions in a straightforward way:
Definition 3.10 (NPD-Recursive (c1, c2, `)-Diversity). LetW be the set of sensitive
values for which negative disclosure is not allowed. A table satisfies negative/positive
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disclosure-recursive (c1, c2, `)-diversity (npd-recursive (c1, c2, `)-diversity) if it
satisfies pd-recursive (c1, `)-diversity and if every s ∈ W occurs in at least c2 percent
of the tuples in every q?-block.
3.4.3 Multiple Sensitive Attributes
Multiple sensitive attributes present some additional challenges. Suppose S
and V are two sensitive attributes, and consider the q?-block with the following
tuples: {(q?, s1, v1), (q?, s1, v2), (q?, s2, v3), (q?, s3, v3)}. This q?-block is 3-diverse
(actually recursive (2,3)-diverse) with respect to S (ignoring V ) and 3-diverse
with respect to V (ignoring S). However, if we know that Bruce is in this block
and his value for S is not s1 then his value for attribute V cannot be v1 or v2, and
therefore must be v3. One piece of information destroyed his privacy. Thus we
observe that a q∗-block that is `-diverse in each sensitive attribute separately may still
violate the principle of `-diversity.
Intuitively, the problem occurred because within the q∗-block, V was not
well-represented for each value of S. Had we treated S as part of the quasi-
identifier when checking for diversity in V (and vice versa), we would have
ensured that the `-diversity principle held for the entire table. Formally,
Definition 3.11 (Multi-Attribute `-Diversity) Let T be a table with nonsensitive
attributes Q1, . . . , Qm1 and sensitive attributes S1, . . . , Sm2 . We say that T is `-diverse
if for all i = 1 . . .m2, the table T is `-diverse when Si is treated as the sole sensi-
tive attribute and {Q1, . . . , Qm1 , S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sm2} is treated as the quasi-
identifier.
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As the number of sensitive attributes grows, it is not hard to see that we will
necessarily need larger and larger q∗-blocks to ensure diversity. This problem
may be ameliorated through tuple suppression, generalization on the sensitive
attributes, and publishing marginals (rather than the full table) containing dif-
ferent sensitive attributes. This is a subject for future work.
3.4.4 Discussion
Recall that we started our journey into Section 3.4 motivated by the weaknesses
of Bayes-optimal privacy. Let us now revisit these issues one by one.
• `-Diversity no longer requires knowledge of the full distribution of the
sensitive and nonsensitive attributes.
• `-Diversity does not even require the data publisher to have as much in-
formation as the adversary. The parameter ` protects against more knowl-
edgeable adversaries; the larger the value of `, the more information is
needed to rule out possible values of the sensitive attribute.
• Instance-level knowledge (Bruce’s son tells Alice that Bruce does not have
diabetes) is automatically covered. It is treated as just another way of rul-
ing out possible values of the sensitive attribute.
• Different adversaries can have different background knowledge leading
to different inferences. `-Diversity simultaneously protects against all of
them without the need for checking which inferences can be made with
which levels of background knowledge.
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Overall, we believe that `-diversity is practical, easy to understand, and
addresses the shortcomings of k-anonymity with respect to the background
knowledge and homogeneity attacks. Let us now see whether we can give
efficient algorithms to implement `-diversity. We will see that, unlike Bayes-
optimal privacy, `-diversity possesses a property called monotonicity. We define
this concept in Section 3.5, and we show how this property can be used to effi-
ciently generate `-diverse tables.
3.5 Implementing Anonymous Data Publishing
In this section we discuss how to build algorithms for `-diverse anonymous
data publishing using domain generalization. Let us first review the search
space for anonymous data publishing using domain generalization [18, 81, 82].
For ease of explanation, we will combine all the nonsensitive attributes into a
single multi-dimensional attribute Q. For attribute Q, there is a user-defined
generalization lattice. Formally, we define a generalization lattice to be a set
of domains partially ordered by a generalization relation ≺G (as described in
Section 2.2.1). The bottom element of this lattice is domain(Q) and the top ele-
ment is the domain where each dimension of Q is generalized to a single value.
Given a table T , each domain D?Q in the lattice defines an anonymized table
T ? which is constructed by replacing each tuple t ∈ T by the tuple t?, such
that the value t?[Q] ∈ D?Q is the generalization of the value t[Q] ∈ domain(Q).
An algorithm for data publishing should find a point on the lattice such that
the corresponding generalized table T ? preserves privacy and retains as much
utility as possible. In the literature, the utility of a generalized table is usually
defined as a distance metric on the lattice – the closer the lattice point is to the
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bottom, the larger the utility of the corresponding table T ?. Hence, finding a a
suitable anonymized table T ? is essentially a lattice search problem. There has
been work on search strategies for k-anonymous tables that explore the lattice
top-down [18] or bottom-up [81, 82].
In general, searching the entire lattice is computationally intractable. How-
ever, lattice searches can be made efficient if there is a stopping condition of
the form: if T ? preserves privacy then every generalization of T ? also preserves
privacy [81, 114]. This is called the monotonicity property, and it has been used
extensively in frequent itemset mining algorithms [11]. k-Anonymity satisfies
the monotonicity property, and it is this property which guarantees the correct-
ness of all efficient algorithms [18, 81, 82]. Thus, if we show that `-diversity
also possesses the monotonicity property, then we can re-use these efficient lat-
tice search algorithms to find the `-diverse table with optimal utility. The same
cannot be said of Bayes-optimal privacy; the following theorem gives a com-
putational reason why Bayes-optimal privacy does not lend itself to efficient
algorithmic implementations.
Theorem 3.2 Bayes-optimal privacy does not satisfy the monotonicity property.
Proof. We shall prove this theorem for the (ρ1, ρ2) version of the Bayes-optimal
privacy definition (see Definition 3.6 and [62]); the proof can easily be extended
to other instantiations. We set ρ1 = 0.31 and ρ2 = 0.58 and we will create an
example where the prior belief a(q,s) < ρ1 but the observed belief is β(q,s,T ?) > ρ2.
First consider Table 3.5 which shows a base table T with two values for Q
and two values for S. Based on this information, we can compute the prior and
observed beliefs for table T :
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Table 3.5: Table T for proof of Theorem 3.2.
q1 q2
s1 f(q1, s1) = .15 f(q2, s1) = .25
n(q1,s1) = 1 n(q2,s1) = 35
s2 f(q1, s2) = .35 f(q2, s2) = .25
n(q1,s2) = 1 n(q2,s2) = 15
Table 3.6: Table T ? for proof of Theorem 3.2.
q?
s1 f(q
?, s1) = .4
n(q?,s1) = 36
s2 f(q
?, s2) = .6
n(q?,s2) = 16
• α(q1,s1) = .3, β(q1,s1,T ) = .5
• α(q1,s2) = .7, β(q1,s2,T ) = .5
• α(q2,s1) = .5, β(q2,s1,T ) = .7
• α(q2,s2) = .5, β(q2,s2,T ) = .3
Clearly, publishing T does not breach privacy. However, suppose we general-
ized T by generalizing both q1 and q2 to q?, as in Table 3.6:
If Bob has nonsensitive value q1, then as before, α(q1,s1) = .3 < ρ1. However,
β(q1,s1,T ?) =
36 .15
.4
36 .15
.4
+ 16 .35
.6
>
13.5
13.5 + 9.34
> .59 > ρ2
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Thus while publishing T would not cause a privacy breach, publishing T ?
would. This counterexample proves that Bayes-optimal privacy is not mono-
tonic.
This seemingly counterintuitive result has a simple explanation. Note that
there are many more tuples t with t[Q] = q2 than there are with t[Q] = q1. This
causes the probabilistic behavior of the q?-block in T ? to be heavily influenced by
the tuples with t[Q] = s2 and so it “pulls” the value of β(q1,s1,T ?) = β(q2,s1,T ?) closer
to β(q2,s1,T ) (this can be verified with Equation 3.1 for observed belief). Since the
prior belief α(q1,s1) doesn’t change, and α(q1,s1) and α(q2,s1) are very different, we
get a privacy breach from publishing T ? but not from publishing T .
Theorem 3.3 (Monotonicity of entropy `-diversity) Entropy `-diversity satisfies
the monotonicity property: if a table T ? satisfies entropy `-diversity, then any gener-
alization T ?? of T ? also satisfies entropy `-diversity.
Theorem 3.3 follows from the fact that entropy is a concave function. Thus if
the q?-blocks q?1, . . . , q?d from table T
? are merged to form the q?-block q?? of table
T ??, then the entropy(q??) ≥ mini(entropy(q?i )).
Theorem 3.4 (Monotonicity of npd recursive `-diversity) The npd recursive
(c1, c2, `)-diversity criterion satisfies the monotonicity property: if a table T ? satisfies
npd recursive (c1, c2, `)-diversity, then any generalization T ?? of T ? also satisfies npd
recursive (c1, c2, `)-diversity.
Proof. We shall prove this for the case where T ∗∗ is derived from T ∗ by merging
two q?-blocks; the general case follows by induction. Let q?a and q?b be the q
?-
blocks of T ? that are merged to form the q?-block q?? of table T ??. The frequencies
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of the sensitive values in q?? is the sum of the corresponding frequencies in q?a
and q?b .
First, let us consider negative disclosures. If every sensitive value s ∈ W
occurs in at least c2 percent of the tuples in q?a and q?b , then surely s should also
occur in at least a c2 percent of the tuples in the q??.
Next let us consider positive disclosures. Let Y be the set of sensitive values
for which positive disclosure is allowed. Let sy be the most frequent sensitive
value in q?? that does not appear in Y . Let sya and syb be the most frequent
sensitive values in q?a and q?b , respectively, which are not in Y . Clearly if ry, rya
and ryb are the respective counts, then
ry ≤ rya + ryb
We also know that the q?-blocks q?a and q?b -block are (c1, `)-diverse (by hypothe-
sis). Hence,
rya ≤ c1 tailq?a(sya)
ryb ≤ c1 tailq?b (syb)
We are done if we prove that ry ≤ c1 tailq?(sy). Since sya is at least as frequent as
sy in q?a (and similarly for syb) then by the definition of tailq? , we have
tailq?a(sy) ≥ tailq?a(sya)
tailq?b (sy) ≥ tailq?b (syb)
tailq??(sy) = tailq?a(sy) + tailq?b (sy)
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Hence
ry ≤ rya + ryb
≤ c1(tailq?a(sya) + tailq?b (syb))
≤ c1(tailq?a(sy) + tailq?b (sy))
= c1 tailq??(sy)
and so the q?-block q?? is npd (c1, c2, `)-diverse.
We can also show that entropy `-diversity with don’t-care sets satisfies the
monotonicity property using analogous concavity arguments and is therefore
amenable to efficient algorithms. We refer the interested reader to Machanava-
jjhala et al. [91] for the details.
Thus to create an algorithm for `-diversity, we can take an algorithm for k-
anonymity that performs a lattice search and we make the following change:
every time a table T ? is tested for k-anonymity, we check for `-diversity in-
stead. Since `-diversity is a property that is local to each q?-block and since
all `-diversity tests are solely based on the counts of the sensitive values, this
test can be performed very efficiently.
We emphasize that this is only one way of generating `-diverse tables and it
is motivated by the structural similarities between k-anonymity and `-diversity.
Alternatively, one can post-process a k-anonymous table and suppress groups
that are not `-diverse or suppress tuples in groups until all groups are `-diverse;
one can directly modify a k-anonymity algorithm that uses suppression into an
`-diversity algorithm; or one can devise a completely new algorithm.
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Table 3.7: Description of Adult database.
Attribute Domain Generalizations Ht.
size type
1 Age 74 ranges-5,10,20 4
2 Gender 2 Suppression 1
3 Race 5 Suppression 1
4 Marital Status 7 Taxonomy tree 2
5 Education 16 Taxonomy tree 3
6 Native Country 41 Taxonomy tree 2
7 Work Class 7 Taxonomy tree 2
8 Salary class 2 Sensitive att.
9 Occupation 14 Sensitive att.
3.6 Experiments
In our experiments, we used an implementation of Incognito, as described in
[81], for generating k-anonymous tables. We modified this implementation so
that it produces `-diverse tables as well. Incognito is implemented in Java and
uses the database manager IBM DB2 v8.1 to store its data. All experiments were
run under Linux (Fedora Core 3) on a machine with a 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4
processor and 1 GB RAM.
We ran our experiments on the Adult Database from the UCI Machine Learn-
ing Repository [108] and the Lands End Database. The Adult Database con-
tains 45,222 tuples from US Census data and the Lands End Database contains
4,591,581 tuples of point-of-sale information. We removed tuples with missing
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Table 3.8: Description of Lands End database.
Attribute Domain Generalizations Ht.
size type
1 Zipcode 31953 Round each digit 5
2 Order date 320 Taxonomy tree 3
3 Gender 2 Suppression 1
4 Style 1509 Suppression 1
5 Price 346 Round each digit 4
6 Quantity 1 Suppression 1
7 Shipment 2 Suppression 1
8 Cost 147 Sensitive att.
values and adopted the same domain generalizations as [81]. Tables 3.7 and
3.8 provide a brief description of the data including the attributes we used, the
number of distinct values for each attribute, the type of generalization that was
used (for non-sensitive attributes), and the height of the generalization hierar-
chy for each attribute.
Homogeneity Attack. In Tables 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12, we illustrate the ho-
mogeneity attacks on k-anonymized datasets using the Lands End and Adult
databases. For the Lands End Database, we treated {Zipcode, Order Date, Gender,
Style, Price} as the quasi-identifier. We partitioned the Cost attribute into 147
buckets by rounding to the nearest 100 and used this as the sensitive attribute.
For the Adult Database, we used {Age, Gender, Race, Marital Status, Education}
as the quasi-identifier and Salary Class as the sensitive attribute. For values of
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Table 3.9: Effect of homogeneity attack on the Adult database.
k Affected Avg. Gps. Avg. Tuples
/Total tables Affected Affected
2 8/8 7.38 558.00
5 11/12 3.58 381.58
10 10/12 1.75 300.42
15 7/8 2.12 317.25
20 8/10 1.20 228.20
30 7/10 0.90 215.40
50 5/5 1.00 202.80
k = 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 50, we then generated all k-anonymous tables that were
minimal with respect to the generalization lattice (i.e. no table at a lower level
of generalization was k-anonymous).
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show an analysis of groups in k-anonymous tables that
are completely homogeneous in the Adult and Lands End databases, respec-
tively, while Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show a corresponding analysis of groups in
k-anonymous tables that are “nearly” homogeneous (i.e., the most frequent sen-
sitive value s in a group appears in at least 95% of the tuples in the group). Both
cases should be avoided since an adversary would believe, with near certainty,
that an individual in a homogeneous or nearly homogeneous group has the sen-
sitive value s that appears most frequently. Note that the minority (i.e.,≤ 5%) of
the individuals in nearly homogeneous groups whose sensitive values are not
s are also affected even though the best inference about them (that they have s)
is wrong. As a concrete example, consider the case when s = AIDS. An in-
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Table 3.10: Effect of homogeneity attack on the Lands End database.
k Affected Avg. Gps. Avg. Tuples
/Total tables Affected Affected
2 2/3 12.3 2537.6
5 2/3 12.3 2537.6
10 2/2 18.5 3806.5
15 2/2 18.5 3806.5
20 1/2 2.5 1750
30 1/2 2.5 1750
50 1/3 0.6 1156
dividual that values privacy would not want to be associated with s with near
certainty regardless of whether the true value is s. In the four tables shown in
Tables 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12, the first column indicates the value of k. The
second column shows the number of minimal k-anonymous tables that have
groups that are completely homogeneous (Tables 3.9 and 3.10) or 95% homoge-
nous (Tables 3.11 and 3.12). The third column shows the average number of
such groups per minimal k-anonymous table. The fourth column shows the av-
erage number of tuples per minimal k-anonymous table that were affected by
the two homogeneity attacks. As we can see from Tables 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12,
the homogeneity attack is a real concern, affecting a very large fraction of both
datasets. Even for relatively large values of k (such as 30 and 50), many tables
still had nearly homogeneous groups.
Note that the average number of affected groups, average number of affected
tuples, etc., are not strictly decreasing functions of k. In particular, tables with
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Table 3.11: Effect of 95% homogeneity attack on the Adult database.
k Affected Avg. Gps. Avg. Tuples
/Total tables Affected Affected
2 8/8 20.50 13574.5
5 12/12 12.67 13328.3
10 12/12 7.83 10796.5
15 8/8 8.88 12009.4
20 10/10 7.10 11041.0
30 10/10 5.50 11177.0
50 5/5 5.80 8002.0
small values of affected tuples are sometimes close to each other in the lattice of
k-anonymous tables and may be generalized to the same table when k increases
(thus reducing the total number of “safe” tables).
Performance. In our next set of experiments, we compare the running times
of entropy `-diversity and k-anonymity. The results are shown in Figures 3.1
and 3.2. For the Adult Database, we used Occupation as the sensitive attribute,
and for Lands End we used Cost. We varied the quasi-identifier size from 3
attributes up to 8 attributes; a quasi-identifier of size j consisted of the first j
attributes of its dataset as listed in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. We measured the time
taken to return all 6-anonymous tables and compared it to the time taken to
return all 6-diverse tables. In both datasets, the running times for k-anonymity
and `-diversity were similar. Sometimes the running time for `-diversity was
faster, which happened when the algorithm pruned parts of the generalization
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Table 3.12: Effect of 95% homogeneity attack on the Lands End database.
k Affected Avg. Gps. Avg. Tuples
/Total tables Affected Affected
2 2/3 13.0 2825.33
5 2/3 13.0 2825.33
10 2/2 19.5 4238.00
15 2/2 19.5 4238.00
20 1/2 3.0 2119.00
30 1/2 3.0 2119.00
50 1/3 1.0 1412.66
lattice earlier than it did for k-anonymity.
Utility. The next set of experiments compare the utility of anonymized tables
which are k-anonymous, entropy `-diverse, or recursive (3, `)-diverse. We use
the Adult Database in all the experiments with sensitive attribute Occupation.
For the purposes of comparison, we set k = ` and experimented with the fol-
lowing values of ` (and hence k): 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. The sensitive attribute Occupation
takes only 14 values. Hence, there is no table which can be more than 14-
diverse for any reasonable definition of diversity. Since some of the values ap-
peared very infrequently, we found that there is no generalization of the Adult
Database that is recursive (3, `)-diverse for ` = 12. We also found that the
marginal distribution of the sensitive attribute is entropy 10.57-diverse. This
means that no generalization of the Adult Database can be more than entropy
10.57-diverse unless the entire data set is suppressed.
The utility of a dataset is difficult to quantify. As a result, we used four
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Figure 3.1: Performance of `-diverse data publishing on Adult database.
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Figure 3.2: Performance of `-diverse data publishing on Lands End
database.
different metrics to gauge the utility of the generalized tables – generalization
height, average group size, discernibility, and KL-divergence. The first metric,
generalization height [81, 113], is the height of an anonymized table in the gen-
eralization lattice; intuitively, it is the number of generalization steps that were
performed. The second metric is the average size of the q∗-blocks generated by
the anonymization algorithm. The third metric, discernibility [18], measures the
number of tuples that are indistinguishable from each other. Each tuple in a q∗
block Bi incurs a cost |Bi| and each tuple that is completely suppressed incurs
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a cost |D| (where D is the original dataset). Since we did not perform any tuple
suppression, the discernibility metric is equivalent to the sum of the squares of
the sizes of the q∗-blocks.
Neither generalization height, nor average group size, nor discernibility take
the data distribution into account. For this reason we also use the KL-divergence
metric described next. In many data mining tasks, we would like to use the
published table to estimate the joint distribution of the attributes. Now, given a
table T with categorical attributes A1, . . . , Am, we can view the data as an i.i.d.
sample from an m-dimensional distribution F . We can estimate this F with the
empirical distribution Fˆ , where Fˆ (x1, . . . , xm) is the fraction of tuples t in the ta-
ble such that t.A1 = x1, . . . , t.Am = xm. When a generalized version of the table
is published, the estimate changes to Fˆ ? by taking into account the generaliza-
tions used to construct the anonymized table T ? (and making the uniformity
assumption for all generalized tuples sharing the same attribute values). If the
tuple t = (x1, . . . , xm) is generalized to t? = (x?1, . . . , x?m), then Fˆ ?(x1, . . . , xm) is
given by
Fˆ ?(x1, . . . , xm) =
|{t? ∈ T ?}|
|T ?| × area(t?)
where, area(x?1, . . . , x
?
m) =
m∏
i=1
|{xi ∈ Ai | xi is generalized to x?i }|
To quantify the difference between the two distributions Fˆ and Fˆ ∗, we use
the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) which is defined as
∑
x∈A1×...×Am
Fˆ (x) log
Fˆ (x)
Fˆ ?(x)
where 0 log 0 is defined to be 0. The KL-divergence is non-negative and is 0 only
when the two estimates are identical.
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In Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, we show the minimum generalization height,
average group size, and discernibility of k-anonymous, entropy `-diverse, and
recursive (3, `)-diverse tables for ` = k = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, while Figures 3.7 and 3.8
show our results for KL-divergence. For each of the graphs in Figures 3.3, 3.4,
3.5, 3.6, and 3.7, we performed the anonymizations on a 5% subsample of the
original data, while Figure 3.8 shows results for anonymization of the entire
data set.
Before explaining why it was necessary to subsample the data, we should
first note that in general, the graphs show that ensuring diversity in the sensitive
attribute does not require many more generalization steps than for k-anonymity
(note that an `-diverse table is automatically `-anonymous); the minimum gen-
eralization heights for identical values of k and ` were usually identical. Nev-
ertheless, we found that generalization height was not an ideal utility metric
because tables with small generalization heights can still have very large group
sizes. For example, using full-domain generalization on the Adult Database
with the quasi-identifier {Age, Gender, Race, Marital Status, Education}, we found
minimal (with respect to the generalization lattice) 4-anonymous tables that had
average group sizes larger than 1,000 tuples. The large groups were caused by
data skew. For example, there were only 114 tuples with age between 81 and 90,
while there were 12,291 tuples with age between 31 and 40. So if age groups of
length 5 (i.e. [1-5], [6-10], [11-15], etc) were generalized to age groups of length
10 (i.e. [1-10], [11-20], etc), we would end up with very large q∗-blocks.2
Thus, to better understand the loss of utility due to domain generalization,
we chose to study a subsample of the Adult Database with a lesser data skew
2Generalization hierarchies that are aware of data skew may yield higher quality anonymiza-
tions. This is a promising avenue for future work because some recent algorithms [18] can han-
dle certain dynamic generalization hierarchies.
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Figure 3.3: Comparing generalization height, minimum average group
size, and discernibility of k-anonymous and `-diverse versions
of a sample of the Adult database. Q = {age, gender, race}.
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Figure 3.4: Comparing generalization height, minimum average group
size, and discernibility of k-anonymous and `-diverse versions
of a sample of the Adult database. Q = {age, gender, race, mar-
ital status}.
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Figure 3.5: Comparing generalization height, minimum average group
size, and discernibility of k-anonymous and `-diverse versions
of a sample of the Adult database. Q = {age, gender, race, mar-
ital status, education}.
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Figure 3.6: Comparing generalization height, minimum average group
size, and discernibility of k-anonymous and `-diverse versions
of a sample of the Adult database. Q = {age, gender, race, mar-
ital status, education, work class, native country}.
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in the Age attribute. It turned out that a 5% Bernoulli subsample of the Adult
Database suited our requirements – most of the Age values appeared in around
20 tuples each, while only a few values appeared in less than 10 tuples each.
The second and third graphs in each of Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the
minimum average group size and the discernibility metric cost, respectively,
of k-anonymous and `-diverse tables for k, ` = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. Smaller values for
utility metrics represent higher utility. We found that the best t-anonymous and
t-diverse tables often (but not always) had comparable utility. It is interesting
to note that recursive (3, `)-diversity permits tables which have better utility
than entropy `-diversity. Recursive (c, `)-diversity is generally less restrictive
than entropy `-diversity, because the extra parameter, c, allows us to control
how much skew is acceptable in a q∗-block. Since there is still some residual
skew even in our 5% subsample, the entropy definition performs worse than
the recursive definition.
In Figures 3.7 and 3.8 we compare k-anonymous and `-diverse tables us-
ing the KL-divergence utility metric. Figure 3.7 shows our results for a
5% subsample of the table and Figure 3.8 shows our results on the whole
Adult Database. In each of the graphs, we wish to publish a table from
which the joint distribution Q × S can be estimated. In all the cases
S = Occupation. Q is the multi-dimensional attribute {Age,Gender,Race},
{Age,Gender,Marital Status,Race} and {Age,Gender,Marital Status, Edu-
cation,Race}, respectively.
Each of the graphs shows a base-line (the bar named “Base”) that corre-
sponds to the KL-divergence for the table where all the attributes in Q were
completely suppressed (thus the resulting table had only one attribute – the
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Figure 3.7: Comparing KL-Divergence to k-anonymous and `-diverse ver-
sions of a sample of the Adult database. From top to bottom,
Q = {Age, Gender, Race}, {Age, Gender, Marital Status, Race} and
{Age, Education, Gender, Marital Status, Race} respectively.
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Figure 3.8: Comparing KL-Divergence to k-anonymous and `-diverse ver-
sions of the Adult database. From top to bottom, Q = {Age,
Gender, Race}, {Age, Gender, Marital Status, Race} and {Age, Ed-
ucation, Gender, Marital Status, Race} respectively.
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sensitive attribute). This table represents the least useful anonymized table that
can be published. The rest of the bars correspond to the KL-divergence to the
best k-anonymous, entropy `-diverse, and recursive (3, `)-diverse tables, respec-
tively for k = ` = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10.
In the experiments run on the full Adult Dataset, we see that the KL-
divergence to the best `-diverse table (entropy or recursive) is very close to the
KL-divergence to the best k-anonymous table, for k = ` = 2, 4, 6. As expected,
for larger values of `, the utility of `-diverse tables is lower. The best tables for
the entropy and recursive variants of the definition often have similar utility.
When a sample of Adult Database table was used, some of the sensitive values
with small counts were eliminated. Hence, for ` = 8, 10, the best tables were
very close to the baseline. For ` = 6, the recursive definition performs better
than the entropy definition since recursive (3, `)-diversity allows for more skew
in the sensitive attribute.
3.7 A Formal Framework for Defining Privacy
In the last two chapters, we have described two seemingly distinct techniques
for ensuring privacy in databases, namely, access control and anonymous data
publishing. These techniques are based on two very different notions of privacy,
namely, perfect privacy and `-diversity, respectively. In recent years, many other
privacy metrics have been proposed in the literature for a variety of data privacy
settings including anonymous data publishing – k-anonymity [122], `-diversity,
perfect privacy, (c, k)-safety [92], privacy skyline [32], γ-amplification [62], dif-
ferential privacy [58], etc. Unfortunately, the current state of the art poses two
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problems – (i) there is no mandate on how to define privacy for new applica-
tions, and (ii) there is no means by which the plethora of privacy metrics in
literature can be compared.
In this section, we propose a solution to the above problem by classifying
privacy definitions as syntactic and semantic. A syntactic privacy definition is an
algorithmic condition than can be efficiently enforced. Most of the privacy met-
rics prevalent in literature, e.g., k-anonymity, recursive (c, `)-diversity, and crit-
ical tuple perfect privacy (from Theorem 2.5) are syntactic privacy definitions.
However, one cannot easily infer the semantics of the privacy guaranteed by a
syntactic definition. For instance, we showed previously in this chapter that re-
cursive (c, `)-diversity guarantees privacy against adversaries with at most `−2
negation statements. However, this can not be immediately deduced from the
syntactic definition. A semantic privacy definition, on the other hand, defines pri-
vacy based on a model of disclosure, and hence, precisely states the assumptions
under which privacy is guaranteed. Bayes-optimal privacy (Section 3.3.2), and
perfect privacy (Equation 2.1) are examples of a semantic privacy definitions.
As we will describe later in this section, unlike syntactic privacy definitions,
the privacy guaranteed by different semantic privacy definitions can be readily
compared, and these definitions can be easily extended to suit the requirements
of new applications. We will also see that, every syntactic privacy definition
should ideally be associated with an equivalent semantic privacy definition.
We now propose a framework for semantic privacy definitions, thus laying
a common ground across privacy definitions that aids the design of new pri-
vacy definitions and helps compare different privacy metrics. We next answer a
progression of questions and in the process describe our framework for formu-
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lating semantic privacy definitions. Simultaneously, we formulate a semantic
privacy definition equivalent to recursive (c, `)-diversity.
Q 1: Is there a single “good” definition of privacy?
Though it would be ideal to have a single definition of privacy, clearly as il-
lustrated in this dissertation, one privacy definition does not meet the needs
of all kinds of applications. For instance, in hospital or military applications
privacy means “do not disclose any sensitive information”; if a nurse is not au-
thorized to view Bruce’s medical records she should not learn any information
about Bruce’s disease. Since k-anonymity and `-diversity allow partial disclo-
sure, they are not applicable to this scenario. On the other hand, in Census
applications privacy means bounded partial disclosure or “disclose very little in-
formation”. Perfect privacy is not applicable here as a researcher can not learn
the correlation between age, race and diseases if she is not allowed to learn any
information about any individual’s disease. So this leads us to the next question,
Q 2: What are the properties of a “good” privacy definition?
We argued in the beginning of Chapter 3 that k-anonymity does not suffice for
ensuring privacy of anonymous data publishing. While k-anonymity was at-
tempting to protect sensitive information about individuals, we showed that it
does not protect against simple adversarial attacks which are reasonable for the
data publishing application. However, perfect privacy and `-diversity also do
not guard against every possible adversary. In fact, there are applications where
the assumptions made by both perfect privacy and `-diversity do not hold. For
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instance, `-diversity assumes that all attributes are categorical; clearly, this as-
sumption does not hold if individuals could have a set of diseases instead of a
single disease, or if the sensitive attribute is numeric. Perfect privacy assumes
that every tuple in the relation is independent of the rest of the tuples; the same
is not true when the data is inherently linked, like in the case of a social network.
Despite their shortcomings, we claim that perfect privacy and `-diversity are
reasonable definitions of privacy due to the following reasons. k-anonymity and
earlier syntactic privacy metrics [128] defined privacy based on known adver-
sarial attacks such as privacy breaches due to re-identification of individuals in
the data. Such a methodology for defining privacy is doomed to fail because a
data publisher can not enumerate every possible scenario in which an adversary
can breach private information. This has also been noted in the field of cryptog-
raphy; early ciphers were broken since they satisfied only ad-hoc definitions of
security.
In contrast to k-anonymity, `-diversity and perfect privacy are based on a
model for disclosure; they explicit state their assumptions about the data and
the sensitive information, the adversary’s background knowledge and how they
measure disclosure. The following excerpt from a seminal paper by Lambert
[79] highlights the importance of models of disclosure,
One could argue that models of disclosure are hopeless because the issues
are too complex and the intruder too mysterious. Instead, this paper argues
that models of disclosure are indispensable. At the least, they force defini-
tions and assumptions to be stated explicitly. And, when the assumptions
are realistic, models of disclosure can lead to practical measures of disclo-
sure risk and harm.
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Since `-diversity and perfect privacy explicitly state their assumptions, given
an application, one can gauge whether or not these privacy metrics will guard
against all the attacks that are typical for that application. This leads us to the
next question,
Q 3: How are the semantics of a privacy definition formulated? That is,
what assumptions made by the privacy metric should be precisely defined?
We answer this question by presenting our framework for defining semantic
privacy definitions. The framework is inspired by the notion of semantic se-
curity for public key encryption [68], and generalizes the formal reasoning in
`-diversity. As we describe the framework, we simultaneously instantiate the
semantic privacy definition for `-diversity.
Let us first recall some basics. There is a population of individuals Ω, and
the information about a subset of these individuals (ΩD) appears in a secret
database D. The secret database D (and the subset of individuals ΩD) is known
to the data publisher.
In our framework, a semantic privacy definition should necessarily define
three important concepts – sensitive information, adversarial background knowledge,
and measure of disclosure.
Sensitive information. The first step towards understanding the semantics
of privacy is a precise definition of the information being protected, i.e., the sen-
sitive information. Defining the sensitive information, though seemingly obvi-
ous, can be quite tricky. Informal specifications can be misleading; for instance,
just stating that medical condition is the sensitive attribute is insufficient. It
could mean, like in perfect privacy, that all properties of the sensitive attribute
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including “total number of diseases appearing in the table” should be protected.
Or, like in `-diversity, it could mean that only the link between an individual
and her disease should be protected. Such ambiguity should be avoided since a
privacy definition only protects the information that is defined as sensitive.
We recommend that the sensitive information be specified as a set of boolean
predicates (Φ). Our semantic definition defines disclosure based on these predi-
cates. For instance, recursive (c, `)-diversity aims to protect the following set of
sensitive predicates,
Φ
`-div = {eq(X[S], s) | ∀X ∈ ΩD ∧ ∀s ∈ S} (3.9)
where S is the domain of the sensitive attribute, ΩD is the set of individuals
who appear in the secret database D, and eq(X[S], s) is the predicate that is true
when X[S] = s, and false otherwise.
Adversarial Background Knowledge. As previously described in this chap-
ter, adversaries may know public information about individuals in the data
from other external sources. We model such information using a probability
distribution over the set of all possible databases. That is, if D is the set of
all possible databases, an adversary’s background knowledge is the probability
function w : D → [0, 1],∑D′∈D w(D′) = 1.
However, we must reason about privacy from a data publisher’s standpoint,
and as we described in the case of `-diversity, the data publisher may not know
all the information the adversary knows. We model this scenario using a set of
adversaries, {A1,A2, . . . ,Aa}, one for each distinct possible background knowl-
edge the data publisher may think the adversary possesses. Each adversary Ai
in this set is modeled using a probability distribution wi.
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For instance, in `-diversity, the set of adversarial distributions can be de-
scribed as follows. Let D denote the set of tables constructed by first choosing
a set of n individuals from the population, and then assigning to each of these
chosen individuals a value from the domain of the sensitive attribute. Each ad-
versary Ai is characterized by an individual X and a set of `− 2 negation state-
ments {X[S] 6= s1, X[S] 6= s2, . . . , X[S] 6= s`−2} (as described in Equation 3.10).
{Ai = (X, s1, . . . , s`−2) | ∀X ∈ Omega, ∀{s1, . . . , s`−2} ⊂ S} (3.10)
For a specific adversary Ai, let Dbadi ⊆ D be the set of databases such that either
X does not appear in the database or X[S] = si, i ∈ [1, ` − 2]. These databases
are not possible under Ai’s knowledge. wi assigns equal probability to the rest
of the possible databases in D −Dbadi as,
wi[D
′] =
 0, D
′ ∈ Dbadi ;
1/(|D − Dbadi |), D′ 6∈ Dbadi .
(3.11)
Measure for Disclosure. We say that privacy is breached if the value of at
least one of the sensitive predicates is disclosed under one of the adversarial
settings after releasing a view of the database, say V . In the case of anonymous
data publishing, V is the anonymized table T ?. As we saw in Section 3.3.2 there
are many ways to model disclosure. A c-positive disclosure occurs if
∃wi ∈ {w1, . . . , wa}, ∃φ ∈ Φ s.t. Pwi(φ | V ) > c
Recursive (c, `)-diversity considers c-positive disclosures as privacy breaches. A
c-negative disclosure occurs if
∃wi ∈ {w1, . . . , wa}, ∃φ ∈ Φ s.t. Pwi(φ | V ) < c
Recall that disclosure can also be modeled using the uninformative principle.
∃wi ∈ {w1, . . . , wa},∃φ ∈ Φ s.t. dist(Pwi(φ | V ), Pwi(φ)) > ²
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where, dist(·, ·) is a distance function, e.g., difference or ratio.
Putting all of our above discussion together, we have developed a frame-
work for defining semantic privacy definitions that (i) defines the sensitive in-
formation as a set of boolean predicates, (ii) models the adversaries as a set
of probability distributions over the set of all possible databases D, and (iii)
defines that privacy is breached if under at least one adversarial distribution,
the truth value of some sensitive predicate is disclosed by a positive disclosure,
negative disclosure and/or by the uninformative principle. Along the way, we
have instantiated one such definition which we will call semantic (c, `)-diversity.
Definition 3.12 (Semantic (c, `)-Diversity) An anonymized table T ? satisfies se-
mantic `-diversity if
∀wi ∈ {w1, . . . , wa},∀φ ∈ Φ`-div, Pwi(φ | T ?) < c
where, Φ
`-div is as defined in Equation 3.9, and the set of adversarial distributions is as
defined in Equation 3.10 and 3.11.
It has been shown that Definition 3.12 is equivalent to recursive (c, `)-diversity
(Definition 3.8) [92]; i.e., a generalized table T ? satisfies semantic (c, `)-diversity
if and only if it satisfies recursive (c, `)-diversity.
We can analogously formulate semantic privacy definitions equivalent
to pd-recursive (c, `)-diversity (Definition 3.9) and npd-recursive (c1, c2, `)-
diversity (Definition 3.10). A semantic definition for pd-recursive (c, `)-diversity
would differ from semantic (c, `)-diversity only in the specification of sensitive
information; the predicates eq(X[S], y), where y ∈ Y is a don’t care sensitive
value, are not considered sensitive.
Φ
(`-div, Y) = {eq(X[S], s) | ∀X ∈ ΩD ∧ ∀s ∈ S − Y }
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A semantic definition for npd-recursive (c1, c2, `)-diversity would differ from
semantic (c, `)-diversity in the measure for disclosure – both c1-positive and c2-
negative disclosures are considered breaches of privacy.
Q 4: Are there other examples of semantic privacy definitions?
`-Diversity is not the first or the only privacy definition with an equivalent se-
mantic privacy definition; perfect privacy [96], γ-amplification [62], and differ-
ential privacy [58] have equivalent semantic definitions that describe the sen-
sitive information, the adversarial knowledge and the measure of disclosure.
However, we would like to point out that this is the first attempt toward a gen-
eral framework for formulating semantic privacy definitions. To illustrate its
generality, we cast the semantic privacy definition for perfect privacy (Equa-
tion 2.1) in terms of our framework.
Theorem 2.1 [96] shows that the perfect privacy definition based on critical
tuples (Chapter 2) is equivalent to an information theoretic semantic privacy
definition (Equation 2.1), which we will call semantic perfect privacy. The sensi-
tive information is modeled as the following set of sensitive predicates,
ΦQSperfect = {answer(QS, S)|∀S ⊆ Tup(QS)}
where Tup(QS) is the set of all tuples that could appear in the answer to secret
query QS , and answer(QS, S) is true if and only if S is the answer to query QS
on the secret database D.
The adversarial knowledge is modeled thus. Let R be a publicly known rela-
tional schema. Let Tup(R) denote the set of all tuples satisfying R. LetD denote
the set of all possible distinct relational instances using tuples in Tup(R). Let
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p be a function mapping each tuple t ∈ Tup(R) to a probability in [0, 1]. Then,
the set of adversaries is characterized by the set of distinct tuple probability
functions p; adversary Ap knows that the tuple probabilities are given by the
function p. The adversarial distribution wp assigns each database D′ the proba-
bility,
wp(D
′) =
∏
t∈D′
p(t)
∏
t 6∈D′
(1− p(t))
Answering a query QV satisfies semantic perfect privacy with respect to se-
cret query QS , if for all answers V to the query QV ,
∀wp∀φ ∈ ΦQSperfect, Pwp(φ) = Pwp(φ | QV (D) = V )
γ-amplification, a privacy metric for independent tuple randomization (see
Section 5.2), was shown to be equivalent to ρ1, ρ2-privacy [62]. Differential pri-
vacy, a privacy metric we will use in Chapter 4, was shown to be equivalent
to ²-semantic security [59]; both ρ1, ρ2-privacy and ²-semantic security can be
formulated in our framework.
While our framework is capable of instantiating a very large number of se-
mantic privacy definitions, not all definitions are useful unless they are proven
to be equivalent to an efficiently enforceable syntactic privacy metric.
Q 5: Why do we need a framework for semantic privacy definitions?
The general theory of semantic privacy definitions has two main advantages.
First, since it precisely states the assumptions under which privacy is guaran-
teed, a semantic privacy definition can be used to identify limitations of an ex-
isting privacy definition, and to extend existing definitions to new settings. For
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instance, `-diversity does not guarantee privacy of numeric sensitive attributes.
Consider a 3-diverse table where salary is the sensitive attribute, and every
group has at least 3 distinct values for salary. While a group that has salaries
$100, 000, $100, 001, and $99, 999 in roughly equal proportions is 3-diverse, it
constitutes a privacy breach as an adversary has a very good estimate of an indi-
vidual’s salary in that group. The privacy breach occurs because Φ
`-div, the set
of sensitive predicates for `-diversity, does not capture the fact that inferring an
individual’s salary is within a small range is also considered a privacy breach.
We can remedy this situation by adding the following predicates to Φ
`-div.
{in(X[S], x− lb, x+ ub),∀x ∈ S
where in(X[S], x − lb, x + ub) is true iff (X[S] ∈ [x − lb, x + ub]) for parameters
lb and ub. (c, k)-Safety [92] and privacy skyline [31] are semantic privacy defi-
nitions that extend `-diversity by considering adversaries with more powerful
kinds of background knowledge.
A more crucial advantage of a general theory of semantic privacy definitions
is that it lays down a common framework for various privacy metrics. Tradi-
tionally, privacy has been defined in terms of a specific application or a specific
privacy preserving technique. However, note that the semantic privacy defini-
tions are not tied to any application or privacy preserving algorithm. Hence,
if the assumptions stated by a semantic privacy definition are reasonable for
two applications, then the equivalent syntactic privacy metric that is defined
in the context of one application can be used in the other application as well.
For instance, differential privacy [58] was traditionally proposed in the context
of output perturbation techniques, where a statistical database answers aggregate
queries by adding random noise. In fact, in the next chapter, we will use differ-
ential privacy as the privacy definition for anonymous data publishing.
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The common framework can also be used to compare different privacy met-
rics; this will be especially useful for analyzing the privacy of a new application.
In the next chapter, we will present a case study of anonymizing data from real-
world mapping application. We will use semantic privacy definitions to guide
our choice of a syntactic privacy definition for that application.
In summary, we have proposed a framework for semantic privacy defini-
tions that will aid understanding existing privacy metrics, extend them to new
applications, and help data publishers to choose the right privacy definition.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter we have shown theoretically and experimentally that a k-
anonymized dataset permits strong attacks due to lack of diversity in the sen-
sitive attributes. We have introduced `-diversity, a privacy definition that gives
stronger privacy guarantees. We have also demonstrated that `-diversity and
k-anonymity have enough similarity in their structure that k-anonymity algo-
rithms can be modified to work with `-diversity. Finally, we presented a general
theory of the semantics of privacy definitions that will help us build upon exist-
ing formal privacy definitions for new applications.
134
CHAPTER 4
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE ON THE MAP
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the problem of applying formal privacy definitions
to a Census Bureau application, called OnTheMap1, that plots commuting pat-
terns of workers in the U.S. This application uses a novel privacy preserving
technology known as synthetic data generation. We present the first formal pri-
vacy analysis (to the best of our knowledge) for this technology. This chapter
chronicles the challenges we faced in this endeavour.
The target application, OnTheMap, is based on data developed by the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program
(LEHD). By combining various Census datasets it is possible to construct a ta-
ble Commute Patterns with schema (id,origin block, destination block) where each
row represents a worker. The attribute id is a random number serving as a key
for the table, origin block is the census block in which the worker lives, and des-
tination block is where the worker works. An origin block o corresponds to a
destination block d if there is a tuple with origin block o and destination block d.
The goal is to plot points on a map that represent commuting patterns for the
U.S. population. For each destination block, we plot points on the map repre-
senting the corresponding origin blocks. There are roughly 8 million Census
blocks so that the domain is very large and the data is very sparse.
Information about destination blocks has already been publicly released,
1http://lehdmap2.dsd.census.gov/
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and is available to any adversary; thus origin block is treated as the sensitive at-
tribute. Due to privacy constraints and legal issues, unanonymized origin block
data cannot be used as an input to such a mapping application. An anonymized
version must be used instead.
The algorithm used to anonymize the data for the above mapping applica-
tion is known as synthetic data generation [111], which is becoming popular in
the statistical disclosure limitation community. The main idea behind synthetic
data generation is to build a statistical model from the data and then to sample
points from the model. These sampled points form the synthetic data, which
is then released instead of the original data. While much research has focused
on the utility of these synthetic datasets (deriving the variance and confidence
intervals for various estimators from synthetic data) [102, 106], there has been
little research on deriving formal guarantees of privacy for such an approach
(an exception is [107]).
4.1.1 Contributions and Chapter Outline
We present the derivation of our techniques as a case study of anonymizing
data for the novel mapping application. In this spirit, we discuss the initial se-
lection of an off-the-shelf privacy definition in Section 4.2 and an off-the-shelf
anonymization algorithm in Section 4.3 based on the requirements of the map-
ping application.
As outlined in Section 3.7, we first describe the privacy requirements of the
mapping application in terms of the sensitive information that needs to be pro-
tected, the background knowledge an adversary may possess, and the measure
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of disclosure. We found that apart from the differential privacy criterion [58],
none of the other existing privacy conditions applied to our scenario.
We found that picking an off-the-shelf synthetic data generation algorithm
and tuning it to satisfy the differential privacy criterion was unsatisfactory for
the following reasons. First, in order to satisfy the differential privacy criterion,
the generated synthetic data contained little or no information about the original
data. We show that this is because differential privacy guards against breaches
of privacy that are very unlikely.
Next, no deterministic algorithm can satisfy differential privacy. Random-
ized algorithms can (albeit with a very small probability) return anonymized
datasets that are totally unrepresentative of the input. This is a problem, espe-
cially, when we want to publish a single, or only a few, anonymous versions of
the whole data. We remedy these two issues by showing that a revised prob-
abilistic version of differential privacy yields a practical privacy guarantee for
synthetic data (Section 4.4).
Finally, the data in our application is very sparse – there are roughly 8 mil-
lion blocks on the U.S. map, and only about a few tens or hundreds of workers
commuting to each destination. Most previous work deals with data where
the number of individuals is typically larger than the size of the sensitive at-
tribute domain. We identify this important open research problem and propose
our first solutions for solving the sparsity issue by modifying the synthetic data
generation algorithm (Section 4.5). In Section 4.6 we present experiments and
discuss the utility of the resulting synthetic data.
To summarize, this chapter’s contributions are as follows: we provide the
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first formal privacy analysis for a synthetic data generation method (to the best
of our knowledge); we present a case-study of applying state-of-the-art research
in privacy to real applications; we identify new challenges for the privacy re-
search community (such as handling large domains), and we propose initial
solutions for these challenges.
4.2 Starting Point: Privacy Definition
To help select a privacy definition, we use the framework from Section 3.7 to
describe the requirements of this application.
Sensitive Information. The original Commute Pattern table contains the ori-
gin block of every worker. Origin blocks are represented as census blocks; census
blocks could be as small as a few streets or a few houses. Hence, an adversary
who has access to the application should not be able to learn either the exact or
approximate origin block of any worker. Let B denotes the set of all blocks on
the map of the United States, and Ω the set of all workers. To disallow the disclo-
sure of exact origin block information, it is sufficient to disallow the disclosure
of the following predicates.
Φexact = {X[origin block] = b | ∀X ∈ Ω ∧ ∀b ∈ B}
To encode approximate origin information, we consider a neighbourhood func-
tion N that maps each block b to a region N(b) ⊆ B, where N(b) is the largest
region around b such that knowing that a worker comes from the region N(b)
is a breach of privacy. For instance, for a worker living in b1 = Devon Street,
Chicago, N(b1) could be the city of Chicago, whereas for a worker living in
b2 = Stewart Ave, Ithaca, N(b2) could be the union of all blocks in Ithaca, and
138
the neighbouring town of Dryden. To disallow disclosure of approximate ori-
gin block information, it is sufficient to disallow the disclosure of predicates in
Φapprox.
Φapprox = {X[origin block] ∈ N(b) | ∀X ∈ Ω ∧ ∀b ∈ B}
Adversary Knowledge. We assume that an adversary knows every worker’s
destination block information. As for the origin block, consider the following
scenario. Alice and Bruce work for the same company, say in Syracuse, NY.
Alice knows that Bruce takes the longest time to commute to work (about one
hour) amongst all the other employees in the company. Alice may also know
that Bruce drives south to go home. Given all this information, Alice can deduce
that Bruce comes from one of the towns in {Ithaca, Freeville, Dryden, Groton,
Trumansburg}.
In the worst case, an adversary may know that a worker commutes from
one of two origin blocks on the map, and has to deduce which of these block the
worker actually comes from looking at the published data.
Measure of Disclosure. Mapping applications come with a lot of back-
ground knowledge; workers usually commute to cities, and most origins are
close to destinations. Hence, it would not be advisable to consider only posi-
tive or negative disclosures. Rather one should use the uninformative principle
(Section 3.3.2), where privacy is breached if the adversary’s prior belief in an
individual’s sensitive predicate is very different from the adversary’s posterior
belief about that predicate.
Rather than developing a new privacy criterion that precisely matches the
above privacy requirements, we decided to shop for a privacy definition that
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captures requirements of our application. We next describe three potential can-
didates `-diversity (Chapter 3), (d, γ)-privacy [105] and differential privacy [58],
and discard two out of the three.
In its most basic form, `-diversity requires that for each destination block, the
` origin blocks with the most number of workers with jobs in this destination
block, have roughly equal number of workers residing in them. Although `-
diversity can protect against adversaries with background knowledge, it does
not always guarantee privacy when there is a semantic relationship between the
sensitive values. Here the semantic relationship is physical proximity which is
encoded by our requirement of protecting (neighbourhood) regions of blocks.
That is, `-diversity does not offer theoretical guarantees against an adversary
who has information such as “Bruce probably lives near Newark and works
near New York City.”
(d, γ)-Privacy is a semantic privacy definition with the following properties.
The sensitive information is whether or not a tuple t appears in the database.
That is, in the context of our mapping application, predicates of the form “Does
Bruce travel from Syracuse to Ithaca” are considered sensitive. The adversary be-
lieves in some prior probability P (t) of a tuple t appearing in the database.
After seeing the anonymized data D, the adversary forms a posterior belief
P (t|D). (d, γ)-Privacy is only designed to protect against adversaries that are
d-independent: an adversary is d-independent if for all tuples t are considered
a priori independent and, the prior belief P (t) satisfies the conditions P (t) = 1
or P (t) ≤ d. For all such adversaries, the privacy definition requires that
P (t|D) ≤ γ and P (t|D)/P (t) ≥ d/γ. This privacy definition does not apply to
our scenario for a couple of reasons. First, this privacy definition does not apply
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for adversaries that believe that P (t) = d + ² (no matter how small ² > 0 is) for
some t even though in those cases we would also like to have some guarantee
about privacy. For instance, an adversary may know apriori that Bruce comes
from either Ithaca with probability 0.2 or from Syracuse with probability 0.8;
for d < 0.8, this privacy definition cannot be used. Second, tuple-independence
is a very strong assumption that is not compatible with our application. In or-
der to be d-independent, an adversary has to consider the facts “Worker #1234
commutes to Block 12 from Block 34” and “Worker #1234 commutes to Block 12
from Block 35” independent. This is not true in our application since, the two
events described above are mutually exclusive.
Differential privacy is privacy definition with the following intuition. If one
individual is considering lying about her data to a data collector (such as the
U.S. Census Bureau), the result of the anonymization algorithm will not be very
different whether or not the individual lies. The differential privacy criterion
can be defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 (²-Differential Privacy) Let A be a randomized algorithm, S be the
set of possible outputs of the algorithm, and ² > 1. The algorithm A satisfies ²-
differential privacy if for all pairs of data sets (D1, D2) that differ in exactly one row,
∀S ∈ S,
∣∣∣ln P (A(D1)=S)P (A(D2)=S) ∣∣∣ ≤ ² (4.1)
Differential privacy fits our application since the semantics of its privacy guar-
antee match the privacy requirements of our application. Differential privacy is
equivalent to a semantic privacy definition with the following properties. Each
tuple in the original table describes the information about a unique individual.
Every property of this tuple is considered sensitive. In the context of our appli-
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cation, every predicate “ Does Bruce commute to one of the blocks in B′”, where B′
is an arbitrary subset of B is considered sensitive. The adversary is assumed to
have complete information about all individuals but one (say X) and believes in
an arbitrary prior probability P for the tuple corresponding to X ; in the context
of our mapping application, the adversary may know that the X commutes to
exactly one of two origin blocks on the map2. Semantically, differential privacy
ensures that [59] after seeing the anonymized data D,
∀X ∈ Ω, ∀B′ ⊆ B,
∣∣∣∣ln P (X[origin block] ∈ B′|D)P (X[origin block] ∈ B′)
∣∣∣∣ < ²
4.3 Starting Point: Anonymization Algorithm
The original data can be viewed as a histogram where each combination of
origin block and destination block is a histogram bucket. Histograms can be
anonymized by modifying the counts in each bucket (for example, by adding
random noise). Both [59] and [105] provide randomized anonymization algo-
rithms for histograms that satisfy ²-differential privacy. One method is to add
an independent Laplace random variable to each bucket of the histogram [59].
Another is to extract a Bernoulli subsample from the data and then to add inde-
pendent Binomial random variables to each histogram bucket [105]. Intuitively,
both methods mix the original data with a dataset that is generated from inde-
pendently and identically distributed noise.
Instead of using one of these approaches, we use synthetic data generation
[111] for protecting privacy. Prior to this work, synthetic data methods did
not have formal privacy guarantees, despite there being significant work on
2This is the reason differential privacy compares two tables that differ in exactly one entry.
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performing statistical analyses of and drawing inferences from synthetic data
[102, 106] based on Rubin’s multiple imputation framework [112]. Thus, our
goal is to complement the research on utility for synthetic data by providing
results about its privacy.
The main idea behind synthetic data generation is to build a statistical model
from the data and then to sample points from the model. These sampled points
form the synthetic data, which is then released instead of the original data. The
motivation behind such statistical modeling is that inferences made on the syn-
thetic data should be similar to inferences that would have been made on the
real data.
Privacy comes from the fact that noise is added to the data from two sources:
the bias that comes from the creation of the model, and the noise due to random
sampling from the model. Note that the process of learning in the context of
a model for synthetic data differs significantly from the normal application of
machine learning. In machine learning, it is imperative not to overfit the data.
For synthetic data, we want to overfit as much as possible (subject to privacy
constraints), so that the synthetic data contains many of the characteristics of
the original data.
For this application, we will use a multinomial model with a dirichlet prior
[66] as the initial mechanism for generating synthetic data. We describe the
model below, starting with some necessary definitions:
Definition 4.2 (Multinomial distribution) Let −→p = (p1, . . . , pk) be a vector of
non-negative values such that p1 + · · · + pk = 1. A multinomial distribution of
size m with parameters (p1, . . . , pk), M(−→p ,m), is a probability distribution over k-
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dimensional vectors with non-negative integer coordinates that sum up to m, with
P (m1, . . . ,mk) =
m!
k∏
i=1
mi!
k∏
i=1
pmii
Definition 4.3 (Dirichlet distribution) Let −→α = (α1, . . . , αk) be a vector of posi-
tive values and let |α| = α1 + · · · + αk. The dirichlet distribution with parameters
(α1, . . . , αk), D(−→α ), is a probability distribution over all k-dimensional vectors with
non-negative coordinates that sum up to 1, with density3
f(p1, . . . , pk|−→α ) = Γ(|α|)k∏
i=1
Γ(αi)
k∏
i=1
pαi−1i
The vector −→α = (α1, . . . , αk) is known as the prior sample, |α| is the prior sample
size, and the vector (α1/|α|, . . . , αk/|α|) is the shape of the prior.
Multinomial sampling with a dirichlet prior D(−→α ) proceeds as follows:
1. Draw a vector −→p = (p1, . . . , pk) from the D(−→α ) distribution.
2. Interpret −→p as a vector of multinomial probabilities and draw a sample of
size n from the multinomial distribution M(−→p , n,).
It is well known that if (n1, . . . , nk) was drawn using multinomial sam-
pling with a dirichlet prior, then the posterior distribution P (−→p |(n1, . . . , nk))
is the dirichlet distribution D((α1 + n1, α2 + n2, . . . , αk + nk)). This can be in-
terpreted informally as first having no information, observing the sample data
(α1, . . . , αk) (note the αi do not have to be integers), and updating the prior to
D((α1, . . . , αk)); then observing the new data (n1, . . . , nk), and updating the prior
3where Γ(t) is the gamma function defined as
∫∞
0
xt−1e−xdx
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Algorithm 3: Synthesize
for all destination blocks d do
Let
−−→
n(d) be the histogram of origin blocks
Choose prior sample
−−→
α(d) with |α(d)| = O(n(d))
Choose output sample size m = O(n(d))
Sample m(d) points from a multinomial distribution with prior D((n(d)1 +
α1, . . . , n(d)k + αk))
end for
once again to D((α1 + n1, . . . , αk + nk)). Thus if we have a D((α1, . . . , αk)) prior,
we are acting as if (α1, . . . , αk) was a piece of data we had already seen. For this
reason (α1, . . . , αk) is called the prior sample.
Now we can describe the initial algorithm for generating synthetic data. Let
k be the total number of Census blocks on the U.S. map. We number the blocks
from 1 to k and for each destination block d we form a k-dimensional vector
−−→
n(d) = (n(d)1, . . . , n(d)k)where n(d)i is the number of people whose origin block
is the Census block i and who commute to destination block d. For each desti-
nation block d we choose a prior sample
−−→
α(d) with |α(d)| = O(n(d)) (the choice
of
−−→
α(d) is discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5), condition on the vector
−−→
n(d) to get
a dirichlet D((n(d)1 + α(d)1, . . . , n(d)k + α(d)k)) prior, and then use multino-
mial sampling with this prior to create a vector
−−−→
m(d) = (m(d)1, . . . ,m(d)k) of
|m(d)| = O(n(d)) synthetic individuals such that m(d)i synthetic people com-
mute to destination block d from origin block i. This procedure is described in
Algorithm 3.
Note that when the destination block d is clear from context, we will drop
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the notational dependency on d and abbreviate
−−→
n(d),
−−−→
m(d) and
−−→
α(d) as −→n =
(n1, . . . , nk), −→m = (m1, . . . ,mk) and −→α = (α1, . . . , αk), respectively.
4.4 Revising the Privacy Definition
In this Section we evaluate our initial choice of privacy definition on the ini-
tial choice of anonymization algorithm. Contrary to intuition, it will turn out
that these initial choices do not give good results for privacy. By analyzing the
problem, we will show where intuition fails, and then we will revise the privacy
definition to account for the discrepancy.
4.4.1 Analysis of Privacy
We start with an explanation behind the intuition that synthetic data should
preserve privacy. Since the anonymized data is synthesized, it consists of syn-
thetic people. Thus, linking real-world individuals to synthetic individuals (as
in k-anonymity [122]) does not make sense. The prior sample
−−→
α(d) controls the
amount of noise we add to the data generator. The larger the components of
−−→
α(d), the more noise is added. Now, we could have achieved ²-differential pri-
vacy by adding i.i.d. Laplace random variables with density ²
4
exp(−²x/2) and
variance 8/²2 to the counts in each origin block [59]. For common values of ²
(i.e., ² > 1) this is a relatively small amount of noise per origin block. So intu-
itively, we also shouldn’t need to add too much noise (i.e., a large prior sample)
using our synthetic data generator.
This turns out not to be true. Let
−−→
α(d) be the prior sample for a destination
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block d (note that the prior sample does not depend on the data). Differen-
tial privacy requires us to consider adversaries who have complete information
about all but one of the individuals in the data; let us call this individual Bruce.
Since a histogram of destination blocks has already been published, our adver-
sary can use this information to determine Bruce’s destination block d; we need
to determine how well Bruce’s origin block is hidden from the adversary. Since
the synthetic data is generated independently for every destination block, we
only consider the synthetic data generated for destination block d. There are n
individuals commuting to destination block d, and we generate m synthetic in-
dividuals for that destination block. To determine if the synthetic data satisfies
²-differential privacy (Definition 4.1) we have to find the maximum of
P ((m1, . . . ,mk) | (n1, . . . , nk),−→α )
P ((m1, . . . ,mk) | (n′1, . . . , n′k),−→α )
(4.2)
over all non-negative integer vectors (m1, . . . ,mk), (n1, . . . , nk), (n′1, . . . , n′k) with∑
mi = m,
∑
ni =
∑
n′i = n, ni = n′i + 1 for some i, nj + 1 = n′j for some
j 6= i, and nh = n′h for all h /∈ {i, j} (thus the difference between −→n and
−→
n′ is
Bruce’s origin block). If this maximum is less than exp(²), the the synthetic data
generator satisfies ²-differential privacy.
Theorem 4.1 The maximum of Equation 4.2 is m+mini(αi)
mini(αi)
and this is at most exp(²) if
and only if each αi ≥ mexp(²)−1 .
Proof. First note that
P (−→m | −→n ,−→α ) =
∫
P (−→m | −→p )P (−→p | −→n ,−→α )d−→p
=
m!∏k
i=1mi!
Γ(n+ |α|)∏
i Γ(ni + αi)
∫ k∏
i=1
pni+αi+mii d
−→p
=
m!∏
imi!
Γ(n+ |α|)∏
i Γ(ni + αi)
∏
i Γ(mi + ni + αi)
Γ(m+ n+ |α|)
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so that
P (−→m | −→n ,−→α )
P (−→m | −→n′ ,−→α )
=
mi + ni + αi − 1
ni + αi − 1
nj + αj
mj + nj + αj
≤ mi + ni + αi − 1
ni + αi − 1
≤ mi + αi
αi
≤ m+ αi
αi
where the first inequality is an equality when mj = 0, the second inequality is
an equality when ni = 1 (note that ni = n′i + 1 and so its minimum value is
1), and the third inequality is an equality when mi = m. Since (m + αi)/αi is a
decreasing function of αi, the maximum of equation 4.2 is m+mini αimini αi and this is at
most exp(²) if and only if each αi ≥ mexp(²)−1 .
The effect of Theorem 4.1 can be illustrated with the following example. Sup-
pose there are one million people in destination block d and we choose to syn-
thesize one million data points (i.e. we set m = 1, 000, 000). By setting ² = 7 we
are effectively requiring that the ratio in Equation 4.2 is at most exp(²) ≈ 1096.
To achieve this privacy definition, we need to set αi ≥ 914 for each i. In other
words, for destination d, our prior sample −→α has to have at least 914 people in
each origin block, which in many cases will be more than ni (the actual number
of people in that origin block that commute to destination block d).
We can analyze where the intuition went wrong by examining the worst case
in Theorem 4.1. The adversary has complete information about n− 1 individu-
als and is trying to determine whether or not Bruce (the remaining individual)
commutes from origin block i. Suppose that (a) αi achieves its minimum value
in origin block i, (b) the adversary does not know of any individual in origin
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block i, and (c) all m synthetic data points occur in origin block i. In this case,
Equation 4.2 is maximized, and can be interpreted as the likelihood that Bruce
commutes from origin block i divided by the likelihood that Bruce does not
commute from origin block i. Note that this scenario leaks the most amount of
information about Bruce; in the example described above, if the noise added to
block i (αi) is smaller than 914, the adversary can deduce that it is 1096 times
more likely that Bruce commutes from origin block i than any other block.
However, it is also a scenario where the synthetic data is completely unrep-
resentative of the original data – in the original data at most one person could
have come from origin block i, but all of the synthetic individuals came from
origin block i. The probability of such an unrepresentative sample is at most
Γ(n+|α|)Γ(m+αi+1)
Γ(1+αi)Γ(m+n+|α|) . As an example, let m = n = 20 and ² = 7, and let all the αj
have their minimum values of m/(exp(7) − 1) ≈ 0.018. If there are even just
k = 2 origin blocks then the probability of that event is approximately e−24.9.
The worst case is, therefore, an extremely unlikely event.
4.4.2 (², δ)-Probabilistic Differential Privacy:
Ignoring Unlikely Privacy Breaches
In Section 4.4.1 we saw that the worst-case privacy breaches are in outputs of
the synthetic data generator that are extremely unlikely to occur. We say that a
function f(x) is negligible if f(x)/x−k → 0 as x→∞ for all k > 0. An output−−−→m(d)
of the synthetic data generator is negligible if P (
−−−→
m(d) | −−→n(d),−−→α(d)) is negligible
in |n(d)| (i.e. P (−−−→m(d) | −−→n(d),−−→α(d))/|n(d)|−k → 0 for all k > 0).
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Because these outputs are so unlikely, we would like to exclude them from
the analysis of privacy. This leads us to the following privacy definition [99]
which is a relaxation of differential privacy.
Definition 4.4 (Indistinguishability) Let ² > 0. Let A be a randomized algorithm
and let S be the space of outputs of A. Algorithm A satisfies (², δ)-indistinguishability
if for all T ⊂ S and all tables D1 and D2 differing in one row,
P (A(X1) ∈ T ) ≤ e²P (A(X2) ∈ T ) + δ(|X2|)
where δ is a negligible function.
Now, for a given destination block d, by constuction we have |m(d)| =
O(|n(d)|). The number of synthetic data sets for destination block d is the
number of ways to assign |m(d)| people to k origin blocks and is equal to |m(d)|+ k − 1
k − 1
, which is a polynomial in |n(d)|; thus, not all outputs oc-
cur with a negligible probability.
However, (², δ)-indistinguishability is an asymptotic privacy guarantee and
so requires each destination block to have a large number of people commut-
ing to it. Since our application contains many destination blocks with a small
amount of commuters, this asymptotic privacy definition would not provide
usable guarantees. For this reason we developed a different relaxation of differ-
ential privacy. First, we need to identify which outputs are “bad” in the sense
that they leak too much information.
Definition 4.5 (Disclosure Set) Let D be a table and D be the set of tables that differ
from D in at most one row. Let A be a randomized algorithm and S be the space of
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outputs of A. The disclosure set of D, denoted by Disc(D, ²) is {S ∈ S | ∃D1, D2 ∈
D, |D1 −D2| = 1 ∧ | ln P (A(D1)=S)P (A(D2)=S) | > ²}
Intuitively, the disclosure set for D is constructed as follows. For each tuple
t ∈ D, let D−t be the table D with tuple t removed. Treat D−t as the adversary’s
background knowledge, so that the adversary is trying to guess the origin block
for t. Now, if our data generator creates the synthetic data−→m, then there are two
likelihoods we are interested: the maximum likelihood of −→m over all possible
origin blocks for t, and the minimum likelihood of −→m over all possible origin
blocks for t. If the ratio of the two likelihoods is greater than e² then −→m is an
output that leaks too much information for some adversary. Consequently −→m is
in the disclosure set for D, and all−→m in the disclosure set for D arise in this way.
Thus, to preserve privacy with high probability, we want the disclosure set
to have a low probability, and so we arrive at the following privacy definition.
Definition 4.6 (Probabilistic Differential Privacy (pdp)) Let A be a randomized
algorithm and let S be the set of all outputs ofA. Let ² > 1 and 0 < δ < 1 be constants.
We say that A satisfies (², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy (or, (², δ)-pdp) if for
all tables D, P (A(D) ∈ Disc(D, ²)) ≤ δ.
Note that in our application, a histogram of destination blocks has already
been made publicly available. Thus the assumption that the adversary contains
full information about all but one individuals in the data implies that the adver-
sary knows the destination block of the remaining individual. Only the identity
of the origin block is unknown to the adversary. For this reason we can partition
the origin/destination dataset by destination block and treat each partition as a
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disjoint dataset. Hence, a dataset satisfies (², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy
if each partition of the dataset satisfies (², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy.
Moreover, in such datasets, for an adversary with complete information about
all but one individuals in the dataset, the probability that the adversary gains
significant information about the remaining individual is at most δ.
4.4.3 (², δ)-Probabilistic Differential Privacy for Synthetic Data
We now describe the technical conditions under which the synthetic data gen-
erated by Algorithm 3 satisfies (², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy. We first
state Theorem 4.2 which provides an efficient criterion for checking whether
Algorithm 3 satisfies probabilistic differential privacy given the prior sample
{−−→α(d)}d, and privacy parameters ² and δ. In a practical scenario, however, an ap-
plication developer would prefer an efficient algorithm that given only ² and δ,
returns a prior sample {−−→α(d)}d such that Algorithm 3 is private. Hence, we next
present Algorithm 4 that computes a prior sample to ensures (², δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy. We conclude the section with a proof of Theorem 4.2. We
will assume throughout that ² ≥ ln 3, and that the number of synthetic in-
dividuals equals the number of original individuals for each destination (i.e.,
m(d) = n(d)).
To formally state the privacy guarantees for Algorithm 3 in terms of proba-
bilistic differential privacy, we will need the following technical definition:
Definition 4.7 Given constants n,m, α1, α2, c, define the function f(x) = c · (α1 +
[x − 1]+) (where, [y]+ = max(y, 0)). Then the reference 0-sample, denoted by
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ρ(n,m, α1, α2, c) is the quantity:
max
x∈[0,n] s.t., f(x)<m
Γ(m+1)
Γ(f(x)+1)Γ(m−f(x)+1)
Γ(n+α1+α2)
Γ(x+α1)Γ(n−x+α2)
Γ(m+n+α1+α2)
Γ(x+f(x)+α1)Γ(n−x+m−f(x)+α2)
where the max is taken over all integers x in the range [0, n].
Theorem 4.2 Let D be a data set, let ² > ln 3 and let m(d) = n(d) for each destina-
tion block d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Algorithm 3 with prior sample {−−→α(d)}d satisfies (², δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy if for each destination block d, the reference 0-sample
ρ
(
n(d),m(d),min
i
(α(d)i), |α(d)| −min
i
(α(d)i), e
² − 1
)
is at most δ(e² − 2)/(2ke²).
We next present Algorithm 4 that given ² and δ returns a prior sample
such that Algorithm 3 satisfies privacy. The following observations guide our
choice of the prior sample. First, while any {−−→α(d)}d that satisfies Theorem 4.2
is sufficient for privacy, we would like to pick the one that ensures the max-
imum utility. Second, since the privacy criterion depends only on mini α(d)i
(for a given prior sample size) we always choose a uniform prior sample; i.e,
∀d,∀i, α(d)i = |α(d)|/k. Third, we observe that when
−−→
α(d) is uniform, increas-
ing |α(d)| (which is the same as increasing each α(d)i) decreases the probability
of a privacy breach. Intuitively, increasing the prior sample size introduces more
noise into each block, and thus ensures more privacy. Therefore, the simple bi-
nary search algorithm presented in Algorithm 4 returns a uniform prior sample
{−−→α(d)}d with the smallest prior sample size that guarantees privacy.
In general, we found that the prior sample size required for ²-differential
privacy was orders of magnitude larger that the prior sample size required for
(², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy. Table 4.1 illustrates this difference; we
show the α(d)i per block required for ²-differential privacy (from Theorem 4.1)
153
Algorithm 4: Choose Prior Sample
Input: ², δ, k, ∀d, |n(d)| (|m(d)| = |n(d)|)
Set err = 0.0001.
for all destination blocks d do
// Upper bound definitely guarantees privacy.
Set α(d)ub =
m(d)
e²−1 , and δub = 0
// Lower bound is an infinitesimally small number; does not guarantee privacy.
Set α(d)lb = η.
Set α(d)mid = (α(d)lb + α(d)ub)/2.
Set δmid = ρ(|n(d)|, |m(d)|, α(d)mid, (k − 1)α(d)mid, e² − 1)× 2ke²e²−2 .
while δmid > δ OR δ − δmid > err do
if δmid > δ then
// Probability of breach too high. Increase αmid.
α(d)lb = α(d)mid.
else
// Probability of breach too low. Decrease αmid.
α(d)ub = α(d)mid.
end if
Set α(d)mid = (α(d)lb + α(d)ub)/2.
Set δmid = ρ(|n(d)|, |m(d)|, α(d)mid, (k − 1)α(d)mid, e² − 1)× 2ke²e²−2 .
end while
Set for all i ∈ [1, k], α(d)i = α(d)mid.
end for
Return: {−−→α(d)}d
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Table 4.1: Noise required per block (α(d)i) to ensure privacy of Algo-
rithm 3.
Privacy Definition ² = 5 ² = 10 ² = 20 ² = 50
²-differential privacy 25 × 104 11 × 104 5.2 × 104 2 × 104
(², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy
(δ = 10−6)
17.5 5.5 2.16 0.74
and (², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy (returned by Algorithm 4), respec-
tively, for n = m = 106 individuals and a domain size of 104 blocks. For
(², δ)-probabilistic differential privacythe amount of noise (the prior sample) is
very small compared to the data and its influence on the output reduces as the
amount of real data grows. Thus with probabilistic differential privacy we sat-
isfy the intuition that synthetic data generation (Algorithm 3) can achieve pri-
vacy with little noise (as discussed at the beginning of Section 4.4.1).
Before we describe the utility of our synthetic data generator (Section 4.5),
we prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof. of Theorem 4.2
Let
−−→
n(d) be the histogram of origins for destination d in dataset D. Let A de-
note Algorithm 3 with
−−→
α(d) as the prior sample for destination d. Let S be a
synthetically generated output with histogram of origins
−−−→
m(d) for destination d.
The first step in the privacy analysis is identifying the disclosure set,
Disc(D, ²). As illustrated in the beginning of this section, the worst disclosure
for ²-differential privacy occurs when the output synthetic data,
−−−→
m(d), was un-
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representative of the input data, D =
−−→
n(d). We characterize the disclosure set in
terms of the following representativeness metric:
Definition 4.8 (γ-Rep) Let S be the synthetic data generated by Algorithm 3 on input
D. Let
−−−→
m(d),
−−→
n(d) and
−−→
α(d) be the histogram for destination d in S, D and the prior
sample, respectively. We define S ∈ γ-Rep(D) (γ > 1) if
∀i, ∀D, m(d)i ≤ γ(α(d)i + [n(d)i − 1]+)
where, [y]+ = max(y, 0).
We can show that if ² = ln(γ+1), the disclosure set consists only of outputs that
are not representative; i.e.,
Disc(D, ²) ∩ γ-Rep(D) = ∅ (4.3)
Let D and D′ differ in the origin of one tuple t with destination d. Let t com-
mute from origin block i in D and from origin block j in D′. If
−−→
n(d)′ denote
the histograms of tuples with destination d in D′, then n(d)i = n(d)′i − 1 and
n(d)j = n(d)
′
j + 1. Recall from the proof of Theorem 4.1,
P (A(D) = S)
P (A(D′) = S) =
m(d)i + n(d)i + α(d)i − 1
n(d)i + α(d)i − 1
n(d)j + α(d)j
m(d)j + n(d)j + α(d)j
≤ m(d)i
n(d)i + α(d)i − 1 + 1
≤ γ + 1 = e² if S ∈ γ-Rep(D) and ² = ln(γ + 1)
This means that bounding the probability of unrepresentative outputs by δ
implicitly bounds the probability of the disclosure set. That is, we can guarantee
(², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy if for every input D, the probability of the
outputs that are not in γ-Rep(D) is bounded by δ.
∀D,P (S 6∈ γ-Rep(D)) ≤ δ
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We first consider D with k = 2 and a single destination; i.e., D = (n1, n2),
prior sample is (α1, α2), and the synthetic data is (m1,m2). The set of all outputs
is {(0,m), (1,m− 1), . . . , (m, 0)}. An output is unrepresentative if
m1 ≥ γ(n1 + α1) or m2 ≥ γ(n2 + α2)
Let SγD be the output such that m1 = γ(n1+α1) if n1 < n2, or m2 = γ(n2+α2),
otherwise. Let Sγ+D denote the set of all outputs with m1 ≥ γ(n1 + α1) if n1 < n2
(m2 ≥ γ(n2 + α2), if n1 ≤ n2). Intuitively, SγD is the output that is just unrepre-
sentative, and Sγ+D is the set of outputs that are unrepresentative4. As an output
S becomes more and more unrepresentative, the probability that S is generated
decreases. Hence, we can bound the probability of the unrepresentative outputs
in terms of the probability of SγD (Lemma 4.1).
P (A(D) ∈ Sγ+D ) =
2(γ + 1)
γ − 1 P (A(D) = S
γ
D) (4.4)
Next, note that by definition, the reference 0-sample is the maximum probability
of SγD, over all D = (x, n− x), x ∈ [0, n]. Hence, we can bound the probability of
SγD by the reference 0-sample. Let αmin = min(α1, α2) and |α| = α1 + α2.
max
D
P (A(D) = SγD) ≤ ρ(n,m, αmin, |α| − αmin, e² − 1) (4.5)
Combining Equations 4.4 and 4.5, we derive the following condition for (², δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy when k = 2.
A satisfies (², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, if
2e²
e²−2ρ(n,m, αmin, |α| − αmin, e² − 1) ≤ δ (4.6)
In order to extend this analysis to larger k (i.e., k > 2), note that there is no
longer only a single output that is just unrepresentative. For instance, for k = 4
4This follows from our assumption that e² > 3.
157
and n = m = 10, if D = (3, 3, 2, 2) and −→α = (1, 1, 1, 1), then all of the following
outputs are just unrepresentative for γ = 2.
{8, 2, 0, 0}, {8, 0, 2, 0}, {8, 0, 0, 2}
{8, 1, 1, 0}, {8, 1, 0, 1}, {8, 0, 1, 1}
{2, 8, 0, 0}, {0, 8, 2, 0}, {0, 8, 0, 2}
{1, 8, 1, 0}, {1, 8, 0, 1}, {0, 8, 1, 1}
and so on ...
Nevertheless, we can still use Equations 4.4 and 4.5 to bound the probability of
the unrepresentative outputs as shown below. Let Sbad be the set of unrepresen-
tative outputs; i.e.,
Sbad = {S | ∃i,mi ≥ γ(ni + αi)}
If Sbadj denotes the set of outputs such that mj ≥ γ(nj + αj), we have
Sbad =
⋃
j
Sbadj and P (A(D) ∈ Sbad) ≤
k∑
j=1
P (A(D) ∈ Sbadj ) (4.7)
Sbadj can be written as follows:
Sbadj =
m⋃
`=γ(nj+αj)
Sbadj,` where Sbadj,` = {S|mj = `} (4.8)
Now Sbadj,` is the set of outputs where ` synthetic individuals are drawn from
the jth block and m − ` individuals are drawn from the rest of the blocks. The
probability that Algorithm 3 outputs some S ∈ Sbadj,` is, in fact, the same as the
probability that Algorithm 3 (A′) with prior sample (αj, |α| − αj) outputs the
synthetic data S(2)` = (`,m−`) on input D(2) = (nj, n−nj). This property follows
from the definition of multinomial sampling with a Dirichlet prior. Therefore,
P (A(D) ∈ Sbadj,` ) = P (A′(D(2)) = S(2)` ) (4.9)
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Note that the {S(2)` | ` = γ(nj+αj), . . . ,m} is the same as Sγ+D(2) , the set of outputs
that are unrepresentative for D(2) for A′. Therefore, if αmin = minki=1 αi,
P (A(D) ∈ Sbadj ) ≤
m∑
`=γ(nj+αj)
P (A(D) ∈ Sbadj,` ) from Eq. 4.8
=
m∑
`=γ(nj+αj)
P (A′(D(2)) = S(2)` ) from Eq. 4.9
= P (A′(D(2)) ∈ Sγ+
D(2)
)
≤ 2(γ + 1)
γ − 1 P (A
′(D(2)) = Sγ
D(2)
) from Eq. 4.4
≤ 2(γ + 1)
γ − 1 ρ(n,m, αmin, |α| − αmin, e
² − 1) (4.10)
Combining Equations 4.7 and 4.10 and , we get
P (A(D) ∈ Sbad) ≤
k∑
j=1
P (A(D) ∈ Sbadj )
≤
k∑
j=1
2(γ + 1)
γ − 1 ρ(n,m, αmin, e
² − 1)
=
2ke²
e² − 2ρ(n,m, αmin, |α| − αmin, e
² − 1)
Thus we have derived the condition for (², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy
for arbitrary k.
A satisfies (², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, if
2ke²
e²−2ρ(n,m, αmin, |α| − αmin, e² − 1) ≤ δ (4.11)
Lemma 4.1 Let D be a dataset with a single destination and k = 2. Let (n1, n2)
(n1 < n2) represent the histogram of D. Let A be Algorithm 3 with prior sample
(α1, α2). Let S
γ
D be an output such that m1 = γ(n1 + α1) and m2 = m − m1, and
m = n. Let Sγ+D be the set of unrepresentative outputs with m1 ≥ γ(n1 + α1). Then
P (A(D) ∈ Sγ+D ) =
2(γ + 1)
γ − 1 P (A(D) = S
γ
D)
159
Proof. Consider two outputs S` = (`,m− `) and S`+1 = (`+1,m− `− 1). Then,
P (A(D) = S`+1)
P (A(D) = S`) =
`+ n1 + α1
`+ 1
m− `
m− `+ n2 + α2
=
(
1− n2 + α2
m− `+ n2 + α2
)/(
1− n1 + α1 − 1
`+ n1 + α1
)
(4.12)
For every S` ∈ Sγ+D , ` ≥ γ(n1 + α1) and m − ` ≤ (n2 + α2). Hence, from Equa-
tion 4.12,
P (A(D) = S`+1)
P (A(D) = S`) ≤
(
1− 1
2
)/(
1− 1
γ + 1
)
= ϕ (4.13)
We can complete the proof using Equation 4.13.
P (A(D) ∈ Sγ+D )
=
m∑
`=γ(n1+α1)
P (A(D)S`)
= P (A(D)SγD)
1 + m∑
`=γ(n1+α1)+1
P (A(D) = S`)
P (A(D) = SγD)

≤ P (A(D) = SγD)
(
1 + ϕ+ ϕ2 + . . .+ ϕm−γ(n1+α1)
)
≤ P (A(D) = SγD)
(
1 + ϕ+ ϕ2 + . . .
)
= P (A(D) = SγD)
(
1
1− ϕ
)
≤ P (A(D) = SγD)
(
1
1
2
− 1
γ+1
)
=
2(γ + 1)
γ − 1 P (A(D) = S
γ
D) (4.14)
4.5 Revising the Algorithm
In this section we discuss several problems with the utility of Algorithm 3 and
refine Algorithm 3 to make it produce more useful synthetic data. The first
problem is that the resulting data may be very unrepresentative of the original
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data (and therefore useless). For example, it is possible (albeit with very small
probability) that in the synthetic data, all the workers commuting to New York
city come from Boston (or worse, from San Francisco) even though this is not
the case in the original data. The second problem is that with a large domain,
the total amount of noise required to guarantee privacy (from Algorithm 4) may
swamp most of the signal. These issues are not unique to the Algorithm 3 and
our mapping application, but also to existing techniques (like [58] and [105]).
We show how to ameliorate these effects by employing the probabilistic differ-
ential privacy as the privacy criterion. In Section 4.5.1 we will discuss when to
throw away unrepresentative synthetic data, and in Section 4.5.2 we will discuss
how to effectively shrink the size of the domain.
4.5.1 Accept/Reject
Randomized synthetic data generation algorithms produce unrepresentative
outputs with small probability. Although rare, these events cause problems for
data analysis. A simple technique to avoid unrepresentative outputs, which we
call the accept/reject method, is to choose a “representativeness” metric and re-
run the algorithm until we get an output which is representative of the input. If
the algorithm generates an unrepresentative output with a probability at most
p, then the expected number of steps before the accept/reject algorithm halts is
at most 1
1−p . However, special care must be taken to avoid privacy breaches.
Lemma 4.2 Let Good(D) be the set of outputs that are representative of D. If there
exists D1 and D2 that differ in only one entry and Good(D1) 6= Good(D2), then for
every ² > 1, Algorithm 3 combined with the accept/reject method does not satisfy ²-
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differential privacy.
Proof. Suppose D1 and D2 are two tables that differ in one entry such that
Good(D1) 6= Good(D2). Then, there exists an output S such that S ∈ Good(D1),
but S 6∈ Good(D2). That is, P (A(D2) = S) = 0. The required result follows:
P (A(D1)) = S
P (A(D2)) = S = ∞ ≥ ², ∀ finite ²
We illustrate the above lemma with an example. Intuitively, the number of
synthetically generated individuals in origin block i, m(d)i, should be propor-
tional to n(d)i + α(d)i. Hence, consider the following γ-representativeness metric
for a table D:
γ-Rep(D) = {S|∀i,∀d,m(d)i ≤ γ(α(d)i + [n(d)i − 1]+)}
where [y]+ is the non-negative part of y (i.e. [y]+ = max(y, 0)). In fact, we
showed in the proof of Theorem 4.2 that any output S which is in γ-Rep(D)
is not in Disc(D, ln(γ + 1)). Hence, one may expect that the synthetic data gen-
erator coupled with the accept/reject method that accepts only outputs in γ-
Rep(D) (denoted by Aa/r) guarantees ²-differential privacy, for ² = ln(γ + 1).
On the contrary, however, this algorithm violates differential privacy because
the probability P (Aa/r(D) = S) is no longer the same as P (A(D) = S). Con-
sider, a synthetic dataset S with m(d)i = γ(α(d)i + [n(d)i − 1]+), γ > 1. Let D′
be a table that differs from D in one entry such that n′(d)i = n(d)i − 1. Clearly,
S 6∈ γ-Rep(D′). Hence,
P (Aa/r(D) = S)
P (Aa/r(D′) = S) =∞
Despite this result, the accept/reject method is compatible with the (², δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy approach. Again, let p denote the probability
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that the synthetic data generator outputs a synthetic dataset S that is not rep-
resentative of the data (S /∈ γ-Rep(D)). We show, in Lemma 4.3, that the ac-
cept/reject algorithm guarantees privacy with probability at least (1− p) when
it only rejects synthetic datasets that does not belong to the set γ-Good, defined
as follows:
γ-Good(D) =
⋃
D′ : |D−D
′|≤1,
|D′−D|≤1
γ-Rep(D′)
Before we prove Lemma 4.3, we remark on the implications for utility when we
accept data from γ-Good(D). We can easily show that the counts in a good S
satisfy the following condition
S ∈ γ-Good(D) ⇒ ∀i, ∀d,m(d)i ≤ γ(n(d)i + 1 + α(d)i)
Lemma 4.3 Let Aa/r denote the synthetic data generator coupled with an accept/reject
method which discards S 6∈ γ-Good(D). If p is the maximum probability over all D
that the synthetic data is not in γ-Rep(D), then Aa/r guarantees (², p)-probabilistic
differential privacy, where ² = ln (γ+1)
1−p .
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that for every table D,
γ-Rep(D) ∩Disc(D, ln(γ + 1)) = ∅
Let δ(D) = P (S 6∈ γ-Rep(D)); by definition of p, δ(D) ≤ p. Then, for any
S ∈ γ-Rep(D),
| ln P (A
a/r(D) = S)
P (Aa/r(D′) = S) | = | ln
P (A(D) = S)
P (A(D′) = S) |+ | ln
1− δ(D)
1− δ(D′) | ≤ ln
(γ + 1)
1− p
Recall from the discussion of Lemma 4.2, that there is a breach of privacy for
synthetic data S when S ∈ γ-Good(D) and S /∈ γ-Good(D′), which happens
with a probability at most p.
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Theorem 4.3 Let A be a synthetic data generator that satisfies (², δ)-probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy. Let Aa/r denote the synthetic data generator coupled with an ac-
cept/reject method which discards S 6∈ γ-Good(D), such that ² = ln(γ+1). Then,Aa/r
guarantees (²′, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, where ²′ = ²− ln(1− δ).
Proof. Since A satisfies (², δ)-pdp,
P (A(D) ∈ Disc(D, ²)) ≤ δ
Since ² = ln(γ + 1), we already know that
γ-Rep(D) ∩Disc(D, ²) = ∅
Hence, we get
P (S ∈ γ-Rep(D)) ≤ δ
This coupled with Lemma 4.3 proves the required result.
4.5.2 Shrinking the Domain
For a randomized algorithm to satisfy differential privacy, or probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy, it must add noise to every origin block so that for every origin
block/destination block pair, there is a chance that the synthetic data will con-
tain a synthetic individual that commutes from that origin block to that destina-
tion block. On the contrary, if noise is not added to some origin block, privacy
can be breached as follows. Consider all the workers with jobs in a destination d
(say, in New York). Suppose the adversary knows the origins of all the workers
except one, and suppose the adversary knows that the last worker commutes
from either o1 (in Albany) or o2 (in Schenectady), and no other worker com-
mutes from o1 or o2. Now, if noise is added to o1, but not to o2, and the output
164
synthetic data contains at least one worker commuting from o2, then it is clear
that the last worker comes from o2 and not from o1, thus breaching his privacy.
For Algorithm 3 to maintain privacy guarantees, for each destination block
d, it needs to set a value c(d) so that α(d)i ≥ c(d) for all origin blocks i. Since
the data is sparse (i.e. the origin blocks for a destination block d are usually the
surrounding census blocks and also major metropolitan areas, rather than the
whole United States), most of this noise is concentrated in areas where there are
no commuters to destination block d. In fact, the amount of noise is the sum of
the α(d)i for all blocks i that have no commuters to d. Thus the data generator
may generate many strange fictitious commuting patterns.
To illustrate this point, let d be a block in Washington, D.C., and let n = m =
106. Let ² = ln(50) = 3.912. From Theorem 4.1, in order to satisfy ²-differential
privacy, c(d)diff = 106/(50 − 1) = 2.05 × 105. Remember that the total number
of Census blocks on the U.S. map is 8 million. Hence, in order to preserve the
privacy of a dataset with a million individuals, we are required to add 16 billion
fake individuals (i.e., the prior sample size |α(d)| = 16 × 109)! Such noise will
completely drown out all the signal.
Let δ = 10−6, and let us consider the situation with (², δ)-probabilistic differ-
ential privacy. In order to guarantee privacy, Algorithm 4 returns c(d)pdp = 0.74
fake individuals per block. Though c(d)pdp is much smaller than c(d)diff , it still
causes spurious commute patterns. Since there are 8 million blocks in total, the
total number of fake individuals (|α(d)|) added to the dataset is 8× 106× 0.74 ≈
6 × 106. These 6 millions fake individuals are uniformly distributed across all
the blocks; hence, about a million of them come from blocks on the West Coast.
That is, out of a total of 7 million points
(−−→
n(d) +
−−→
α(d)
)
, 1/7th of the population
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commute from the West Coast to Washington, D.C., for work! This spurious
commute pattern will be represented in the synthetic data, since on average the
synthetic data,
−−−→
m(d), closely mirrors
−−→
n(d) +
−−→
α(d).
One way to tackle this problem is to reduce the size of the origin block do-
main. This reduces the number of blocks with no commuters to d, thus reducing
the sum of α(d)i for such blocks. We propose two ways of handling this: coars-
ening the domain and probabilistically ignoring blocks.
To coarsen the domain, much like generalization, we partition the origin
blocks and merge the blocks within each partition. A partition must be chosen
with care because it can leak information about the data. One way to do this is
to cluster the data using a privacy-preserving clustering algorithm that is com-
patible with differential privacy, such as the k-means algorithm in the SULQ
framework [24]. However, it is hard to evaluate the quality of such a cluster-
ing. Despite metrics that measure the quality of a clustering, numbers do not
tell the whole story and an expert’s subjective judgment is often necessary. The
effect of the expert (the data publisher generating synthetic data) choosing from
multiple clustering on privacy is difficult to quantify and so it lies outside the
differential privacy framework.
For this reason, we suggest that the partition be selected from publicly avail-
able data. For our application this is possible because of a previous release of
similar data. Thus for a given destination block d we can coarsen the domain of
its origin blocks using this partition. To plot (on a map) the origin of a synthetic
individual, we first select the partition the individual is commuting from (as in
Algorithm 3), and then we choose a specific point inside this partition using a
density function derived from publicly available external data.
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Theorem 4.4 Let A be a randomized algorithm that satisfies ²-differential privacy, or
(², δ)-probabilistic differential privacy for our mapping application. If for each destina-
tion block d the domain of origin blocks is coarsened, then A satisfies the same privacy
criterion with the same parameters.
Proof. The first step where A generated synthetic data Scoarse in terms of the
coarsened blocks clearly satisfies the original privacy guarantee. Since the sec-
ond step generated synthetic data S from Scoarse and the external dataset, S does
not leak any more information than Scoarse.
Even after coarsening, the domain may still be large. We trade off privacy
versus the amount of noise added to regions with no commuters by probabilis-
tically ignoring blocks. We say that a block i is ignored by the synthetic data
generation algorithm if αi is set to 0 in Algorithm 3; i.e., none of the points in
the synthetic data having destination block = d will have origin block = i. Al-
gorithm 5 illustrates our approach. For a given destination block d, let fd be a
function that assigns to every origin block a number in the interval (0, 1] (note:
this function must not depend on the data). For each origin block i that does
not appear in the data (i.e., n(d)i = 0), we keep it in the domain with probability
fd(i) and ignore it with probability 1 − fd(i). Effectively, we are reducing the
size of the domain by throwing out origin blocks when creating synthetic data
for destination block d. Note that it is important to choose the vector
−−→
α(d) (in
particular, to determine the minimum value of any α(d)i) before shrinking the
domain (and for those i that do not belong to the domain, αi is set to 0). Algo-
rithm 3 is then run using this new domain and
−−→
α(d). We can quantify the loss in
privacy due to applying Algorithm 5 for each destination block d followed by
Algorithm 3 with the following theorem:
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Algorithm 5: Sample Domain
Input:
−−→
n(d), function fd : {1, . . . , k} → (0, 1]
Select
−−→
α(d) so that Theorem 4.2 is satisfied
New Domain= ∅
for i = 1..k do
if n(d)i > 0 then
New Domain=New Domain
⋃{i}
else
Let X be a binomial(fd(i)) random variable
if X == 1 then
New Domain=New Domain
⋃{i}
else
α(d)i = 0
end if
end if
end for
Return: New Domain
Theorem 4.5 Let A be a randomized algorithm that satisfied (², δ)-probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy. Let C be the randomized algorithm that chooses the domain of
origin blocks for each destination block d using Algorithm 5 and then applies A
on this new domain. Then C satisfies (²′, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy, where
²′ = ²+maxi ln(1/fd(i)) + maxidα(d)ie ln 2.
The interested reader is referred to Appendix A for the proof.
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4.6 Experiments
The goal of combining probabilistic differential privacy with synthetic data
generation was to develop a system that can be used for practical dis-
tribution of products from statistical agencies. In order to assess our
progress towards that goal, we applied Algorithms 3, 4 and 5 to public-
use data from the Census Bureau’s OnTheMap (OTM) microdata files
(http://lehdmap2.did.census.gov/themap/). The versions of those files that
are available for public use are themselves synthetic data. However, in our ex-
perimental evaluation we treat the Census Bureau’s released file as if it were the
ground truth. Thus we measure the privacy protection and the utility of our
experimental synthetic data against the “gold standard” of the OTM data.
Although much privacy research has focused on answering range queries
[13, 105, 129, 135], in contrast to this work, we decided to evaluate the quality of
the data using a measure for which we did not explicitly tune our anonymiza-
tion algorithm. We computed the average commute distance for each destina-
tion block and compared it to the ground truth from OnTheMap. Note that the
domain covers a two-dimensional surface since the average commute distance
is not a linear statistic.
For our data evaluation, we selected a subset of OTM Version 2 data such
that all destination workplaces are in Minnesota, yielding 1,495,415 distinct ori-
gin/destination block pairs (O/D pairs) which contain a commuter traveling
from the origin block to the destination block. Many of these O/D pairs are
singletons (i.e., they had only one commuter).
The actual partition of the United States into Census blocks comes from the
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Census 2000 Summary File5 1, which also contains information about the block
characteristics and population counts. 8,206,261 blocks cover the 50 United
States and the District of Columbia. We also used data from the previously pub-
lished Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP)6, which contains data
similar to the O/D pairs from OnTheMap, based on Census 2000. We used
CTPP to reduce the size of the domain for the origin blocks.
A preliminary data analysis using the CTPP data revealed that in Minnesota,
50% of all O/D work commutes were less than 6.23 miles, 75% less than 13.1
miles, and 90 percent less than 21.54 miles. Commutes longer than 200 miles
were beyond the 99th percentile; so we ignored all origin blocks that were over
200 miles from their destination (and we also suppressed such O/D pairs in the
data). As a result of this pruning, the maximum size of the domain of origin
blocks in the experiments is 233,726.
We selected the minimum α(d)i values using Theorem 4.2 with ² = 4.6 and
δ = 0.00001. Recall that ² represents the maximum allowed disclosure due to
the generation of synthetic data, and δ represented the maximum probability
of a breach of ²-privacy. We also used Algorithm 5 to shrink the domain and
the probability function fd that is used in Algorithm 5 was created based on the
CTPP data. The probability function fd was roughly proportional to the his-
togram of commute distances as determined by the CTPP data. The maximum
of the dα(d)ie was 1 and the minimum value of fd(i) was 0.0378. Thus the addi-
tional disclosure due to shrinking the domain was ln(1/0.0378) + ln 2 ≤ 4. The
overall ²′ for the procedure was 8.6 and disclosure probability δ was = 0.00001.
The results presented in this section are those of 120 blocks that are selected
5http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/sumfile1.html
6http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ctpp/
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uniformly at random, averaging 15 primary job holders per destination block.
For each block we computed the length of the average commute to that block,
and compared the corresponding average commute distances in the OTM data
to the synthetic data that we generated.
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Figure 4.1: Average commute distance in the synthetic data vs # primary
job holders (²′ = 8.6, δ = 10−5, k = 233, 726).
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Figure 4.2: Average commute distance in the synthetic data vs # primary
job holders (²′ = 8.6, δ = 10−5, k = 233, 726) for short com-
mutes.
In experiment 1, our privacy algorithm added an additional 419 primary job
holders to each destination with a minα(d)i of 0.01245. Figure 4.1 shows the
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relation between average commute distance as measured in OTM and in our
experimental data. Each point in the figure corresponds to a particular desti-
nation block. The x-axis is the number of people whose primary job is in the
destination block and the y-axis is the average commute distance to that desti-
nation block. It is clear that the experimental shape of fd and values of min fd
and minαi admitted too many distant synthetic workers. The synthetic data
overestimated the number of commuters with long commutes. This effect is
strongest when the destination block has few workers and diminishes as the
number of workers increases.
Figure 4.2 shows the same plot restricted to short commutes (i.e., those com-
mutes that are shorter than the 6.23 miles which is the median commute distance
in CTPP). Here the synthetic data better matches the ground truth. Note that the
synthetic data slightly underestimates the commute distances (as a result of the
fact that long commutes were overestimated, while the total number of com-
muters matched the ground truth). Again, the estimation error diminishes as
the number of workers in a destination block increases.
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Figure 4.3: Average commute distance in the synthetic data vs # primary
job holders (²′ = 8.6, δ = 10−5, k = 120, 690).
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Figure 4.4: Average commute distance in the synthetic data vs # primary
job holders (²′ = 8.6, δ = 10−5, k = 120, 690) for short com-
mutes.
To further limit the effect of domain size on the estimation of commute dis-
tances, in our second experiment we restricted the domain of the origin blocks to
be within 100 miles of the destination, keeping ² and δ values unchanged. Com-
mutes of more than 100 miles were still beyond the 99th percentile for CTPP. This
reduced the domain size to 120,690. The overall ² and δ values remained un-
changed. In this case, minα(d)i = 0.039764. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the results
for all distances and for short commutes, respectively. The tighter restriction
on the domain significantly enhanced data quality in the moderate commute
distances, did not diminish quality in the short distances, and reduced the bias
at all distances. We can see that the extremely long commutes are again over-
estimated, but the destination blocks with long average commutes have few
workers, so accurate estimates are not expected. This suggests that long com-
mutes should be modeled separately when creating synthetic data. We leave
this as an interesting avenue for future work.
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter we showed that, with a little work, theoretical privacy defini-
tions can be applied state-of-the-art ideas from statistical inference to create a
practical yet provably private application. One remaining challenge is handling
datasets with very sparse domains because noise must be spread throughout
the domain. We found that this is necessary to hide outliers; if insufficient noise
is added, an outlier appearing in the synthetic data is more likely due to a simi-
lar outlier in the real data than due to random noise. In our application we were
able to use exogenous data and other techniques to help reduce the domain size.
However, such data are not always available. Furthermore, even after reducing
the domain size, the data was still sparse; as a result, the addition of noise to
all parts of the reduced domain created many outliers. The distribution of com-
mute distances was reasonable only for the study of commutes that were not
extremely long.
We believe that judicious suppression and separate modeling of outliers may
be the key since we would not have to add noise to parts of the domain where
outliers are expected. For future work, we must consider methods for incor-
porating outlier identification, suppression, and modeling to the privacy and
utility guarantees for the mapping application.
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CHAPTER 5
RELATED WORK
Data privacy has been a focus of much research in the fields of computer science
and statistics. In this chapter, we provide an overview of representative work.
Most of the work can be broadly classified based on whether or not the data
collector is trusted. In Section 5.1, we first discuss the trusted data collector
scenario, the setting for all of the work presented in this dissertation. We then
discuss the untrusted data collector scenario in Section 5.2.
5.1 Trusted Data Collector
In many scenarios, individuals contributing to the data trust the data collector
to not breach their privacy. Examples of such data collectors are Census Bu-
reaus and hospitals. However, these data collectors wish to share data with po-
tentially untrusted third parties to engender research, and this poses a privacy
risk. Trusted data collectors use a variety of techniques to limit this privacy risk,
and these techniques can be broadly classified into four classes (each of these is
discussed in detail in the following sections):
• Access Control: Only authorized users are allowed to view portions of the
data based on an access control policy.
• Anonymous Data Publishing: An anonymous version of the data is pub-
lished for public use.
• Online Statistical Databases: An online database that answers aggregate
queries is exposed to the public.
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• Private Collaborative Computation: Two or more data collectors can crypto-
graphically share data for collaborative research in such a way that apart
from the result, no other information about their respective data is dis-
closed to the other data collector.
5.1.1 Access Control
The three main approaches to access control are discretionary access control
(DAC), mandatory access control (MAC), and role-based access control (RBAC). Dis-
cretionary access control allows owners of relations and views to grant and re-
voke authorizations to users [69]. Mandatory access control labels users and
parts of the relations (views, rows, columns or even cells) with security clear-
ances and security levels, respectively. Positive and negative authorizations
are then specified on (clearance, level) pairs [26, 87]. Role-based access control
groups users based on their roles [23]; a single user may have access to different
parts of the data based in two different roles.
Many techniques have been used to enforce access control policies. A com-
mon method, discussed in Chapter 2, is to allow or deny queries based on
whether a user is allowed to access information [23, 25, 109, 110]. Most of the
existing techniques only allow positive authorizations on views. Under positive
authorizations, a user u’s query Qu is allowed if and only if the query can be an-
swered using all the information that u is positive authorized to access. Rizvi
et al.’s [109] techniques for positive authorizations on views are based on query
equivalence [70]. Bertino et al. [23] proposed a solution when there are positive
authorizations on arbitrary views and negative authorizations on base relations.
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While Brodsky et al. [25] considered negative authorizations on arbitrary views,
they used a privacy metric that allows multiple user queries to leak information
about the negatively authorized views. Hence, their algorithms have the addi-
tional overhead of keeping track of the history of queries posed by a user.
Motro [98] presented a different technique for enforcing access control with
positive authorization on views. Queries that can be answered using the views
are answered correctly. However, if the query accesses unauthorized informa-
tion, the database returns a partial answer that is computed only from the autho-
rized views along with a description of the partial answer (for instance, “only
the prescriptions of patients in ward #1212 have been returned”).
Access control is also enforced using multilevel relational databases [87].
These databases allow users to read and write data, and use mandatory access
control at the granularity of individual cells; i.e., each cell is associated with a
security level. Rather than denying queries that do not satisfy the access control
policy, multilevel relations use a technique called polyinstantiation [73]. For in-
stance, suppose Dr. Drake’s salary can only be accessed by users with security
level high. The relation maintains two salary values with different security lev-
els – the correct value with security level high and a random number (or null)
with security level low. This ensures that only users with high security clearance
can access the correct salary of Dr. Drake.
While access control methods that grant negative authorizations strive to
disallow unauthorized disclosure, often sensitive information (defined by the
negative authorizations) can be indirectly inferred using covert inference chan-
nels [63]. Inference channels occur either due to database design (constraints
like functional and multivalue dependencies) [43, 120], or by using external in-
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formation or mining patterns (like correlations between attributes). These in-
ference channels are very much like the adversarial background knowledge in
anonymous data publishing. However, to the best of our knowledge, there has
been work only on modeling inference channels that are known to the system.
Ozsoyoglu and Su [120] proposed techniques to combat inference chan-
nels caused by functional and multivalue dependencies in multilevel relational
databases. The techniques involve changing the security levels (to higher levels)
of the least number of attributes. Dawson et al. [43] imposed constraints on the
function that assigns security levels to data values based on known constraints
in the database. For instance, if salary is determined by education qualifications,
and salary has a security level high, then education qualifications should also be
labeled high. Given such constraints and a lattice on security levels, Dawson et
al. proposed efficient algorithms to find the security labeling of the data that
satisfies the constraints while releasing the most information.
Perfect privacy [96] is the first step toward modeling unknown inference
channels (in the form of correlations between attributes). However, enforc-
ing perfect privacy for conjunctive queries is shown to be intractable. This
model has been extended to allow for arbitrary dependencies in the database
and views which have are already been published [47]. Checking perfect pri-
vacy in this setting is even harder. Allowing only queries which disclose no
information about the QS might be too restrictive. Dalvi et al. [42] presented a
less restrictive privacy guarantee based on asymptotic conditional probabilities.
Stoffel et al. [119] proposed certain answer privacy, yet another privacy guar-
antee, that disallows only those QV which disclose that some tuple is for sure in
the output of QS .
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Hippocratic databases [10] are a recently proposed design principle for
building database systems that regulate the sharing of private data with third
parties. Such a solution requires both the individuals who provide data and the
databases that collect it to specify privacy policies describing the purposes for
which the data can be used and the recipients, or third parties, who can access
parts of the data. The policies are specified using a policy specification lan-
guage like APPEL [60], which satisfies the P3P standard [61]. The recent focus
on specifying privacy policies based on purposes rather than identities or roles
requires new techniques for authentication beyond standard password based
techniques, coupled with legal enforcement. A Hippocratic database also needs
other functionality, like query rewriting for disclosure limitation [80], support
for data retention, and techniques for maintaining audit trails [9]. Snodgrass et
al. [118] proposed schemes for auditing the operations of a database such that
any tampering with the audit logs can be detected. Such a solution can guard
against the database’s manipulation of the audit logs, thus giving assurance of
eventual post-breach detection.
Finally, there has been work on publishing XML documents and ensuring ac-
cess control on these documents [95, 132]. Miklau et al. [95] used cryptographic
techniques to ensure that only authorized users can access the published docu-
ment. Yang et al. [132] proposed publishing partial documents that hide sensi-
tive data in the presence of known constraints in the XML schema.
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5.1.2 Anonymous Data Publishing
Statistical agencies, especially those related to the Census, have studied the
problem of data privacy for the past half a century. The Census Bureau collects
information about individuals, and provides researchers with access to public-
use microdata (PUMS). The Census uses a variety of sanitization techniques to
ensure privacy and utility of the published data. Hence, there is a huge amount
of research on anonymization algorithms, privacy metrics, and techniques to
use these anonymized datasets. While many of the proposed techniques in this
literature guarantee utility of the anonymous data, very little is known about
their privacy properties.
Historically, the main focus of the Census literature has been to limit the abil-
ity of an attacker to re-identify individuals from the anonymized data. Hence,
techniques in this literature attempt to identify and protect the privacy of sen-
sitive entries in contingency tables ([37, 38, 39, 52, 53, 64, 117]). A contingency
table TAC of a relation T is a table of counts that represents the complete cross-
classification of T over all its attributes A = A1, . . . , Ak. That is, the contin-
gency table TC has one cell for every value i ∈ dom(A1) × . . . × dom(Ak), and
records the number of times i appears in the table in cell TC [i] (equivalently, SE-
LECT COUNT(*) GROUP BY A1, . . . , Am). The contingency table TA
′
C is called a
marginal of T if it cross-classifies only the attributes in A′ = Ai1 , . . . , Aij (equiva-
lently, SELECT COUNT(*) GROUP BY Ai1 , . . . , Aij ). A nonzero cell value in the
contingency table is considered sensitive if it is smaller than a fixed threshold
k, which is usually chosen in an ad-hoc manner. An alternate approach is to
determine a safety range or a protection interval for each cell [51], and to publish
only those marginals which ensure that the feasibility intervals (i.e. upper and
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lower bounds on the values a cell may take) contain the protection intervals for
all cell entries.
Cell suppression [36, 37] is one of the earliest techniques proposed to protect
the privacy of sensitive cells, where cells with low counts are simply deleted.
Due to data dependencies caused by marginal totals that may have been previ-
ously published, additional related cell counts may also need to be suppressed.
On the other hand, generalization techniques, described in Chapter 3, group cells
with small counts in the contingency table such that the new contingency ta-
ble has cells with counts either 0 or at least k. This is the k-anonymity tech-
nique. All information about the distribution of the cells within each group is
lost. Many techniques have been proposed for efficiently creating k-anonymous
tables. Samarati et al. [114] proposed a binary search technique, for computing
a k-anonymous table using full-domain generalization techniques. Bayardo et
al. [18] modeled k-anonymization as an optimization problem between privacy
and utility, and proposed an algorithm similar to a frequent itemset mining
algorithm [11]. LeFevre et al. [81, 82] extended the approach of full-domain
generalization and proposed an algorithm for returning all valid k-anonymous
tables, again using techniques similar to frequent itemset mining. The problem
of k-anonymization has been shown to be NP -hard [94], and approximation
algorithms for producing k-anonymous tables have been proposed [7].
Clustering techniques have been proposed to protect sensitive cells. Microag-
gregation techniques group low count cells, and publish the centroid of each
group [93]. Aggarwal et al. [6] proposed the condensation technique that clus-
ters data in T using a distance metric on the domain (dom(A1)× . . .× dom(Ak))
and then publishes averages and variances for each cluster.
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Recent research in the statistics community has focused on generating syn-
thetic microdata. Data swapping, the simplest of the synthetic data generation
techniques, involves moving data entries from one cell in the contingency ta-
ble to another so that the table remains consistent with a set of published
marginals [41, 48, 56]. Newer techniques for partial and fully synthetic pop-
ulations [3, 106, 111] preserve statistical properties of the original data using re-
sampling and multiple-imputation techniques [112]. While much research has
focused on deriving the variance and confidence intervals for various estima-
tors from synthetic data [102, 106], with the exception of Reiter [107], there has
been little research on deriving formal guarantees of privacy for such an ap-
proach. In Chapter 4 we studied the privacy properties of one such technique
and adapted it to meet formal privacy guarantees.
Chawla et al. [29] proposed a formal definition of privacy for published data,
based on the notion of blending in a crowd, to protect against re-identification
attacks. Here privacy of an individual is said to be protected if an adversary
cannot isolate a record having attributes similar (according to a suitably cho-
sen distance metric) to those of a given individual without being sufficiently
similar to several other individuals; these other individuals are the crowd. The
authors proposed perturbation and histogram-based techniques for data sani-
tization prior to publication. This formal notion of privacy presents a theoret-
ical framework for studying the privacy-utility trade-offs of the proposed data
sanitization techniques. However, due to the heavy reliance on an inter-tuple
distance measure of privacy, the proposed definition of privacy fails to capture
scenarios where identification of even a single sensitive attribute may constitute
a privacy breach.
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While re-identification is an important attack on anonymous data, ad-
versaries can learn sensitive information about individuals even without re-
identifying them in the data. Such disclosure has been called attribute disclosure
in the Census literature [57]. `-Diversity [89, 91], presented in Chapter 3, is a
formal privacy definition that not only protects against attribute disclosure, but
also guarantees privacy when adversaries have unknown background knowl-
edge. However, as pointed out in Section 3.7, `-diversity does not guarantee
privacy in all adversarial settings; subsequent work has extended `-diversity to
handle set valued [130] and numeric [84] sensitive attributes, more powerful
adversaries [32, 92], and to incorporate prior knowledge about the distribution
of the sensitive attribute [85]. We briefly describe these below.
`-Diversity assumes that in the input table every individual is represented
by a unique tuple, and that each individual is associated with a single cate-
gorical attribute. Hence, `-diversity would not apply if there were semantic
relations between different values of the sensitive attribute. For instance, con-
sider a group in an anonymized table where the diseases dyspepsia (s1), gas-
troenteritis (s2) and ulcer (s3) appear in equal proportions. While this satisfies
3-diversity, it discloses the information that an individual in the that group has
a stomach related disease. Semantically, we can extend semantic (c, `)-diversity
(Definition 3.12) to prevent such disclosures by also considering predicates like
eq(X[S], s1 ∨ s2 ∨ s3) as sensitive. Xiao et al. [130] proposed a syntactic defini-
tion and efficient algorithms that limit such disclosures. Li et al. [84] extended
`-diversity to handle numeric attributes by considering ranges as sensitive val-
ues. While both the above papers correctly recognize that semantic information
about the sensitive attribute makes more kinds of information sensitive, they
fail to recognize that adversaries can possess more powerful kinds of knowl-
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edge. For instance, in the former case, an adversary may also know negation
statements of the form “Bruce does not have a stomach related disease”. In the lat-
ter case, negation statements of the form “Bruce’s salary is not $100,000” is not
very informative; it is more reasonable to consider inequality statements like
“Bruce’s salary is greater than $100,000”, or “Bruce’s salary is between $100,000 and
$150,000”.
Talking about more expressive forms of background knowledge, Martin
et al. [92] proposed a formal study of adversarial background knowledge.
They consider adversaries whose background knowledge can be represented
as propositional formulas over literals of the form X[S] = s, where X is an indi-
vidual in the population and s ∈ S is a value in the domain of the sensitive at-
tribute. Such background knowledge can not only express negation statements
(like those in `-diversity) but also implications of the form “If Bruce has the flu,
then his spouse Ivy also has the flu”. In fact, Martin et al. showed that any propo-
sitional formula is equivalent to a conjunction of implication statements; hence,
they measured the power of an adversary in terms of the number of implica-
tion statements the adversary knows. They showed that checking whether a
generalized table guarantees privacy given an arbitrary set of k implications is
intractable. Nevertheless, the worst case k implications had a special structure,
and this allows for efficiently checking for privacy under unknown adversar-
ial knowledge. Chen et al. [32] extended this work by considering adversaries
who know the correct sensitive information of k individuals, ` negation state-
ments and m implication statements. Both these pieces of work do not change
either the sensitive information specification or the measure of disclosure used
in `-diversity; they considered categorical attributes and positive disclosures.
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Li et. al [85] proposed t-closeness, a syntactic privacy metric that attempts to
extend `-diversity by measuring privacy breaches as a distance between the ad-
versary’s posterior distribution and his prior distribution. t-Closeness requires
that in a generalized table, the distribution of the sensitive attribute in every
group of tuples that share the same quasi-identifier value should be close to the
distribution of the sensitive attribute in the whole table.
Apart from proving privacy properties of generalization techniques, recent
research has also focussed on generating synthetic data with provable privacy
guarantees [17, 90, 105]. Barak et al. [17] proposed a solution to publish
marginals of a contingency table. Publishing a set of noise infused marginals is
not satisfactory; such marginals may not be consistent, i.e., there may not exist a
contingency table that satisfies all these marginal contingency tables. Barak et al.
solved this problem by adding noise to a small number of Fourier coefficients;
any set of Fourier coefficients correspond to a (fractional and possibly negative)
contingency table. They showed that only a “small” number of Fourier coeffi-
cients are required to generate the required marginals, and hence only a small
amount of noise (proportional to the size of the marginal domain) is required.
In order to create non-negative and integral marginals, the authors employed a
linear program solution (in time polynomial in the size of multidimensional do-
main) to generate the final non-negative integral set of noise infused marginals.
The synthetic contingency tables thus generated were shown to satisfy differ-
ential privacy and guarantee that the L-1 distance between the counts of the
original and the synthetic contingency table is bounded with high probability.
However, the quality bound and the running time of the linear program are pro-
portional to the size of the domain, rather than the size of the data; hence this
technique may not be suited for sparse data.
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Rastogi et al. [105] proposed the αβ algorithm for synthetically generating
databases. Given an database instance I that is a subset of the domain of all
tuples D, the αβ algorithm creates a randomized database V by retaining tuples
in I with probability α + β and adding tuples in D − I with probability β. This
algorithm satisfies (d, γ)-privacy (described in Section 4.2). The authors also
show that for aggregate queries Q : 2D → R, Q(I) can be estimated as:
Qˆ(I) = (Q(V )− βQ(D))/α (5.1)
where Q(V ) and Q(D) are the answers to the query Q on the randomized
database V and the full domain D, respectively. Qˆ(I) is shown to provably
approximate Q(I) with high probability.
While much research has focussed on publishing a single anonymized mi-
crodata table, as described in Chapter 4, these tables may not preserve enough
useful information about the original data. Aggarwal [5] showed that for sparse
high-dimensional data (with a large number of attributes), even a weak condi-
tion like k-anonymity dramatically reduces the utility of the data. Hence, mul-
tiple anonymous version of the data may need to be published. However, it
has been shown that checking whether a set of generalizations is private can be
#P -hard; even learning from multiple generalizations can be intractable [86].
Kifer et al. [77] proposed a technique to publish multiple generalizations of the
original data in such a way that there are efficient algorithms for both checking
for privacy (k-anonymity or `-diversity) and utilizing these multiple tables. Yao
et al. [133] analyzed the privacy of releasing multiple SQL views.
Finally, all of the above work assumes that a static snapshot of the data is
published; there has been very little work that considers updates on the origi-
nal data. There is a privacy risk in sequential releases of the same data, since
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adversaries can link information about indiv iduals across the releases. Xiao et
al. [131] proposed efficient techniques to sequentially release tables after a batch
of insert and delete operations.
5.1.3 Statistical Databases
The third scenario in the trusted data collector model is hosting a query answer-
ing service. This is addressed by the statistical database literature. In this model,
the database answers only aggregate queries (COUNT, SUM, AVG, MIN, MAX)
over a specified subset of the tuples in the database. The goal of a statistical
database is to answer the queries in such a way that there are no positive or
negative disclosures. Techniques for statistical database query answering can
be broadly classified into three categories – query restriction, query auditing,
data and output perturbation. Though the literature proposes a large number
of techniques for ensuring privacy, only a few of the techniques provably guar-
antee privacy. Adam et al. [4] provide an excellent literature survey of early
techniques. In this section we describe three approaches to statistical databases
– query restriction, query auditing, and output perturbation.
Query restriction techniques ensure that privacy is not breached by specify-
ing that a set of queries should not be answered. Legal queries are answered
truthfully. These techniques focus on the case where a query specifies an aggre-
gate function and a set of tuples C that are aggregated. The query set size control
technique [64, 116] answers only those queries that access at least |C| ≥ k and at
most |C| ≤ L− k tuples. Here k is a parameter and L is the size of the database.
However, it was shown that snooping tools called trackers [46] can be used to
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learn values of sensitive attributes. The query set overlap control technique [50]
disallows queries which have a large intersection with previous queries.
Query auditing in statistical databases has been studied in detail. The query
monitoring approach [50, 33] is an online version of the problem where the
(t+ 1)th query is answered or denied depending on the first t queries that have
been asked. The decision is only based on the queries and not on the answers
to those queries. Pure SUM queries and pure MAX queries can be audited ef-
ficiently but the mixed SUM/MAX problem is NP -hard. In the offline auditing
problem [33, 34], the queries are presented all at once and the problem is to
choose the maximum number of queries that can be answered. Kleinberg et al.
[78] considered auditing SUM queries over boolean attributes and shows that
it is co-NP hard to decide whether a set of queries uniquely determines one of
the data elements. Kenthapadi et al. [76] studied the problem of simulatable au-
diting. This is a variant of the query monitoring approach where the decision to
allow a query can depend on the answers to the previous queries as well. The
main challenge in this model is that if a query answer is denied, information
could be disclosed. Hence, the solutions proposed are such that any decision
(to allow or deny a query) that is made by the database can also be simulated
by the adversary.
Output perturbation techniques evaluate the query on the original data but
return a perturbed version of the answer. Techniques here include returning an-
swers to aggregate queries over a sample of the database [45], rounding off the
answers to a multiple of a prespecified base b [40], and adding random noise
to the outputs [21]. More recently, Dinur et al. [49] proved that in order to
protect against an adversary who is allowed to ask arbitrarily many queries to
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a database, the random noise added to the answers should be at least Ω(
√
n),
n being the number of tuples in the database. On the positive side, they also
showed a technique that provably protects against a bounded adversary who is
allowed to ask only T (n) ≥ polylog(n) queries by using additive perturbation of
the magnitude O˜(
√T (n)). Building on this result, Blum et al. [24] propose the
SULQ framework that answers upto a sub-linear number of aggregate queries
by adding Laplacian noise while guaranteeing differential privacy [58]. The
amount of noise added to each query S depends on the sensitivity of Q. For an
aggregate query that outputs a single real number, the sensitivity of Q, is the
smallest number S(Q), such that for any two databases D1 and D2 that differ in
one record, |Q(D1)−Q(D2)| ≤ S(Q). In order to guarantee ²-differential privacy,
it is sufficient add noise drawn from a Laplacian distribution with parameter
S(Q)/²; i.e., more the sensitivity, more the noise. This technique is useful when
the amount of noise added is small; i.e., when the Q has low sensitivity. Exam-
ples of queries with low sensitivity are histograms, linear aggregation queries
and nearest-neighbour queries.
5.1.4 Private Collaborative Computation
In private collaborative computation there are n parties, each holding a secret in-
put xi, who want to collaboratively compute a function f(x1, . . . , xn) such that
(i) all the parties get the correct answer, and (ii) no information about the se-
cret inputs is disclosed beyond whatever can be inferred from the output of the
computation. For instance, the n = 2 parties could be the Department of Home-
land Security of the United States (DHS) and an airline company (FlyUSA), their
secret inputs are the list of purported terrorist names (xDHS) and the list of pas-
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sengers on an aircraft (xFlyUSA), and the function is the intersection of these two
lists (f(xDHS, xFlyUSA) = xDHS ∩ xFlyUSA).
Private collaborative computation can be solved using secure multiparty
computation techniques that are popular in the cryptography literature [28, 67,
101]. Most of the early work focused on building solutions for general functions
by representing any function as a boolean circuit. In such general solutions,
cryptographic protocols were used to simulate the computation of every gate in
the boolean circuit description of the function. Hence, general solutions are per-
ceived to be communication inefficient (of the order of the square of the number
of parties involved for each gate in the boolean circuit being evaluated).
More recently, there has been much research proposing more efficient solu-
tions to secure multiparty computations for specific functions. Du [54] proposed
efficient protocols for various specific (secure) two-party computations prob-
lems. The commodity server model [19, 20] has been used for privately com-
puting the scalar product of two vectors [55]. In the commodity server model,
the two (or more) parties involved in the multiparty computation protocol em-
ploy the services of an untrusted third party to provide some randomness [19]
or to help with some computation [55]. It is assumed that this untrusted third
party does not collude with the players involved in the multiparty computation.
Agrawal et al. [8] employed commutative encryption techniques for infor-
mation sharing across private database. Their techniques can be used to cal-
culate the intersection and equijoin of two databases while disclosing only the
sizes of the two databases. Clifton et al. [35] described methods to implement
basic operations like secure sum, secure set union, secure set intersection, and
secure scalar product using both encryption and additive randomization. These
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primitives are used in various application scenarios to build multiparty proto-
cols for private EM clustering, private association rule mining in horizontally
partitioned data [74], and private association rule mining in vertically parti-
tioned data [123].
One drawback which permeates the above literature is that there is no clear
characterization of how much information is disclosed by the output of the pro-
tocol about the sensitive inputs.
5.2 Untrusted Data Collector
Randomization methods have been historically used to elicit accurate answers
to surveys of sensitive yes/no questions. Respondents may be reluctant to
answer such questions truthfully when the data collector (surveyor) is un-
trusted. Warner’s classical paper on randomized response [125] proposed a simple
technique, where each individual X independently randomized the answer as
follows: X answers truthfully with probability pX , and lies with probability
(1− pX). Randomized response intuitively ensures privacy since no individual
reports the true value. However, Warner did not formalize this intuition.
More recently, Agrawal et al. [12] proposed adding independent random
noise to numeric data to help individuals mask their sensitive information while
enabling data collectors to build good decision trees on the perturbed data.
However, Kargupta et al. [75] showed that adding independent zero mean ran-
dom noise does not necessarily preserve privacy. The techniques provided in
the paper exploit spectral properties of random matrices to remove the noise, re-
cover the original data, and thus the data collector could breach privacy. Huang
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et al. [71] showed that the correlation between attributes is the key factor behind
the attacks proposed in [75]. The paper proposes two techniques based on Prin-
ciple Component Analysis (PCA) and the Bayes Estimate (BE) to reconstruct the
original data from the randomized data.
Subsequent work [14, 62] generalized the randomized response technique to
other domains. Evfimievski et al. [62] studied the problem where individuals
share itemsets (e.g., a set of movies rented) with an untrusted server (e.g., an
online movie rental company) in return for services (e.g., movie recommenda-
tions), and were the first to propose a formal privacy analysis of randomized
response techniques using a semantic privacy definition called (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy.
They invented a provably private randomization technique where users sub-
mit independently randomized itemsets to the server. They also proposed data
reconstruction algorithms to help the server mine association rules from these
randomized itemsets, and experimentally illustrated the accuracy of the recon-
struction techniques.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This dissertation addresses conceptual and practical issues in combating the
privacy risk arising from the dissemination of personal information. Privacy,
though a much debated concept, does not have a unique definition. In addi-
tion, the privacy risk from information disclosure must be modeled differently
in different settings. One also needs practical algorithms to enforce these var-
ied metrics of privacy. This dissertation presents formal privacy definitions and
practical algorithms that can help data collectors to disseminate personal infor-
mation while mitigating the privacy risk in various settings.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
In Chapter 2, we considered the setting where any disclosure of sensitive in-
formation is considered a breach of privacy. We adopted an existing privacy
definition, called perfect privacy [96], to help decide whether answering a con-
junctive query on a relational database leads to any disclosure of sensitive in-
formation (defined by another conjunctive query). This problem is known to
be intractable; we proposed practical and efficient algorithms for a large set of
subclasses of conjunctive queries.
In Chapter 3, we considered the problem of publishing “anonymous” aggre-
gate information about populations of individuals while preserving the privacy
of individual-specific information. Extant techniques publish information by
ensuring that each individual is k-anonymous, or hidden in a crowd of k similar
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individuals. Using simple attacks we illustrated that guaranteeing anonymity
alone does not sufficiently eliminate the privacy risk from data publication;
first, adversaries can discover sensitive information if all the similar individ-
uals have the same sensitive information, and second, adversaries usually have
background knowledge, and k-anonymity does not guarantee privacy against
such adversaries.
This dissertation initiated a formal study of privacy definitions for data pub-
lishing. We presented a novel formal definition, `-diversity, that ensures di-
versity of sensitive information, guards against adversaries with limited back-
ground knowledge, and allows practical algorithms for data publishing that
release useful information.
It is well known that different settings need different definitions of the pri-
vacy risk arising from information disclosure. Since we proposed `-diversity
[89], many newer privacy metrics have been proposed. However, there is
neither a mandate on the how to define privacy for new applications, nor a
means to compare the plethora of privacy metrics in literature. We presented
a novel framework for privacy definitions that, for the first time, distinguishes
between semantic and syntactic privacy definitions. While syntactic privacy
metrics can be efficiently enforced, semantic definitions explicit state their as-
sumptions about the data and the sensitive information, the adversary’s back-
ground knowledge and the measure of disclosure, and thus, lay a common
ground across different definitions. We believe that our framework will aid
develop formal privacy definitions for newer applications. We urge that, in the
future, privacy metrics must be proven equivalent to a semantic definition to
help evaluate their strengths and weaknesses.
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In Chapter 4, we analyzed the privacy of a real Census data publishing ap-
plication. We presented the derivation of our techniques as a case study of
anonymizing data with provable privacy guarantees. We identified that the
data in our target application was sparse, and that none of the existing data
publishing solutions are tailored to anonymize sparse data. We proposed pri-
vacy definitions and efficient algorithms to for this application.
6.2 Future Directions
Personal data is being increasingly collected on the Web. According to a very
recent study [104], an estimated 8-10 GB of professional and user generated
content is published on the web every day. There is still an estimated 3 TB of
untapped private content generated per day in the form of emails, instant mes-
sages, browsing histories, user-click data, search logs, social networks, etc. If ex-
ploited, these new types of data can result in fascinating new applications and
improved user experience on the Web. Harnessing this wealth of private data
would require novel privacy-aware web-scale data management techniques,
highlighting the increasing importance of privacy research.
There are a number of challenges arising from deploying privacy solutions
to the Web. These include overcoming some of the challenges presented in this
work, as well as, new techniques to incentivize users to specify their privacy
preferences and to handle distributed data sharing. Below we discuss a few
avenues for future work.
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Distributed Data Anonymization
Web companies collect immense amounts of data everyday. This data is usually
stored in geographically distinct locations. Hence, in order to extend the practi-
cal solutions presented in this work to the Web, one needs to study the locality
properties of these algorithms so that they can be deployed on geographically
distributed datasets.
A Suite of Provably Private Privacy-Aware Techniques
A variety of data analyses are performed on data collected on the Web. Rather
than designing different privacy-aware algorithms for different uses of private
data, it might be worthwhile to build a suite of primitive privacy-aware algo-
rithms that can be composed together to satisfy the needs of various applica-
tions. Whether privacy definitions and algorithms are composable while retain-
ing their privacy properties is an open question.
Moreover, new types of data need new privacy definitions. For instance,
in traditional scenarios, adversaries are passive and restricted to existing in-
criminating information about the individual being attacked. However, newer
applications allow adversaries to actively gather information by creating new
friends in the social network, or rating new movies, etc. Characterizing such
adversaries and their knowledge is a very interesting challenge.
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Learning from Anonymized Views
Much current research has focused on publishing a single anonymized view of
the data in a format similar to the original unanonymized data, so that existing
analysis techniques can be directly applied to the anonymized data. Recent
work has shown that the utility of the anonymized data can be improved by
publishing multiple anonymous views of the data. New algorithms must be
designed to manage and use these multiple views. Inference algorithms exist if
the views are either SQL views, or marginal distributions of the original data.
However, for the case of synthetic data generation, where the anonymized data
is a random sample from a distribution, and for the case of output perturbation,
where noise is added to the outputs of a set of prespecified queries, no general
solutions exist.
Solving the above problem requires a formal study of learning from
anonymized views. We would need to (a) propose a language for express-
ing these anonymized views, (b) explore and characterize the properties of the
views that allow efficient learning, and (c) develop a suite of general purpose
algorithms that can efficiently answer typical database queries and perform sta-
tistical analyses on the original data using the anonymized views.
Eliciting Privacy Preferences from Users
Though a system for sharing private data may guarantee utility and satisfy
mathematical privacy definitions, it may not be adopted by users unless the pri-
vacy guarantees can be easily translated into user preferences. For instance, con-
sider a system like del.icio.us that lets users tag web pages, and allows them to
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share their tags with friends in an underlying social network. Suppose George
tags http://www.abc.xyz as ‘junk’. George can either share this tag with Tony,
in which case Tony knows for sure that George tagged the page as ‘junk’, or not
share this tag, in which case Tony has no information whether George tagged
the above page. However, this sharing is binary, and George has no way to
allow his tags to be anonymously shared with Tony.
In tomorrow’s web applications, simple binary notions of sharing will not
suffice. We already have technology that supports sharing with provable guar-
antees of partial disclosure. Unfortunately, we do not know how to elicit from
users their preferences for the allowable limits on disclosure. Removing this
barrier is very important to facilitate the adoption of these new applications.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.5
Let B denote the set of all Census blocks on the map. Below we recall the al-
gorithm for probabilistically dropping blocks given a particular destination d.
Without loss of generality, we ignore the dependence on d in the rest of the
proof1.
1. Set m = n (i.e., number of synthetic workers commuting to destination d
is equal to the number of workers in the input data commuting to destina-
tion d).
2. Choose minimum αi using Algorithm 4 based on the original domain B.
3. Let f(i) be a probability distribution over all the blocks in B.
4. InitializeBnew to be the set of origin blocks that appear in the input dataset.
5. For every origin block i that does not appear in the input data, add it to
Bnew with probability f(i) to get the new domain.
Let n1 and n2 be two different input datasets that differ in one tuple, say
corresponding to Bruce. In either input dataset, Bruce commutes to the same
destination block d but from different origin blocks. Let the origin in the first
case be a and the origin in the second case be b. There are three cases: (i) a is
an origin for d for some tuple in n2 and b is an origin for d for some tuple in n1
(a ∈ n2 ∧ b ∈ n1), (ii) a ∈ n2 ∧ b /∈ n1 (the case a /∈ n2 ∧ b ∈ n1 is the same), and
(iii) a /∈ n2 ∧ b /∈ n1.
1In collaboration with Daniel Kifer.
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Case 1: a ∈ n2 ∧ b ∈ n1
We’ll use the random variable D to denote the set blocks that were probabilisti-
cally added. In this case, P (D|n1) = P (D|n2) so
P (m|n1, α)
P (m|n1, α) =
∑
D
P (m|n1, D, α)P (D|n1)∑
D
P (m|n2, d, α)P (D|n2)
Now, this is a weighted sum (with weights summing to one) of the terms
P (m|n1, D, α)P (D|n1)
P (m|n2, D, α)P (D|n2) =
P (m|n1, D, α)
P (m|n2, D, α)
=
n1b
n1a − 1
ma + n
1
a − 1 + αa
mb + n1b + αb
=
P (m|n1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α) < e
²
We let the disclosure set for our data be the events
⋃
D
⋃
m{D ∧mi > (e²−1)(ni+
αi)}; i.e., each event corresponds to a chosen domain D and an unrepresentative
output with mi > (e² − 1)(ni + αi). The reference 0-sample is independent of
the domain size. Hence, if it is less than δ(e² − 2)/(2|B|e²) then for all fixed
domain sizes ≤ |B|, the disclosure set has probability < δ. Thus the disclosure
probability is
P (
⋃
D
⋃
m
{D ∧ mi > (e² − 1)(ni + αi)})
=
∑
D
P (
⋃
m
{D ∧ mi > (e² − 1)(ni + αi)})
=
∑
D
P (
⋃
m
{D ∧ mi > (e² − 1)(ni + αi)}|D)P (D)
≤ δP (D) ≤ δ
After removing the “bad” samples m, the maximum value for the ratio of the
probabilities P (m|n1, α) and P (m|n2, α) is e². Taking logs and absolute values,
we find that we have with probability at least 1 − δ the maximum information
leakage is ².
211
Case 2: a ∈ n2 ∧ b /∈ n1
So a ∈ n1, n2 and b ∈ n2. There are two subcases depending on whether or not
b ∈ m (i.e., b appears in the output).
Subcase 2a, b ∈ m:
In this case, b is a block that is certainly added to the domain in the case of n1.
P (m|n1, α)
P (m|n2, α) =
∑
D
P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)∑
D
P (m|n2, D, α)P (D|n2)
where the summations are over all D not containing b. (Note that for such D,
P (D ∪ b|n1) = f(b)P (D|n2)). Again, we have a weighted average of terms (with
weights summing to 1)
P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)
P (m|n2, D, α)P (D|n2) =
P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, D, α)
=
P (m|n1, B, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, B, α)
(because n1∪D∪b has the same domain as n2∪D). As in case 1, the bad outputs
m have probability less that δ, and the ratio here is ≤ e²f(b). To compute the
inverse of the ratio, we have P (m|n
2,α)
P (m|n1,α) is a weighted sum of terms
P (m|n2,B,α)
P (m|n1,B,α)f(b) .
Hence, the ratio is less then e²/f(b). Taking logs we see that we need to add
ln(1/f(b)) to our ².
Subcase 2b, b /∈ m
In this case n2b = 1, n
1
b = 0.
P (m|n1, α)
P (m|n2, α) =
∑
D
[P (m|n1, D, α)P (D|n1) + P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)]∑
D
P (m|n2, D, α)P (D|n2)
where the summation is over D not containing b. This is a weighted average of
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terms (note P (D ∪ b|n1) = f(b)P (D|n2) and P (D|n1) = (1− f(b))P (D|n2))
P (m|n1, D, α)P (D|n1) + P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)
P (m|n2, D, α)P (D|n2)
=
P (m|n1, D, α)(1− f(b)) + P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, D, α)
=
P (m|n1, D, α)(1− f(b))
P (m|n2, D, α) +
P (m|n1, B, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, B, α)
=
P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α) P (m|n1,D,α)
P (m|n1,D∪b,α)(1− f(b))
P (m|n2, D, α) +
P (m|n1, B, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, B, α)
=
P (m|n1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α)
(
f(b) + (1− f(b)) P (m|n
1, D, α)
P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)
)
=
m!∏
imi!
Γ(n1+α)
Γ(n1a+αa)
∏
i6=a,b
Γ(n1i+αi)
Γ(n1a+ma+αa)
∏
i6=a,b
Γ(n1i+mi+αi)
Γ(n1+m+α)
m!∏
imi!
Γ(n1+α+αb)
Γ(n1a+αa)Γ(αb)
∏
i6=a,b
Γ(n1i+αi)
Γ(n1a+ma+αa)Γ(αb)
∏
i6=a,b
Γ(n1i+mi+αi)
Γ(n1+m+α+αb)
C(1− f(b))
+Cf(b)
where C =
P (m|n1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α)
= C
(
f(b) + (1− f(b)) Γ(n
1 + α)
Γ(n1 + α+ αb)
· Γ(n
1 +m+ α+ αb)
n1 +m+ α
)
≤ C
(
f(b) + (1− f(b)) Γ(n
1 + α)
Γ(n1 + α+ dαbe) ·
Γ(n1 +m+ α+ dαbe)
n1 +m+ α
)
= C
(
f(b) + (1− f(b))(n+m+ α)× · · · × (n+m+ α+ dαbe − 1)
(n+ α)× · · · × (n+ α+ dαbe − 1)
)
≤ P (m|n
1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α)
(
f(b) + (1− f(b))
(
1 +
m
n+ α
)dαbe)
≤ P (m|n
1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α)
(
2dαbe
)
Taking the logarithm, we see that we have to add ln(2dmaxαbe) to our ².
The high confidence result holds as usual. The inverse of the ration, namely,
P (m|n2,α)
P (m|n1,α) , is a weighted sum of terms
C−1
f(b) + (1− f(b)) Γ(n1+α)
Γ(n1+α+αb)
· Γ(n1+m+α+αb)
n1+m+α
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The above fraction is less that e². Therefore, taking into account Cases 1 and 2,
we have to add maxb
[
ln(1/f(b), ln(2dmaxαbe)
]
to our ².
Case 3: a /∈ n2 ∧ b /∈ n1
Here we have 3 subcases: (a) a, b ∈ m, (b) a ∈ m, b /∈ m (a /∈ m, b ∈ m is the
same), and (c) a /∈ m, b /∈ m.
Subcase 3a: a, b ∈ m
P (m|n1, α)
P (m|n2, α) =
∑
D
P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)∑
D
P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)P (D ∪ a|n2)
where the summations are over all D not containing a and b. (Note that for such
D, f(a)P (D ∪ b|n1) = f(b)P (D ∪ a|n2)). Again, we have a weighted average of
terms (with weights summing to 1)
P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)
P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)P (D ∪ a|n2) =
P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)f(a)
=
P (m|n1, B, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, B, α)f(a)
(because n1∪D∪b has the same domain as n2∪D∪a). So for this we have to add
to our ² the value maxa,b ln(f(b)/f(a)). The bad mi still have < δ chance of occur-
ring, so taking into account Cases 1 and 2, adding maxb
[
ln(1/f(b), ln(2dmaxαbe)
]
to our ² gives a worst case bound on disclosure.
Subcase 3b: a ∈ m, b /∈ m
In this case we have
P (m|n1, α)
P (m|n2, α) =
∑
D
[P (m|n1, D, α)P (D|n1) + P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)]∑
D
P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)P (D ∪ a|n2)
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where the summations are over the D that don’t contain a and b. Noting that
f(a)P (D|n1) = (1− f(b))P (D ∪ a|n2) and f(a)P (D ∪ b|n1) = f(b)P (d∪ a|n2), we
see that we have a weighted average (with weights summing to 1) of the terms:
P (m|n1, D, α)P (D|n1) + P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)
P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)P (D ∪ a|n2)
=
P (m|n1, D, α)(1− f(b)) + P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)f(a)
=
P (m|n1, D, α)(1− f(b))
P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)f(a) +
P (m|n1, B, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, B, α)f(a)
=
P (m|n1, D ∪ b) P (m|n1,D,α)
P (m|n1,D∪b)(1− f(b))
P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)f(a) +
P (m|n1, B, α)f(b)
P (m|n2, B, α)
=
P (m|n1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α)f(a)
(
f(b) + (1− f(b)) P (m|n
1, D, α)
P (m|n1, D ∪ b)
)
=
m!∏
imi!
Γ(n1+α)
Γ(n1a+αa)
∏
i6=a,b
Γ(n1i+αi)
Γ(n1a+ma+αa)
∏
i6=a,b
Γ(n1i+mi+αi)
Γ(n1+m+α)
m!∏
imi!
Γ(n1+α+αb)
Γ(n1a+αa)Γ(αb)
∏
i6=a,b
Γ(n1i+αi)
Γ(n1a+ma+αa)Γ(αb)
∏
i6=a,b
Γ(n1i+mi+αi)
Γ(n1+m+α+αb)
C
1− f(b)
f(a)
+C
f(b)
f(a)
where C =
P (m|n1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α)
=
C
f(a)
(
f(b) + (1− f(b)) Γ(n
1 + α)
Γ(n1 + α + αb)
· Γ(n
1 +m+ α+ αb)
n1 +m+ α
)
≤ C
f(a)
(
f(b) + (1− f(b)) Γ(n
1 + α)
Γ(n1 + α + dαbe) ·
Γ(n1 +m+ α+ dαbe)
n1 +m+ α
)
=
C
f(a)
(
f(b) + (1− f(b))(n+m+ α)× · · · × (n+m+ α+ dαbe − 1)
(n+ α)× · · · × (n+ α+ dαbe − 1)
)
≤ P (m|n
1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α)f(a)
(
f(b) + (1− f(b))
(
1 +
m
n+ α
)dαbe)
≤ P (m|n
1, B, α)
P (m|n2, B, α)
(
2dαbe
)
/f(a)
So we now have to add maxb ln(1/f(b))+ln(2dmaxαbe) to our ². To compute the
inverse fraction, as in Case 2b, we get the upper bound of f(a)/C which is less
than e². So after all cases examined so far, adding maxb ln(1/f(b)) + ln(2dmaxαbe)
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to our ² is sufficient to bound the worst case disclosure.
Subcase 3c: a /∈ m, b /∈ m
In this case we have
P (m|n1, α)
P (m|n2, α) =
∑
D
[P (m|n1, D, α)P (D|n1) + P (m|n1, D ∪ b, α)P (D ∪ b|n1)]∑
D
[P (m|n2, D ∪ a, α)P (D ∪ a|n2) + P (m|n2, D, α)P (D|n2)]
where the summations are over the D that don’t contain a and b. If we remove
the second term in the denominator, we increase the fraction and we get the
same computations as in Case 2b. If we remove the first term on the numerator,
we get the same computations as in the part of Case 2b where the inverse is
considered.
Thus in all cases, the bad sets have probability less than δ if we add
maxb ln(1/f(b)) + ln(2
dmaxαbe) to our ².
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